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A BSTRACT

With the advent of the internet of things (IoT) era and the extensive deployment of smart devices
and wireless sensor networks (WSNs), interactions of humans and machine data are everywhere. In
numerous applications, humans are essential parts in the decision making process, where they may
either serve as information sources or act as the final decision makers. For various tasks including
detection and classification of targets, detection of outliers, generation of surveillance patterns
and interactions between entities, seamless integration of the human and the machine expertise is
required where they simultaneously work within the same modeling environment to understand and
solve problems. Efficient fusion of information from both human and sensor sources is expected to
improve system performance and enhance situational awareness. Such human-machine inference
networks seek to build an interactive human-machine symbiosis by merging the best of the human
with the best of the machine and to achieve higher performance than either humans or machines
by themselves.
In this dissertation, we consider that people often have a number of biases and rely on heuristics
when exposed to different kinds of uncertainties, e.g., limited information versus unreliable information. We develop novel theoretical frameworks for collaborative decision making in complex
environments when the observers may include both humans and physics-based sensors. We address fundamental concerns such as uncertainties, cognitive biases in human decision making and
derive human decision rules in binary decision making. We model the decision-making by generic
humans working in complex networked environments that feature uncertainties, and develop new
approaches and frameworks facilitating collaborative human decision making and cognitive multimodal fusion.
The first part of this dissertation exploits the behavioral economics concept Prospect Theory
to study the behavior of human binary decision making under cognitive biases. Several decision
making systems involving humans’ participation are discussed, and we show the impact of human

cognitive biases on the decision making performance. We analyze how heterogeneity could affect
the performance of collaborative human decision making in the presence of complex correlation
relationships among the behavior of humans and design the human selection strategy at the population level. Next, we employ Prospect Theory to model the rationality of humans and accurately
characterize their behaviors in answering binary questions. We design a weighted majority voting rule to solve classification problems via crowdsourcing while considering that the crowd may
include some spammers. We also propose a novel sequential task ordering algorithm to improve
system performance for classification in crowdsourcing composed of unreliable human workers.
In the second part of the dissertation, we study the behavior of cognitive memory limited humans in binary decision making and develop efficient approaches to help memory constrained
humans make better decisions. We show that the order in which information is presented to the
humans impacts their decision making performance. Next, we consider the selfish behavior of
humans and construct a unified incentive mechanism for IoT based inference systems while addressing the selfish concerns of the participants. We derive the optimal amount of energy that
a selfish sensor involved in the signal detection task must spend in order to maximize a certain
utility function, in the presence of buyers who value the result of signal detection carried out by
the sensor. Finally, we design a human-machine collaboration framework that blends both machine
observations and human expertise to solve binary hypothesis testing problems semi-autonomously.
In networks featuring human-machine teaming/collaboration, it is critical to coordinate and
synthesize the operations of the humans and machines (e.g., robots and physical sensors). Machine
measurements affect human behaviors, actions, and decisions. Human behavior defines the optimal
decision-making algorithm for human-machine networks. In today’s era of artificial intelligence,
we not only aim to exploit augmented human-machine intelligence to ensure accurate decision
making; but also expand intelligent systems so as to assist and improve such intelligence.
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C HAPTER 1

I NTRODUCTION

Information fusion with observations from multiple sensors in various decision making and control
systems has been explored quite extensively in the literature [142,143,147]. Deployment of sensors
of multiple modalities, such as RF, radar, infrared, acoustics and optical, in a sensing unit or on a
sensing platform is expected to yield better inference, prediction and decision making by observing
the same phenomenon of interest from different diverse sensors. The main goal of this dissertation
is to establish a framework to capture the attributes specific to human-based sources of information
so that information from both the physical sensors and humans can be employed for inference.
By employing a human-in-the-loop methodology, we believe that this decision making paradigm
involving augmented human machine intelligence breaks new grounds and pushes the boundaries
of signal processing, decision making, and data fusion.

1.1

Motivation

The modeling of decision-making and control systems that include human agents has become
an important research area in terms of the design and analysis of complex autonomous systems
including military surveillance, smart cities, the internet of things, and healthcare. In these critical environments and situations, decision-making must be very accurate. Incorporating human

2
cognitive strengths and expertise in addition to machine-made observations is often imperative to
improve decision quality and enhance situational awareness (SA). For instance, in electronic warfare (EW) systems, the detection of an adversary radar is required before designing appropriate
countermeasures. In such scenarios where the course and success of the campaign depends on a
small detail being observed or missed, automatic sensor-only decision making may not be sufficient and it is necessary to incorporate human(s) in the loop of decision making, command and
control.
Let us consider a distributed detection problem consisting of a number of local decision makers and a fusion center (FC). In decision making systems composed of physical sensors/machines1 ,
the optimal decision rules for both the local decision makers and the FC in different contexts have
been derived in the signal processing literature in centralized as well as distributed settings (see,
for e.g., [18, 68, 142, 143]). In these systems, perfect rationality of the decision maker is assumed,
i.e., among the alternative actions i ∈ I producing utility ui , decision makers always choose the alternative that maximizes the utility i∗ = arg maxi∈I ui . In contrast to the rational decision making
systems where the agents in the decision making process are only electronic devices or machines,
human decision making is fundamentally different due to the bounded rationality of humans. There
are two aspects characterizing the inherent imperfections of human decision making and reasoning
process: i) humans might not know the entire action space or the complete set of alternatives, and
ii) the utility of choosing a particular alternative might not be correctly perceived. The concept
of bounded rationality recognizes that there are cognitive biases, limited thinking capacity, lack of
available information, time constraints, etc., in human decision making. Hence, human agents may
not always make the best decision. Using conventional decision theory to model decision making
systems that include human agents is, therefore, not appropriate. To capture attributes specific
to human based-sources of information and to enable high accuracy decisions, it is desirable to
develop efficient techniques and frameworks to analyze and utilize human data.
1

The terms ‘sensors’ and ‘machines’ are used interchangeably throughout the dissertation.

3

1.2

Background

Modeling and analysis of human decision behavior has been investigated by several authors for
different applications in the behavioral economics literature. Simon proposed a ‘satisfying’ point
as a more accurate model to characterize human decision making, where instead of finding a
global optimal solution, humans keep searching the action space until a satisfactory solution is
found [125]. This approach was adopted in the area of spectrum access and self-configuring wireless networks, where a generalized satisfaction equilibrium rather than a Nash equilibrium, was
established [43, 52]. Another approach proposed in [92] suggests that humans, instead of always
selecting the alternative that maximizes the utility, employ a probabilistic decision rule such that
“better options are chosen more often”. Along this direction, stochastic decision models, such as
random utility models and a logic choice framework, were established in [85]. In [5], the authors
considered that the humans adjust their decisions towards higher utilities and characterized the
steady state distribution of decisions over the long run.
The problem of distributed detection where humans act as local decision makers has been studied in different contexts. For example, the quantization of priors in hypothesis testing was analyzed
to model the fact that humans make categorical observations [117]. The authors in [144] developed
a Bayesian hierarchical structure to characterize human behavior of decision fusion at individual
level, group level and population level. The performance of collaborative human decision making
was analyzed when each individual is assumed to make local decisions by comparing the observations to a random threshold [152, 153]. By utilizing crowd wisdom, crowdsourcing has become an
efficient paradigm to solve problems that are easy for humans but hard for machines, e.g., handwriting recognition, image labeling and voice transcription. Different methods were proposed for
aggregation of the local decisions by considering the unreliability and uncertainty of the human
crowd workers [47,87]. Moreover, since humans are selfish who request incentives to be motivated
to perform the sensing tasks, the authors in [17, 22, 38, 71, 75] have incorporated game theory into
the design of efficient incentive mechanisms.
Another line of work on human decision making is the consideration of cognitive biases of

4
human agents in the decision making process. It is well known in the psychology literature that
cognitive biases and uncertainties can be found in the human judging and decision making processes at individual and group levels [55, 67]. The significance of cognitive psychology has been
demonstrated by its ability to outperform machine learning methodologies when predicting people’s choice behavior [44]. Among these biases are people’s distorted representations of outcomes
and probabilities, which are accurately captured by the Nobel prize winning Prospect Theory
(PT) [67]. In the signal processing literature, PT has been employed to study human behavior
in wireless communication and spectrum sensing. For instance, a secondary wireless operator’s
spectrum investment problem was studied in [155] where the operator decides its spectrum sensing and leasing amounts to maximize its profit under Prospect Theory. In [80], the authors studied
a random access game where players follow the principles of Prospect Theory to adjust their transmission probabilities over a random access channel under throughput rewards, delay penalties and
energy costs. Recently, there have been a few works that incorporate PT into hypothesis testing
to model human decision making. In the Bayesian framework, the authors in [100] exploited PT
to analyze the behavior of optimists and pessimists of different types. The optimality of the likelihood ratio test (LRT) was investigated in PT based hypothesis testing in [51]. In this work, the
authors showed that the LRT may or may not be optimal for behavioral decision makers in terms
of Neyman-Pearson and/or Bayesian criterion.

1.3

General Architecture

While humans have important roles in decision making, machines/sensors alleviate human workload in numerous applications. Sensors can be deployed in hazardous and dangerous workplaces
for monitoring and gathering intelligence. This is not only because of the associated risks for
humans but also because sensors are efficient in acquiring tedious raw data and processing information that are beyond humans’ capabilities. Human-machine interaction has expanded from
desktop office applications to include many aspects in everyday life such as education, commerce,
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traffic control, healthcare and so on. As shown in Fig. 1.1, we depict a typical human-machine
collaboration network, where the subjective opinions of humans and the objective measurements
of machines are aggregated for decision fusion. In the networks that involve human-machine collaboration, it is important to coordinate and synthesize the operations of both parties. On one hand,
the measurements taken by the physical sensors affect the behavior, actions and decisions of the
humans. For instance, considering that humans are influenced by the starting point observations
or initial beliefs, the authors in [98] studied the problem of selection, ordering and presentation
of data to a human to solve detection problems under the Bayesian framework. On the other
hand, the behavior of humans also determines the optimal decision making algorithm design in
the human-machine networks. To maximize system performance, efficient implementations of the
human-machine network should be designed in a holistic manner based on the appropriate modeling of human behavior.

Fig. 1.1: Human machine collaboration network
The focus of this dissertation is to understand and model decision making of generic behavioral
humans in complex networked environments under uncertainties. By exploring cognitive psychology theories and behavioral economic principles, we conduct extensive analysis on the following
aspects: the modeling of decision making of cognitively limited and biased humans at the individual level, decision fusion of collaborative human decisions, mechanism design to address the
participatory and selfish concerns of the human users in IoT systems, and adaptation strategies for
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cognitive human-machine teams for optimized performance.

1.4

Outline and Contributions

This rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we study prospect theoretic
utility based human decision making and its impact on the decision making performance in multiagent systems. In Chapter 3, we employ a psychologically accurate description of human behavior
in crowdsourcing environments and develop the optimal rule for aggregating the responses from
human workers. In Chapter 4, we present a new paradigm for classification in crowdsourcing systems in which binary questions (micro-tasks) are asked in a sequential manner. Cognitive memory
constrained human decision making based on multi-source information is investigated in Chapter
5. In Chapter 6, a unified IoT based inference system for signal detection while addressing the
participatory concerns of the users is developed. In Chapter 7, a semi-autonomous human machine
collaboration system is proposed to suitably distribute the tasks and workload to be performed by
humans and machines in binary decision making. We conclude this dissertation in Chapter 8. The
main contributions of each chapter are as below.
Chapter 2 studies human decision making via a utility based approach in a binary hypothesis
testing framework that includes the consideration of individual behavioral disparity. We proceed
with utility based approaches, i.e., people make decisions by selecting the choice with larger expected utilities, to obtain closed form solutions for the optimal decision rule that maximizes the
perceived utility of humans under Prospect Theory. Next, to capture the unreliable nature of human decision making behavior, we model the decision threshold of a human as a Gaussian random
variable, whose mean is determined by his/her cognitive bias, and the variance represents the uncertainty of the agent while making a decision. We also consider the scenario where decision
making humans are a part of networked human-machine teams. Finally, we derive the FC’s decision rule for collaborative human decision making composed of independent and correlated local
decision makers.
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In Chapter 3, we consider the M -ary classification problem via crowdsourcing, where crowd
workers respond to simple binary questions and the answers are aggregated via decision fusion.
The workers have a reject option to skip answering a question when they do not have the expertise,
or when the confidence of answering that question correctly is low. We further consider that there
are spammers in the crowd who respond to the questions with random guesses. Under the payment mechanism that encourages the reject option, we study the behavior of honest workers and
spammers, whose objectives are to maximize their monetary rewards. To accurately characterize
human behavioral aspects, we employ Prospect Theory to model the rationality of the crowd workers. Moreover, we employ a weighted majority voting decision rule, where we assign an optimal
weight for every worker to maximize the system performance.
Chapter 4 presents a novel sequential paradigm for classification in crowdsourcing systems.
Considering that workers are unreliable and they perform the tests with errors, we study the construction of decision trees so as to minimize the probability of mis-classification. By exploiting the
connection between the probability of mis-classification and entropy at each level of the decision
tree, we propose two algorithms for decision tree design. Furthermore, the worker assignment
problem is studied when workers can be assigned to different tests of the decision tree to provide
a trade-off between classification cost and resulting error performance.
In Chapter 5, we study how humans make decisions based on internal and external sources
of information under cognitive memory limitations. Due to the constrained capacity of working
memory, humans are known to perform cognitive tasks and update their beliefs in a sequential
manner rather than in parallel. In a Bayesian hypothesis testing framework, we derive the metrics
for performance evaluation and comparison when the humans use different ordering of information
for processing and to update their beliefs. We show that an optimized order of information sources
can help a cognitive memory limited human make better decisions. Simulations based on the
proposed human decision making model are presented to corroborate the theoretical results.
Chapter 6 studies the problem of a sensor performing inference tasks based on utility theory
where the objective is to derive the optimal resource usage amount that maximizes a profit-cost
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based utility function. Furthermore, to enable the concept of sensing as a service in the context
of IoT systems, we present a market based paradigm where there is a “buyer” interested in buying
the inference result from the sensor. We jointly optimize the resource usage policy and payment
negotiation strategy for the sensor so as to maximize the expected profit. Optimal payment negotiation is analyzed in two situations, namely, when the sensor spends a fixed amount of resource
as well as when the sensor could vary the amount of resource consumption to maximize profit. It
is shown that in the presence of the buyer, the optimal amount of resource consumption increases
and hence, the inference accuracy improves. Finally, we present some discussion on how energy
efficiency affects the behavior of energy consumption in realistic environments.
In Chapter 7, we investigate a human-machine collaboration framework for binary decision
making and ask questions, when should we request human participation and how much performance improvement can be attained by adding human expertise? Next, the optimal observation
region that needs human participation is generalized by considering human factors such as limited attention duration and participation costs. Moreover, a correlation structure is proposed to
model the dependency between the machine’s observation and the human expertise. It is shown
that the amount of correlation plays an important role in guiding the design of the human-machine
collaboration system. When multiple human agents of diverse expertise levels are recruited to further improve the detection accuracy, the asymptotic performance of the decision making system is
derived.
In Chapter 8, we conclude the findings and results of this dissertation, and discuss several
directions and ideas for future work.

1.5

Bibliographic Note

Most of the research work appearing in this dissertation has been published at various venues and
has appeared in the publications listed below.

9
Work Included in the Dissertation
Journal Papers:
• B. Geng, C. Quan and P. K. Varshney, “Human Machine Collaboration for Semi-autonomous
Binary Decision Making", to be submitted to as a journal paper.
• B. Geng, Q. Li, and P. K. Varshney, “Utility Theory Based Optimal Resource Consumption
for Inference In IoT Systems", IEEE Internet of Things (IoT) Journal, 2021.
• B. Geng, X. Cheng, S. Brahma, D. Kellen and P. K. Varshney, “Collaborative Human Decision Making with Heterogeneous Agents", IEEE Transactions on Computational Social
Systems, 2021.
• B. Geng, S. Brahma, T, Wimalajeewa, P. K. Varshney, and M. Rangaswamy, “Prospect Theoretic Utility Based Human Decision Making in Multi-agent Systems", IEEE Transactions
on Signal Process, vol. 68, pp. 1091– 1104, 2020.
• B. Geng, Q. Li, and P. K. Varshney, “Prospect Theory based Crowdsourcing for Classification in the Presence of Spammers", IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 68, pp.
4083–4093, 2020.
Conference Papers:
• B. Geng, C. Quan and P. K. Varshney, “Cognitive Memory Constrained Human Decision
Making based on Multisource Information", IEEE International Conference on Acoustics,
Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP) , 2021.
• B. Geng, P. K. Varshney, and M. Rangaswamy, “On Amelioration of Human Cognitive Biases in Binary Decision Making", IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing (GlobalSIP),, 2019.
• B. Geng, Q. Li and P. K. Varshney, “Decision Tree Design for Classification in Crowdsourcing Systems", 52nd Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers, 2018.

10
Work not Included in the Dissertation
Journal Papers:
• X. Cheng, B. Geng, P. Khanduri, B. Chen, and P. K. Varshney, “Joint Collaboration and
Compression Design for Random Signal Detection in Wireless Sensor Networks", submitted
to IEEE Signal Processing Letters, 2021.
• J. Wang, T. Grant, S. Velipasalar, B. Geng, and L. Hirshfield, “Taking a Deeper Look at the
Brain: Predicting Visual Perceptual and Working Memory Load from High-Density fNIRS
Data", submitted to IEEE Journal of Biomedical and Health Informatics, 2021.
• C. Quan, A. Yadav, B. Geng, P. K. Varshney, and H. V. Poor, “A Novel Spectrally Efficient
Uplink Hybrid-domain NOMA System", IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 24, pp. 26092613, 2020.
• N. Cao, S. Brahma, B. Geng, and P. K. Varshney, “Optimal Auction Design with Quantized
Bids for Target Tracking via Crowdsensing", IEEE Transactions on Computational Social
Systems, vol. 6, no. 5, pp. 847–857, 2019.
Conference Papers:
• C. Quan, B. Geng and P. K. Varshney, “Establishing the Nash-equilibrium in Jamming Models for Collaborative Distributed Detection Networks", IEEE International Conference on
Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2021.
• N. Sriranga, B. Geng and P. K. Varshney, “On Human Assisted Decision Making for Machines Using Correlated Observations", 54th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and
Computers, 2020.
• C. Quan, B. Geng and P. K. Varshney, “Asymptotic Performance of Binary Decision Making in Heterogeneous Human-machine Inference Networks", 54th Asilomar Conference on
Signals, Systems, and Computers, 2020.

11
• B. Geng, S. Brahma, and P. K. Varshney, “A Truthful Mechanism for Mobility Management
in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Networks", 53rd Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers, 2019.
• B. Geng and P. K. Varshney, “On Decision Making in Human-machine Networks", IEEE
16th International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems (MASS), 2019.
• S. Zhang, B. Geng, P. K. Varshney, and M. Rangaswamy, “Fusion of Deep Neural Networks for Activity Recognition: A Regular Vine Copula-based Approach", 22nd International Conference on Information Fusion (FUSION), 2019.
Book Chapter:
• B. Geng, P. K. Varshney and M. Rangaswamy, “Information Integration from Human and
Sensing Data for Cognitive Radar", submitted to Next Generation Cognitive Radar, The
Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) Press.

12

C HAPTER 2

P ROSPECT T HEORETIC U TILITY BASED
H UMAN D ECISION M AKING IN
M ULTI - AGENT S YSTEMS

2.1

Introduction

The difficulty in modeling human decision making arises because of their cognitive biases as well
as due to the uncertainties exhibited by human decision makers. Cognitive biases are characterized
by diminishing marginal utility, risk seeking/aversion behavior and loss aversion attitude; while
the uncertainties in decision making behavior of humans can arise from emotion, time constraint,
fatigue and operating environment [6,42,65,67]. The purpose of this chapter is to develop a unified
framework that incorporates both cognitive biases and uncertainties in decision making, which we
call decision making under behavioral biases. We begin our study with the discussion of cognitive
biases based on Prospect Theory (PT). This Nobel-prize-winning theory proposed by Kahneman
and Tversky [67] provides a theoretically sound description of human cognitive biases through a
value function and a probability weighting function. Value function, as the name suggests, acts on
the values (gains and losses) to reflect humans’ loss attitude, i.e., asymmetric valuation towards
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gains and losses. From the cognitive psychology viewpoint, people are usually loss averse in the
sense that loss feels worse than the gain of an equivalent amount feels good. Probability weighting
function, on the other hand, acts on the probability that an event will occur. It represents the fact
that in humans’ cognitive perception, they usually overweigh small probabilities and underweigh
large probabilities.

2.1.1

Related Work

We consider human decision making behavior in the context of hypothesis testing. As is well
known, humans make decisions in the framework of hypothesis testing and the decision is made
by selecting the hypothesis that best supports the given set of observations [109]. There have only
been a few works that incorporate PT into hypothesis testing to model human decision making. In
[100], Nadendla et al. applied Prospect Theory to hypothesis testing and analyzed the behavior of
optimists and pessimists of different types. In their work, the definitions of optimists and pessimists
were limited in scope for modeling general human behavior. As a result, the analysis cannot be
extended to the development of explicit decision rules for agents with arbitrary prospect theoretic
parameters. The optimality of the likelihood ratio test (LRT), which is known to be the optimal
decision rule in minimizing the Bayesian risk, was investigated in PT based hypothesis testing
in [51]. The authors showed that the LRT may or may not be optimal for behavioral decision
makers under the Neyman-Pearson criterion.
In addition to being subject to cognitive biases, human agents may also exhibit uncertainties
in decision making. There have been some research efforts that explore uncertainties in human
decision making. Since human participants have different backgrounds and expertise regarding a
PoI, the qualities of the local decisions vary quite considerably. It was shown in [128] that when
there is no reliability information available for each decision maker, the majority rule is often the
choice that gives better results in group decision making, compared to other criteria such as the
consensus rule. Budescu et al. [12] showed a scenario where the FC gives more weight to the
decisions made by agents who have been more accurate in the past, while it assigns less weight to
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the decisions made by unreliable agents. In [127], the fusion of local decisions made by humans
was analyzed using signal detection techniques. The authors studied how the quality variation
of local decisions affects the decision performance of the FC. decision making framework was
analyzed to model categorization in human decision making [117]. In [152], Wimalajeewa et al.
studied collaborative human decision making and assumed that each participating agent makes
decisions using a random decision threshold. The authors in [153] investigated the conditions
under which integration of human operators with physical sensors can improve the performance in
binary decision making.
In the above works that study cognitive biases in the context of decision making [51, 100],
the authors assume that humans make decisions so as to minimize their behavioral Bayesian risk
under the Bayesian formulation. However, psychology studies show that in practice, instead of
employing the decision rule that minimizes the behavioral Bayesian risk, people use utility based
approaches based on existing evidence and select the action which results in the highest expected
payoff over all possible alternatives [41,108]. To the best of our knowledge, the analysis of human
decision making from a utility based perspective while considering cognitive biases under PT has
not been addressed in the previous literature. Besides, the existing work has not considered how
the uncertainties differ from one human to another in decision making, i.e., the individual level
quantification of human uncertainty. No prior work has discussed the combination of both decision uncertainties and cognitive biases in affecting the decision quality. Such a unified framework
is crucial to the design of efficient decision rules when we have humans-in-the-loop, and is relevant in many areas such as situational awareness in monitored civil and military systems, targeted
advertising and recommendation systems, portfolio management, insurance policy design, as well
as investment in financial markets.

2.1.2

Major Technical Contributions

The main objective of this chapter is to investigate the impact of behavioral biases that include
cognitive biases and decision uncertainties on human decision making and, correspondingly, on
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the decision fusion rule in multi-agent systems. Specifically, our contributions are:
• We consider that a human perceives the utility of making correct decisions to be gain and
perceives the utility of making wrong decisions to be loss1 . Value functions and probability
weighting functions based on PT are exploited to construct the subjective utility function for
humans in a binary hypothesis testing problem. The optimal decision rule for cognitively
biased humans is determined in which they choose the hypothesis that maximizes their subjective expected utility.
• Next, we consider that humans use a threshold based scheme to make decisions based on
their observations [130, 152]. The threshold of a human is treated as a random variable
where the threshold mean is determined by the person’s cognitive biases under PT, and the
threshold variance represents the person’s uncertainty in decision making. We thoroughly
study the impact of an individual’s behavioral biases (cognitive biases and uncertainties) on
the performance of decision making systems that involve human participation. In particular,
three configurations are investigated: (i) a human acts as an assistant to help a rational FC
make the final decision, (ii) the other scheme considers the FC to be a behaviorally biased
human who makes the final decision with the help of a physical sensor, and (iii) two-person
decision fusion, where two human agents independently provide their local decisions to the
FC.
• Finally, we investigate collaborative human decision making and obtain the optimal decision
fusion rule at the FC. In our work, the FC is able to adjust its decision making strategy when
the human behavioral properties change. This provides generality and flexibility compared
to existing group decision fusion schemes, such as those developed in [126–128,131], where
the authors did not consider the behavioral biases of human participants.
1

When the humans make right decisions, there is a potential gain as they have a better knowledge of the status of
the environment and remedial actions can be taken. On the other hand, when humans make wrong decisions in terms
of false alarms and miss detections, there is a loss as they have an inaccurate perception regarding the PoI.
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2.2

Utility based Hypothesis Testing

In this section, we explore human decision making for binary hypothesis testing problems using
utility based decision theory, starting with a brief introduction of Prospect Theory.

2.2.1

Prospect Theory Background

From a psychology viewpoint, people are said to be loss averse in the sense that they feel more
hurt when they lose something, than they feel good when they gain something of equal value. For
example, the satisfaction a person gets when $100 is added to his/her present value is less than
the loss of satisfaction when $100 is subtracted from the present value. In Prospect Theory [67],
the value function v(x) plotted in Fig. 2.1 (a) characterizes the loss aversion effect by assigning a
subjective utility to an outcome x:

v(x) =





xλ

x≥0


 −β(−x)λ

x<0

(2.1)

where x is the actual gain (when it is positive) or loss (when it is negative), and v(x) represents the
human subjective valuation of x. Utilities under PT are perceived as gains and losses with respect
to a reference point, which is a subjective value above which utilities are perceived as gains and
utilities blow which are perceived as losses. With different reference points, the characterization of
human behavior even for the same experiment is significantly different. In this work, for simplicity,
we assume the case where the gain and loss are perceived with respect to the fixed reference point
set at zero so that positive utilities humans derive from deciding correctly correspond to gains
and negative utilities humans derive from deciding incorrectly correspond to losses. β is the loss
aversion coefficient, and v(x) reflects people’s different loss aversion attitudes that are realized
by the variation of parameter β. When a person becomes more loss averse, β increases and the
subjective valuation of a fixed loss appears to be more significant. λ characterizes the phenomenon
of diminishing marginal utility, which indicates that as the total number of units of gain (or loss)
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increases, the utility of an additional unit of gain (or loss) to a person decreases. This effect can be
seen in Fig. 2.1 (a) as the curve saturates when it goes in either direction (positive or negative).
On the other hand, the probability weighting function reflects people’s four-fold pattern of
risk attitudes, i.e., risk-seeking for small-probabilistic gains and large-probabilistic losses, and
risk-aversion for small-probabilistic losses and large-probabilistic gains. This phenomenon can
be interpreted as people overweighing small probabilities and underweighing large probabilities.
For example, the certainty effect, which states that a sure gain is favored over a probabilistic gain,
indicates humans’ risk aversion behavior for large probabilistic gains. Tversky and Kahneman [67]
illustrated the certainty effect by investigating which of the following options do people prefer: (A)
a sure gain of $30; and (B) 80% chance to win $45 and 20% chance to win nothing. In this case,
most participants chose option A and it demonstrates the typical risk-aversion phenomenon in PT
because the expected value of option B ($45 × 0.8 = $36) exceeds that of A by 20%. A detailed
discussion of the four-fold pattern of risk behavior can be found in [135].
As shown in Fig. 2.1 (b), the probability weighting function in PT is:

w(p) =

pα
(pα + (1 − p)α )1/α

(2.2)

where p is the actual probability with which an event occurs. w(p) gives the subjective probability
distorted by the probability distortion coefficient α. For behaviorally unbiased people, α = 1,
β = 1 and λ = 1. In a landmark study [135], the authors conducted experiments by letting human
subjects choose the preference between a series of prospect pairs. Based on the experimental
data, the behavioral parameters α, β and λ of each individual can be estimated using a nonlinear
regression procedure. According to their result, the medians of α, β and λ are 0.69, 2.25 and 0.88,
respectively.
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Fig. 2.1: Value function and weighting function in Prospect Theory

2.2.2

Decision Making Model and Bayesian Formulation under PT

In hypothesis testing, an agent makes a decision on which of the hypothesis H0 or H1 is true,
based on an observation r regarding a PoI. The observations under the two hypotheses are H0 :
r = s0 +w, H1 : r = s1 +w, where s0 and s1 are signal amplitudes under H0 and H1 , respectively,
and w denotes the observation noise. Assume that the signal and noise are independent of each
other and the probability density functions (PDFs) of r under H0 and H1 are assumed to be known.
We denote them as f0 (r) and f1 (r), respectively. The prior probabilities of H0 and H1 are π0 and
π1 , respectively. Let Cij be the cost of declaring Hi when Hj is true for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. These costs
are assigned to reflect the the relative importance of the four courses of actions [73, 142].
Let R be the acceptance region of hypothesis H1 , then the decision maker employs the following decision rule:

d=




1;

if r ∈ R



0;

otherwise

(2.3)

When human cognitive biases are modeled by PT, i.e., the costs and probabilities are affected by
the value function and the probability weighting function, respectively, the expected behavioral
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risk under Bayesian formulation is:

b(R) =

1 X
1
X

w[P r(Declare Hi |Hj is true)] · v(Cij ).

i=0 j=0

The objective is to find the optimal acceptance region R∗ that minimizes the behavioral risk:

R∗ = arg min b(R).
R∈R

(2.4)

Because of the nonlinearity of the value function (2.1) and the probability weighting function (2.2), the Bayesian formulation of the optimization problem (2.4) does not have an explicit
solution [51,100]. Under Bayesian formulation, the decision rule, i.e., the acceptance region of hypothesis H1 , is pre-determined before any observation is received. Whenever an observation comes
in, a decision is made according to the same decision rule. However, psychology studies suggest
that humans make decisions after observing some evidence, where the observation provides some
support for a hypothesis. Depending on whether the observation confirms or refutes a hypothesis,
human confidence towards a hypothesis can vary continuously from 100% certainty about its truth
to 100% certainty about its falsity. Correspondingly, when making a decision, a rational decision
maker calculates the expected utility of deciding each alternative hypothesis based on observed
evidences, and selects the one that results in the highest expected utility [41, 108, 109]. This action
of the rational decision makers is called decision making under the expected utility theory (EUT)
framework [97]. We proceed with the above utility based methods to model human decision making and employ PT to incorporate human cognitive biases. In fact, when a rational decision maker
selects the hypothesis from a set of alternative hypotheses that results in the maximum expected
payoff under EUT, it is equivalent to the decision rule that minimizes the Bayesian cost [4, 56].
However, in the following, we will show that this equivalence does not hold in general when the
decision maker is cognitively biased under PT.
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2.2.3

Subjective Utility based Hypothesis Testing

We begin with the analysis of utility based decision making for binary hypothesis testing under
EUT, where the decision makers are assumed to be rational. Instead of minimizing the Bayesian
risk (2.4), the objective is to choose the hypothesis that results in the highest expected utility. Let
Uij denote the utility of deciding Hi when the true hypothesis is Hj , for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, U00 and
U11 represent the utilities of correct decisions and are usually positive, while U10 and U01 represent
the utilities of wrong decisions and are usually negative. Given an observation r, a rational decision
maker’s expected utility of declaring H0 and H1 are:

EU(Declare H0 ) = Pr(H0 |r)U00 + Pr(H1 |r)U01
EU(Declare H1 ) = Pr(H0 |r)U10 + Pr(H1 |r)U11 ,

(2.5)

where Pr(Hi |r) denotes the probability that Hi is true given that the observation is r, and

Pr(Hi |r) =

fi (r)πi
f (r|Hi )πi
=
f (r)
f (r)

(2.6)

for i = 0, 1, respectively, where f (·) and fi (·) denote the appropriate PDFs and πi is the prior
probability of hypothesis Hi . Given the observation r, the hypothesis H0 or H1 whichever has a
larger expected utility is declared to be true
H1

EU(Declare H1 )

R

EU(Declare H0 ).

H0

Substitute the expression of Pr(Hi |r) given in (2.6) into (2.5), we have
f0 (r)π0
U00 +
f (r)
f0 (r)π0
EU(Declare H1 ) =
U10 +
f (r)
EU(Declare H0 ) =

f1 (r)π1
U01
f (r)
f1 (r)π1
U11
f (r)

(2.7)
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Next, we substitute the above equations into (2.7), and the utility based decision rule reduces to
the classical LRT:
f1 (r)
f0 (r)

H1

R
H0

π0 (U00 − U10 )
, η.
π1 (U11 − U01 )

(2.8)

which is also the optimal decision rule that minimizes the Bayesian cost.
In the statistical detection theory framework, the decision making agent is assumed to be rational and the objective is to maximize the expected utility. Under EUT, decision makers are rational
in the sense that they are able to calculate the expected utility of each action without biases. For
example, a typical characteristic of rational decision makers is that they should be indifferent between two alternative courses of action if their expected utilities are the same. However, due to
human cognitive biases in perceiving the utilities and the probabilities, a human usually prefers
a sure gain over a probabilistic gain even if the two alternatives have the same expected utility.
In many settings when the decisions are made by humans, certain behavioral factors may cause
the results to deviate from the outcomes predicted by EUT. Unlike rational decision makers who
choose the hypothesis that maximizes their expected utilities, humans act to maximize their subjective utilities under cognitive biases. When calculating the subjective utility of declaring H0 and
H1 , we employ PT by applying the value function v(·) defined in (2.1) on the utilities and applying
the probability weighting function w(·) defined in (2.2) on the probabilities. Given observation r,
the subjective utilities of declaring H0 and H1 are:



SU(Declare H0 ) = w Pr(H0 |r) v(U00 )+w Pr(H1 |r) v(U01 )


SU(Declare H1 ) = w Pr(H0 |r) v(U10 )+w Pr(H1 |r) v(U11 ).

(2.9)

Without optimizing over all possible events in a Bayesian sense, humans are known to select the
alternative which has a higher subjective utility after receiving observation r:
H1

SU(Declare H1 ) R SU(Declare H0 ).
H0

(2.10)
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Combining (2.9) and (2.10), the subjective utility based decision rule becomes:

w Pr(H1 |r)

w Pr(H0 |r)

H1

v(U00 )−v(U10 )
V00 −V10
,
,
v(U11 )−v(U01 )
V11 −V01

R
H0

(2.11)

where Vij are the subjective utilities when the value function (2.1) acts on Uij , respectively, for
i, j ∈ 0, 1. Again, V00 and V11 are positive, while V01 and V10 are negative. Employing the
expression of the weight function given in (2.2) and the expression of P r(Hi |r) given in (2.6), and
noting that P r(H1 |r) = 1−P r(H0 |r), we have

w(P r(H1 |r))
w(P r(H0 |r))

=

P r(H1 |r)α
.
P r(H0 |r)α

It follows that the decision

rule given in (2.11) becomes
f1 (r)
f0 (r)

H1



R
H0

V00 − V10
V11 − V01

 α1

π0
, ηp .
π1

(2.12)

Thus, the test reduces to a LRT with threshold ηp as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Under prospect theoretic framework, the optimal subjective utility based decision
rule reduces to an LRT. The threshold of the LRT, ηp , is a monotonous function of parameters α
and β.
P ROOF : We have already shown that the perceived utility decision rule under PT reduces to a LRT.
To show that the threshold of the LRT, ηp , is monotone with respect to α, we take the derivative

1 

V00 −V10 α
−V10
−1 π0
d
ln VV00
.
of the expression of ηp given in (2.12) with respect to α: dα ηp = α2 π1 V11 −V01
11 −V01

 α1
V00 −V10
π0
d
Since −1
is strictly negative, dα
ηp is always non-positive or non-negative depending
α2 π 1
V11 −V01


−V10
on the sign of ln VV00
.
11 −V01
Similarly, differentiating ηp with respect to β, we get
d
π0
ηp =
dβ
απ1



V00 −V10
V11 −V01

 α1 −1

λ
λ
U11
(−U10 )λ −U00
(−U01 )λ
2
λ
U11
+β(−U01 )λ

λ
λ
which is non-positive or non-negative depending on the sign of U11
(−U10 )λ −U00
(−U01 )λ , since all

other terms are strictly positive. Thus, the likelihood ratio is monotone with respect to parameters
α and β.
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In the special case of V00 − V10 = V11 − V01 , ηp does not change when α varies; and in the
special case of U11 U10 = U00 U10 , ηp remains constant when β varies.
In many applications, the likelihood ratio Λ(r) =

f1 (r)
f0 (r)

is strictly increasing or decreasing with

respect to r. One example is when f1 (r) and f0 (r) are Gaussian PDFs with different means and
the same variance2 . Gaussian distributions are very commonly used as they characterize a large
number of problems in signal processing and communications. In this case, the LRT reduces to
a threshold based decision rule based on the observation r and the optimal decision threshold t is
monotone with respect to α and β as well.
Proposition 2.1. When the likelihood ratio Λ(r) is strictly increasing or decreasing, the LRT in
(2.12) becomes a threshold decision rule. The optimal decision threshold is monotone with respect
to behavioral parameters α and β, respectively.
H1

P ROOF : Given the monotonicity of Λ(r), the likelihood ratio test (2.12) is equivalent to r RH t0
0

H0

or r RH t0 , depending on whether Λ(r) is increasing or decreasing. The decision threshold t0 is
1

obtained by setting t0 = Λ−1 (ηp ), where Λ−1 (·) is the inverse function of Λ(r). Because of the
monotonicity of Λ−1 (·), t0 is monotonous with respect to ηp . From Theorem 2.1, we know that ηp
is a monotonous function with respect to parameters α and β, it follows that t0 is monotonous with
respect to α and β as well.
In the remainder of this chapter, we consider human decision making for the binary hypothesis
testing problem, and the observations under each hypothesis are assumed to follow a Gaussian
distribution:

H0 : r ∼ N (m0 , σs2 ), H1 : r ∼ N (m1 , σs2 )

(2.13)

where the signal means under H0 and H1 are m0 and m1 , respectively. The signal variance under
both hypotheses is σs2 . We assume that m0 < m1 and the diminishing marginal utility parameter λ
2

e

In case that f1 (r) and f0 (r) are Gaussian PDFs with means m1 and m0 , and variance σs2 , Λ(r) =

2
2(m1 −m0 )r−(m2
1 −m0 )
2
2σs

, which is strictly increasing if m1 > m0 , and strictly decreasing if m1 < m0 .

f1 (r)
f0 (r)

=
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Fig. 2.2: Decision thresholds with respect to behavioral parameters.
from PT is set equal to 0.88. We focus on analyzing how behavioral parameters α and β affect the
human decision qualities.
For illustration, we conduct experiments on a hypothesis testing problem with the following
setting: π0 = 0.7, π1 = 0.3, U11 = U00 = 20, U01 = −80, U10 = −20, m0 = 0, m1 = 5, and
σs2 = 2.25. In Fig. 2.2, we plot the optimal decision thresholds with respect to α, β under EUT
and PT based subjective utility approaches. We also provide the optimal decision thresholds for
PT based Bayesian formulation using numerical methods. It can be observed that under EUT, the
decision threshold is a constant, without being affected by humans’ behavioral properties. In this
particular example, we can see that the decision thresholds, under both PT utility based methods
and PT Bayesian methods, decrease as probability distortion parameter α decreases and decrease
as loss aversion parameter β increases. An intuitive explanation for this is that as α decreases,
the human perceives less distinction between the priors {π0 , π1 }. Therefore, the hypothesis with a
smaller prior probability, in this case, H1 , is more likely to be declared true and correspondingly,
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the decision threshold is decreasing. When β increases, the human perceives the penalty for miss
detection U01 = −80 to be more significant than the penalty for false alarm U10 = −20. Therefore,
the decision threshold is decreasing to avoid the possibility of miss detection.
In contrast to the fact that the Bayesian formulation is equivalent to the utility based decision
making under EUT, there exist disparities between these two approaches when PT is incorporated.
Results in Fig. 2.2 suggest that when α is smaller and β is larger, the decision threshold under PT
Bayesian formulation deviates more from the rational case than the decision threshold under PT
utility based approaches. Note that when α = β = 1 and λ = 1, i.e., the person is rational, the
decision rule of both approaches reduces to the classical LRT (2.8).
The above results have provided us with the basic insights on how the parameters α and β
from PT affect the decision threshold used by a cognitively biased person in utility based decision
making. We denote the cognitively biased threshold t as t = F(α, β), where F is monotone with
respect to α and β.

2.2.4

Uncertainties in Human Decision Making

Unlike physical sensors, whose decision thresholds can be programmed to be fixed values that
do not change, there are uncertainties in human decision making due to uncontrolled factors like
time constraint, mood, environment, location and so on. Individual uncertainty (variability) is a
prominent feature in human behavior. Variability is observed in human perception and decision
making even when the external conditions, such as the sensory signals and the task environment,
stay the same [21]. This is also known as trial-to-trial variability in psychology experiments,
i.e., differences of responses are noticeable when the same experiment is repeated using the same
human subject. From a psychology point of view, the sources of the variability are: a) the initial
condition of the neural circuitry is likely to be different at the start of each trial, and b) the noise
permeating in every level of the nervous system, from the perception of input observations to
the stage of decision making. These two sources cause uncertainties in human decision making
and are highly dependent on factors such as time constraints, outside environment and human
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mood [45, 65].
In the following, decision thresholds of humans are modeled as random variables as in [128,
152, 153]. Specifically, we model the threshold of a human to be τ = F(α, β) + v, where
v ∼ N (0, στ2 ). Here στ2 represents the variance associated with an agent while making a decision due to uncertainty as discussed above. From now on, we let τ denote the behaviorally biased
decision threshold used by the human agent. τ is assumed to be a Gaussian random variable, whose
mean is affected by the average level of human cognitive biases and the variance στ2 is due to decision uncertainties. A larger value of στ2 indicates higher uncertainty of a person while making
a decision. To measure the individual uncertainty in human decision threshold, one may conduct
the experiments as in [135] on the same human under different environments, e.g., time pressure,
change of location, etc. In each experiment, the set of behavioral parameters α, β and λ of the
human can be estimated. Since the variability of these parameters can be incorporated via the variability of the decision threshold, we can obtain the variance of the decision threshold by analyzing
the statistics.
Lemma 2.1. In solving the hypothesis testing problem (2.8), if a human employs a random decision
threshold τ ∼ N (mτ , στ2 ), the probabilities of false alarm and detection are given by

PF = Q

m − m0
pτ
σs2 + στ2

!
,

PD = Q

m − m1
pτ
σs2 + στ2

!
,

(2.14)

where Q(x) is the probability that a standard normal random variable takes a value larger than
R∞
2
x: Q(x) = √12π x exp (− u2 )du.
P ROOF : See Appendix A.1.
Next, we want to study the impact of decision uncertainty quantified in terms of στ2 on human
decision making performance. For a human agent who uses a random decision threshold τ ∼
N (mτ , στ2 ) to make a decision in the binary hypothesis testing problem (2.8), we have the following
theorem.
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Theorem 2.2. There exists a pair of values {mτ , mτ } where mτ < mτ and both mτ and mτ
satisfy:
e

2
2(m1 −m0 )mτ −(m2
1 −m0 )
2
2σs


×

mτ − m1
mτ − m0


= η,

such that for humans with mτ ≤ mτ ≤ mτ , the expected utility while making a decision monotonically decreases as στ2 becomes larger, i.e., the expected utility while making a decision is maximized
∗

for decision uncertainty σt2 = 0. For humans with mτ > mτ and mτ < mτ , the expected utility is unimodal, i.e, first increases then decreases, as στ2 becomes larger. The optimal decision
∗

uncertainty στ2 is greater than 0 and satisfies:

e

2
2(m1 −m0 )mτ −(m2
1 −m0 )
2 +σ 2 ∗ )
2(σs
τ


×

mτ − m1
mτ − m0


= η.

P ROOF : See Appendix A.2.
Definition 2.1. Under the hypothesis testing framework discussed above, if for decision variance
∗

στ2 = 0, a human obtains the maximum expected utility while making a decision and the expected
utility decreases monotonically as στ2 increases, i.e, mτ ≤ mτ ≤ mτ , the person is called reason∗

able. If the best decision in terms of expected utility is made for decision variance στ2 > 0, i.e.,
mτ > mτ or mτ < mτ , the person is called extremely biased.
Some simulation results are provided when a human employs the decision threshold N (mτ , στ2 )
in the hypothesis testing problem discussed before. In this case, we obtain that mτ = −0.025 and
mτ = 5.015. Correspondingly, the left side extremely biased region, the reasonable region and
the right side extremely biased region in terms of mτ are (−∞, −0.025), [−0.025, 5.015] and
(5.015, ∞), respectively. In Fig. 2.3, we plot the expected utility of a human while making a decision with respect to the uncertainty of decision threshold στ2 . It can be observed that the expected
utility of a reasonable human is monotonically decreasing with respect to στ2 . For extremely bi∗

ased human agents, there exists an optimal value of decision uncertainty στ2 at which they achieve
the maximum expected utility. Note that in this hypothesis testing problem, left side extremely
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biased humans whose decision threshold is on the far left typically perform better than a right side
extremely biased humans agent whose decision threshold is on the far right. This is because the
penalty of miss detection (U01 = −80) dominates the penalty of false alarm (U10 = −20) in this
particular problem. Right side extremely biased humans with higher biased decision thresholds are
more probable to suffer miss detection and their performance is significantly deteriorated. Moreover, it is observed in Fig. 2.3 that a left side extremely biased human outperforms a reasonable
human after a certain value of στ2 is reached. The reason is that as the decision threshold variance
στ2 increases, a reasonable human agent is more likely to employ higher biased decision thresholds
than a left side extremely biased human, while degrading the performance due to higher cost of
miss detection.

Fig. 2.3: Expected utility of a human agent as decision uncertainty στ2 increases.

Remark 2.1. Extremely biased humans have their decision making performance enhanced in the
presence of decision uncertainty up to a certain point before it begins to deteriorate. This is analogous to noise-enhanced signal processing [23] where the performance of a suboptimal detector
can sometimes be enhanced by adding noise. This phenomenon is also known as stochastic resonance in the literature [24, 25, 72].
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2.3

Decision Fusion Involving Human Participation

In this section, we analyze how the biased decision threshold τ employed by humans affects the
performance of the decision making system in three different scenarios.

2.3.1

Human Participates in Decision Making as an Assistant, FC is Rational

First, as shown in Fig. 2.4, we consider the scenario where a human agent assists the FC in making
the final decision with the FC being rational (unbiased).

Fig. 2.4: Human participating in decision making as an assistant
We assume that the FC observes r0 and agent A observes ra via orthogonal observation channels. The observation channels of both the FC and agent A are assumed to be corrupted by additive
Gaussian noises, which are independent of each other but have the same PDF. The observations at
the FC and agent A are denoted by r0 and ra to emphasize the fact that they are observed over two
independent channels. Specifically, agent A is a human who makes a decision on which hypothesis
is true by comparing ra with a threshold ta :
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 1 if ra ≥ ta
da =

 0 if ra < ta
For simplicity of exposition, we first consider ta to be a fixed decision threshold determined by
the PT parameters αa and βa , ta = F(αa , βa ). Decision making uncertainty of agent A will be
incorporated later in this subsection. After agent A sends its decision da = j ∈ {0, 1} to the FC,
the FC makes the final decision d0 based on da and its own observation r0 . Given da and r0 , the
expected utilities for the FC to declare H0 and H1 are:

EU(Declare H0) = Pr(H0 |r0 , da = j)U00 +Pr(H1 |r0 , da = j)U01
EU(Declare H1) = Pr(H0 |r0 , da = j)U10 +Pr(H1 |r0 , da = j)U11 ,

respectively. Choosing the hypothesis that has the larger expected utility yields the decision rule:
Pr(H1 |r0 , da = j)
Pr(H0 |r0 , da = j)

H1

R
H0

U10 − U00
,
U01 − U11

where Pr(Hi |r0 , da = j) represents the probability that Hi is true given observation r0 and da = j.
We have
Pr(Hi |r0 , da = j) =

πi Pr(da = j|Hi )f (r0 |Hi )
f (r0 , da = j)

for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Note that Pr(da = 1|H0 ) = PFa , and Pr(da = 1|H1 ) = PDa , which are the
probabilities of false alarm and detection of agent A, respectively. After simplification, the decision
rule at the FC becomes:
f1 (r0 ) H1 1−PFa π0 (U10 −U00 ) 1−PFa
R
=
η, if da = 0,
f0 (r0 ) H0 1−PDa π1 (U01 −U11 ) 1−PDa

(2.15)

f1 (r0 ) H1 PFa π0 (U10 −U00 ) PFa
R
=
η, if da = 1.
f0 (r0 ) H0 PDa π1 (U01 −U11 ) PDa

(2.16)
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By setting

f1 (r0 )
f0 (r0 )

=

1−PFa
a η
1−PD

for da = 0, and

f1 (r0 )
f0 (r0 )

=

PFa
a η
PD

for da = 1, we obtain the decision

thresholds applicable to observation r0 at the FC, denoted by t0 and t1 , respectively. When obser0
) and
vations under both hypotheses follow Gaussian distributions (2.13), we have PFa = Q( ta −m
σs
1
PDa = Q( ta −m
). Considering the two scenarios together where da = {0, 1}, the probability of
σs

false alarm and the probability of detection at the FC can be expressed as:

pf =

1
X

Pr(d0 = 1|da = j, H0 )Pr(da = j|H0 )

j=0

= PFa Q(

pd =

1
X

t0 − m0
t1 − m0
) + (1 − PFa )Q(
),
σs
σs

Pr(d0 = 1|da = j, H1 )Pr(da = j|H1 )

j=0

= PDa Q(

t1 − m1
t0 − m1
) + (1 − PDa )Q(
),
σs
σs

respectively. Then, the expected utility at the FC is:

U = π0 (1 − pf )U00 +π0 pf U10 +π1 (1 − pd )U01 +π1 pd U11 .

(2.17)

We conduct simulations for the same hypothesis testing problem as described in Section 2.2.3.
In Fig. 2.5, when agent A’s decision threshold ta varies, i.e., the cognitive bias of the human varies,
we present the expected utilities of agent A by itself and that of the FC. Note that the thresholds
used at agent A that yield the maximum expected utility for agent A by itself and that at the fusion
center are different. In other words, a rationally behaving person who acts to maximize his/her
EU (with decision threshold equal to 2.28 indicated by the red dot) does not necessarily provide
the best performance for the FC. In this particular example, a person behaving with some biases
(with decision threshold equal to 2.41 indicated by the blue dot) results in a larger expected utility
for the FC. How to choose the properly biased person is dependent on the specific setup of the
hypothesis testing problem. After knowing the effect of agent A’s decision threshold on the FC’s
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performance, we are able to determine a particular type of cognitively biased person, in terms of
α, β, to be chosen to undertake the task.

Fig. 2.5: Expected utility as a function of threshold ta used by agent A.
Next, to incorporate decision making uncertainty, the decision threshold employed by agent A
is considered to be a Gaussian random variable τa ∼ N (mτa , στ2a ). In this case, PFa and PDa can
be calculated through (2.14), and the optimal decision rule at the FC can be obtained in a manner
similar to the previous discussions. The FC’s expected utility can be correspondingly derived. In
the following, we focus on studying the FC’s decision making performance when the uncertainty
of agent A’s decision threshold changes.
With the earlier setup of the hypothesis testing problem, Fig. 2.6 shows the expected utility at
the FC with respect to the mean decision threshold of agent A. In the red, green and blue curves,
the variances of agent A’s decision threshold are στ2a = 0, στ2a = 1 and στ2a = 4, respectively. It
is not surprising that the red curve with smallest decision making uncertainty performs better than
the other two curves in the middle range of mτa , namely when the human agents are reasonable.
Thus, it is preferable to have human agents who are reasonable in that they are more predictable in
the presence of decision making uncertainty and their performance degrades in a graceful manner.
On the far left or far right of the graph, i.e., when the behavioral threshold is extremely biased, a
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larger variance surprisingly gives better performance at the FC. Intuitively, for extremely biased
agents whose behavioral thresholds are far from being rational, a large variance is more likely to
‘rectify’ their thresholds to be close to optimal thresholds. However, for rational agents whose
behavioral thresholds are already close to the optimal, a large variance is more likely to deviate
their thresholds away from their optimal values. For this reason, a large variance helps increase the
FC’s utility when the agent is extremely biased, while it hurts when the agent is already behaving
rationally. This phenomenon is consistent with our previous analysis about the effect of uncertainty
on the quality of a single human agent’s decision shown in Fig. 2.3.

Fig. 2.6: Expected utility of the FC as a function of the mean threshold of agent A.
Also notice that in Fig. 2.5, in order for the FC to derive maximum expected utility, agent A
employed the fixed decision threshold ta = 2.41. When we introduce uncertainty in the decision
threshold of agent A by increasing the variance in Fig. 2.6, the optimal mean of A’s decision
threshold while assisting FC to derive the largest expected utility, changes to mτa = 2.2 when
στ2a = 1, and mτa = 1.98 when στ2a = 4. This is because with the same mean threshold mτa ,
different variances result in different values of probability of false alarm and detection for agent A
(as shown in (2.14)), which in turn leads to different decision thresholds used by the FC (calculated
using (2.15) and (2.16)). Thus, the utility of the FC correspondingly changes. For this reason, we
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should also take the variance of the agent into consideration when deciding the agent’s optimal
mean threshold while assisting the FC.

2.3.2

Human is the Decision Maker at the FC, FC is Biased

For the system shown in Fig. 2.4, next consider that A is a physical sensor with fixed decision
threshold ta . The FC is a biased human with behavioral parameters α, β and decision making
uncertainty σF2 C . Again, physical sensor A sends its decisions da = j ∈ {0, 1} to help the FC
make the final decision. If the FC is biased, we need to apply v(·) and w(·) when calculating the
FC’s subjective utility of declaring either H0 or H1 being true, when agent A sends its decision
da = j:



SU(Declare H0 ) = w Pr(H0 |r0 , da = j) V00 +w Pr(H1 |r0 , da = j) V01


SU(Declare H1 )) = w Pr(H0 |r0 , da = j) V10 +w Pr(H1 |r0 , da = j) V11

(2.18)
(2.19)

The FC makes its decision by selecting the hypothesis which results in a higher subjective utility.
Since the FC observes r0 and agent A makes its decision independently, the likelihood ratio at the
FC can be shown to be strictly increasing or decreasing with respect to observation r0 . Hence, the
FC uses a threshold based decision rule and the mean of the decision threshold mjF C is obtained
by setting (2.18) equal to (2.19) for j = 0, 1. Finally, we model the decision threshold that the
FC uses as a Gaussian random variable τ0 = N (mjF C , σF2 C ) to make the final decision, after it
observes the decision made by agent A, da = j.
The probability of false alarm and probability of detection at the FC are:

pf =

1
X

Pr(d0 = 1|da = j, H0 )Pr(da = j|H0 )

j=0

ta −m0  m0F C − m0
ta −m0  m1F C − m0
Qp
+(1−Q
) Qp
σs
σs
σs2 +σF2 C
σs2 +σF2 C
1
X
pd =
Pr(d0 = 1|da = j, H1 )Pr(da = j|H1 )
=Q

j=0
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=Q

ta −m1  m1F C − m1
ta −m1  m0F C − m1
Qp
) Qp
+
1−Q(
,
σs
σs
σs2 +σF2 C
σs2 +σF2 C

mj −m 
where Pr(d0 = 1|da = j, Hi ) = Q √F C2 2 i for i, j = {0, 1} follows directly from the result of
σs+σF C

Lemma A.1. Again, the expected utility of FC can be calculated using (2.17).
Fig. 2.7 shows the expected utility of the FC with respect to the decision threshold ta used
by the physical sensor A. In Fig. 2.7 (a), the red curve represents the scenario where the FC
is rational, and in the green and blue curves the FC is behaviorally biased with β = 1.5 and
β = 2, respectively. When the FC is biased, we set the FC’s probability distortion parameter to be
α = 0.72. It is observed that the FC achieves higher expected utility when it acts rationally. On
the other hand, the peak points on these curves (denoted by the red, green and blue dots) suggest
that for FCs with different behavioral properties, the optimal decision threshold of A in helping
the FC achieve the best utility differs. In such a decision making system where we are dealing
with humans that do not provide an opportunity for parameter tuning while they make decisions,
the best we can do is to acknowledge the fact that humans have cognitive biases and are subject to
uncertainties and try to develop efficient approaches to optimize the system performance. In the
problem considered here, we are tuning the threshold of the physical sensor A so as to help the
FC/human optimize the decision quality.
Another interesting fact is that in this decision making configuration, a more biased behaving
FC (indicated by the blue curve which has a larger β) outperforms a less biased FC (indicated by
the green curve which has a smaller β) for the entire range of A’s decision threshold. The reason is
that under the joint influence of behavioral parameters α, β and γ, the threshold of the likelihood
ratio test used by a biased FC deviates from the threshold used by a rational FC. In our case, a
larger β counteracts the effect of α and γ, making the threshold used by the biased FC closer to
that of a rational FC. In Fig. 2.7 (b), we set the loss aversion parameter β = 2 and plot the expected
utility of the FC with respect to ta as α varies. Similarly to the phenomenon in Fig. 2.7 (a), it can
be seen that a more biased value of α = 0.6 helps the FC make better decisions than α = 0.8
when β = 2. In general, it is not wise to judge the decision making performance of a human based
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Fig. 2.7: Expected utility of FC as a function of the decision threshold of agent A, when FC has
behavioral biases.
on the comparison of one single behavioral parameter, instead all the parameters should be treated
together in a more holistic manner.

2.3.3

Amelioration of Human Cognitive Biases by Adapting the Physical Sensor’s Threshold

For a human with behavioral parameters α, β, λ acting as the FC in the system model shown in
Fig. 2.4, variation of the physical sensor’s decision thresholds results in different decision rules at
the FC, which yield different decision making performance. The next proposition determines the
threshold t∗a employed by the physical sensor so that the human achieves the best decision making
performance.
Proposition 2.2. The decision threshold t∗a employed by the physical sensor that minimizes the
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FC’s expected cost satisfies the following condition:

G(t∗a )

=

p1 )−m0
p0 )−m0
Q( g(η
) − Q( g(η
)
σs +σF C
σs +σF C
p1 )−m1
p0 )−m1
Q( g(η
) − Q( g(η
)
σs +σF C
σs +σF C

η.

where we denote the thresholds of the LRT in (2.15) and (2.16) as ηp0 =
2σs2 log x+(m21 −m20 )
,
2(m1 −m0 )

respectively, and g(x) =

(2.20)

1−PFa
a ηp
1−PD

and ηp1 =

PFa
a ηp ,
PD

which is the inverse function of the likelihood ratio

f1 (r)
.
f0 (r)

P ROOF : Exploiting the independence assumption, the Bayesian cost of a human while making a
decision is:
X Z

πk P r(d0 |da , r0 )P r(da |ra )P r(ra |Hk )P r(r0 |Hk )cd0 k dr0 dra

d0 ,da ,Hk

for d0 , da , k ∈ {0, 1}. By summing da over {0, 1}, ignoring the constant factors and using the fact
P r(da = 1|ra ) = 1 − P r(da = 0|ra ), we have
Z
P r(da = 0|ra )
ra

XZ
d0 ,Hk

πk P r(r0 |Hk )P r(ra |Hk )cd0 k

r0



× P r(d0 |da = 0, r0 ) − P r(d0 |da = 1, r0 ) dr0 dra ,

(2.21)

which is minimized by setting P r(da = 0|ra ) = 0 if
XZ
d0 ,Hk

πk P r(r0 |Hk )P r(ra |Hk )cd0 k

r0



× P r(d0 |da = 0, r0 ) − P r(d0 |da = 1, r0 ) dr0 ≥ 0

(2.22)

and setting P r(da = 1|ra ) = 0 if (2.22) does not hold.
R
Note that P r(r0 |Hk )P r(d0 |da , r0 )dr0 = P r(d0 |da , Hk ) and P r(d0 = 0|da = 0, r0 ) ≥
P r(d0 = 0|da = 1, r0 ). By setting (2.22) equal to 0 and summing over Hk for k = {0, 1},
we obtain the condition that must be satisfied by the optimal decision threshold t∗a of the physical
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sensor:
1
P

G(t∗a ) =



π0 cd0 0 P r(d0 |da = 1, H0 ) − P r(d0 |da = 0, H0 )

d0 =0
1
P

,


π1 cd0 1 P r(d0 |da = 0, H1 ) − P r(d0 |da = 1, H1 )

d0 =0

Lastly, substituting P r(d0 = 1|da = j, Hk ) = Q(
1 − Q(

g(ηpj )−mk
)
σs +σF C

g(ηpj )−mk
)
σs +σF C

and P r(d0 = 0|da = j, Hk ) =

for j, k = {0, 1} and after simplification, the condition in (2.20) follows.

In general, t∗a is not the optimal decision threshold, namely, g(η), that minimizes the expected cost
of the physical sensor while decision making. Also note that (2.20) is only a necessary condition that an optimal threshold of the physical sensor must satisfy. There might exist several local
minimum solutions and we should make a comparison to determine the global optimum.

2.3.4

Fusion of Decisions Made by Two Human Agents

Fig. 2.8: Fusion of decisions made by two human agents.
Now, consider the decision fusion scheme shown in Fig. 2.8, where A and B are two human
agents that make local decisions da and db , which are transmitted to an unbiased FC to make the
final decision. Let the decision threshold of A be τa ∼ N (mτa , στ2a ), and the decision threshold of
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B be τb ∼ N (mτb , στ2b ). Suppose the FC receives the decision da = i ∈ {0, 1} from agent A, and
decision db = j ∈ {0, 1} from agent B. The expected utility of declaring H1 and H0 for a rational
FC are:

EU (Declare H0 ) = Pr(H0 |da = i, db = j)U00 + Pr(H1 |da = i, db = j)U01
EU (Declare H1 ) = Pr(H0 |da = i, db = j)U10 + Pr(H1 |da = i, db = j)U11 .

The decision rule that declares the hypothesis which has the larger expected utility to be true, is


Pr(da = i, db = j|H1 )
≥η ,
d0 (da = i, db = j) = I
Pr(da = i, db = j|H0 )
where I(·) is the indicator function which equals 1 if the statement inside the parentheses is true,
and it equals 0 otherwise. The optimal decision rule of the FC requires the calculation of the probabilities of local decisions under hypotheses H1 and H0 , which depends on the decision thresholds
used by the two human agents. Further, the probability of false alarm and detection at the FC are:

pf =

1 X
1
X

Pr(d0 = 1|da = i, db = j)Pr(da = i, db = j|H0 )

i=0 j=0

pd =

1 X
1
X

Pr(d0 = 1|da = i, db = j)Pr(da = i, db = j|H1 ).

i=0 j=0

Finally, the expected utility of the FC can be calculated using (2.17).
In Fig. 2.9, we plot the expected utility of the FC with respect to the mean values of the decision
thresholds used by agents A and B, namely mτ a and mτ b . In the red smooth surface, both agents
have decision uncertainty στ2 = 0.2, and in the blue meshed surface, both agents have decision
uncertainty στ2 = 0.7. In the graph, there are two local maximum points where the FC achieves locally optimal utilities. When the means of the decision thresholds deviate from their local maxima
points, the utility drops significantly. We can also see that the agents with less decision making
uncertainty (red curve) help the FC perform better than the agents with larger uncertainty do (blue
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Fig. 2.9: Expected utility of the FC when fusing decisions of two human agents.
curve) in the ‘center’ region of the graph. In the ‘leaf’ regions where humans are extremely biased, larger uncertainties produce higher utilities for the FC. For better visualization of the system
performance, we present the cross section curves of Fig. 2.9 in Fig. 2.10, where we plot the FC’s
utility with respect to mτ b for different values of mτ a . Fig. 2.10 (a) and Fig. 2.10 (b) correspond
to the cross section plots yielding the two maximum utility points, respectively. Note that for both
of the local maximal points, the mean value of the decision threshold of agent A is equal to that
of agent B. In subplots Fig. 2.10 (a) and (b) where the values of mτ a are close to optimal, we
observe that FC performs better when the value of στ2 is smaller. However, in subplots Fig. 2.10
(c) and (d) where the values of mτ a and mτ b are both extremely biased, the blue curve with a larger
decision uncertainty στ2 = 0.7 outperforms red curve with a smaller decision uncertainty στ2 = 0.2.
This phenomenon coincides with what we observed in Fig. 2.6 when there was only one human
participating.
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Fig. 2.10: FC’s expected utility with respect to mτ b for different values of mτ a .

2.4

Collaborative Decision Making Composed of Independent Decision Makers

In this section, we consider the scenario where multiple human agents (n > 2) participate in the
collaborative decision making process. Each agent independently makes a decision di ∈ {0, 1}
using a random decision threshold τi ∼ N (mτi , στ2i ), for i = 1, . . . , n. The FC receives a vector of
decisions D = {d1 , . . . , dn } and makes a final decision d0 regarding the hypothesis present. As the
number of agents becomes larger, the likelihood ratio test derived in the previous sections becomes
complicated and intractable. However, if we know the behavioral property of each agent, we can
derive the decision thresholds and calculate the probability of false alarm PFi and probability of
detection PDi for each agent. The optimal fusion rule at the FC in this situation can be obtained by
calculating the log likelihood ratio according to the Chair-Varshney rule [18] given as follows:

log

X
Pr(H1 |D)
π1 X
PD
1 − PDi
= log +
log i +
log
,
Pr(H0 |D)
π0
PFi
1 − PFi
+
−
s

s
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where s+ represents the agents whose local decisions are 1 and s− are agents with local decisions
0. Decisions are made based on:

log

Pr(H1 |D) H1
R log η.
Pr(H0 |D) H0

Another fusion rule that is widely used is the majority rule due to its simplicity even though it
is not necessarily optimal. When the FC receives the decision vectors D, it calculates the sum of
P
local decisions: Γ = ni=1 di . In the majority rule, the statistic Γ is compared to a preset threshold
k = dn/2e. If Γ ≥ k, the FC decides that H1 is true, otherwise the FC decides that H0 to be
H1

true, i.e., Γ RH k. In this case, di ∈ {0, 1} is a Bernoulli random variable with probability
0

Pr(di = 1) = PDi under H1 and Pr(di = 1) = PFi under H0 . Thus, Γ is a Poisson Binomial
distributed random variable. Under H0 , for example, the probability mass function (PMF) of Γ is:

Pr(Γ = γ) =

XY
A∈Fγ i∈A

PFi

Y

(1 − PFi ),

j∈Ac

where Fγ is the set that contains all possible combinations of γ agents out of a total of n agents.

The cardinality of Fγ is nγ , so the computation becomes more complicated when n is large. In
the following, we use the Binomial approximation as well as the normal approximation to estimate
the statistics of Γ.

2.4.1

Approximations of Probabilities of False Alarm and Detection at
the FC

Considering that the FC uses the majority rule, this subsection presents two approximation methods
that allow us to compute the probabilities of false alarm and detection in a simpler and faster way.
• Binomial approximation. It can be seen that Pr(Γ) = γ approximately follows a Binomial
n
P
PMF B(n, p̃f ) under H0 , where p̃f = n1
PFi , and it follows B(n, p̃d ) under H1 , where
p̃d =

1
n

n
P
i

i

PDi . Thus, the probability of false alarm and the probability of detection at the
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FC can be appproximated by pf = Pr(d0 = 1|H0 ) ≈

n
P
γ=k

1|H1 ) ≈

n
P
γ=k

n
γ



p̃γf (1− p̃f )n−γ and pd = Pr(d0 =

 γ
p̃d (1 − p̃d )n−γ , respectively.

n
γ

• Normal approximation. Since di s are independent, while not identically distributed Bernoulli
random variables, we cannot use the central limit theorem (CLT) directly to approximate Γ
to be Gaussian distributed when n is large. However, CLT can be generalized to be applied to
independent but non-identically distributed random variables when the Lyapunov condition
h
i
n
n
P
P
1
is satisfied: limn→∞ s2+δ
E |di − µi |2+δ = 0, where sn =
σi2 , µi and σi are the
n

i=1

i=1

mean and standard deviation of each random variable. It is easy to verify that the Bernoulli
random variables satisfy the Lyapunov condition. Therefore, when n is large, Γ can be
n
P
approximated by a Gaussian random variable with mean mf =
PFi and variance σf2 =
n
P

PFi (1 − PFi ) under H0 ; and mean md =

i=1

n
P

i=1

PDi and variance σd2 =

i=1

n
P

PDi (1 − PDi )

i=1

under H1 . Thus, the probabilities of false alarm and detection at the FC are approximated
R∞
T −m
(x−m )2
by pf = Pr(d0 = 1|H0 ) ≈ √ 1 2 exp (− 2σ2f )dx = Q( σ f ), pd = Pr(d0 = 1|H1 ) ≈
R∞
T

T

√1

2πσd2

2πσf

f

f

2

d)
d
exp (− (x−m
)dx = Q( T −m
), respectively.
σd
2σ 2
d

With approximate values of pf and pd , the expected utility of the FC can be calculated via
(2.17). Fig. 2.11 shows the expected utility of the FC as a function of group size when applying the
Chair-Varshney decision rule, the majority rule, the Binomial and Gaussian approximations of the
majority rule, respectively. In our simulation, the parameters of the hypothesis testing problem are
chosen to be the same as before, and each agent in the group has behavioral parameters α = 0.72,
β is drawn from a Gaussian distribution N (mβ , σβ2 ), where mβ = 1.5 and σβ2 = 0.2. The variance
of human decision threshold is set equal to στ2 = 0.25. Results are obtained through 5000 Monte
Carlo trials. It is observed that the optimal Chair-Varshney decision rule outperforms the majority
fusion rule. The expected utility of the FC under the majority rule goes up when the group size
increases, and convergence occurs fairly fast. When the group size goes up to around 10, the
performance reaches its saturation. We also observe that the binomial approximation method gives
quite a good approximation to the majority rule and the Gaussian approximation starts to perform
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Fig. 2.11: Expected utility as a function of the group size.
well when n becomes large as expected.

2.4.2

Optimal Decision Rule at the FC

In our previous analysis, the majority rule was used for decision fusion where the statistic Γ is
compared to a threshold k = dn/2e. The majority rule is a special case of the k out of n rule and
is optimal only in certain scenarios. This rule is not necessarily optimal if the (binary) problem
has non-uniform priors, non-uniform costs of false alarm and miss detection, non-identical local
decision makers, etc. Here, we employ the more general k out of n rule, where d0 = 1 is declared
when k or more out of n people vote in favor of H1 . The goal is to find the optimal value of k ∗
for the k out of n rule so that the Bayesian utility at the FC is maximized. To characterize the
local decision qualities, we use population-level averages of the probabilities of detection and false
alarm, P̂D and P̂F , for each of the human agent.
Given that the sum of the local decisions is l, i.e., Γ = l, the expected utilities for the FC to
declare H0 and H1 are:

EU (Declare H0 ) = Pr(H0 |Γ = l)U00 + Pr(H1 |Γ = l)U01
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EU (Declare H1 ) = Pr(H0 |Γ = l)U10 + Pr(H1 |Γ = l)U11 ,

respectively, where Pr(Hi |Γ = l) =

πi Pr(Γ=l|Hi )
Pr(Γ=l)

for i = {0, 1}, and

 
n
Pr(Γ = l|H0 ) =
P̂Fl (1 − P̂F )n−l
l
 
n
Pr(Γ = l|H1 ) =
P̂Dl (1 − P̂D )n−l
l
respectively. The FC decides that hypothesis to be true which has a higher expected utility. After
simplification, we obtain the optimal decision rule at the FC:

(

P̂D
P̂F

)l (

1 − P̂D
1 − P̂F

H1

)n−l

R

η

(2.23)

H0

where η is defined in (2.8). We make the reasonable assumption that P̂D > P̂F [73, 142], so that
the left hand side of (2.23) is an increasing function of l and the optimal decision rule reduces
H1

to l RH l∗ , where the optimal threshold at the FC k = l∗ is the smallest integer l that satisfies
0

P̂D n−l
)
≥ η.
( P̂P̂D )l ( 1−
1−P̂
F

F

For a group size of n = 20, we calculate the optimal threshold l∗ for the k out of n rule when
the behavioral properties of the people in the group change. In simulations, we set the group members’ probability weight parameter α equal to 0.72, and let the loss aversion parameter β follow
the Gaussian distribution N (mβ , σβ2 ), where mβ and σβ2 could change. We employ Monte Carlo
methods to obtain the P̂D and P̂F of the agents numerically and calculate the optimal threshold l∗ .
In the left subplot of Fig. 2.12, we observe that with σβ2 fixed to be 0.25, the optimal threshold
decreases when mβ increases. In the right subplot we set mβ = 2, and it shows that the optimal
threshold decreases as well when σβ2 becomes larger. Thus, it is important to understand the behavioral properties of the population in order to set the best threshold for the k out of n rule at the
FC.
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Fig. 2.12: Optimal threshold at the FC for different behavioral parameters of the group.

2.5

Collaborative Decision Making Composed of Correlated
Decision Makers

Humans from the same demographic subgroup often share similar behavioral properties that include emotion state, loss attitudes and perception of the environment, while the variations of those
behavioral properties are significant across different ages, genders and cultural backgrounds [149].
For example, psychologists have studied the impact of cultural differences on economic decision
making, where they showed that cross-cultural differences such as experiences, individualism,
power distance, and masculinity are highly correlated with the level of loss aversion and subjective
perceptions [31]. In experiments conducted in two countries (China and Ethiopia), it was shown
that the inter-country differences in behavioral patterns are more significant than intra-country differences. The authors in this work concluded that the inter-country variations in risk attitudes can
be ascribed to cultural differences [146].
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2.5.1

Correlation Between Local Decision Makers

Inspired by the above evidence, we develop the correlation structure of local decision makers in
the following. Consider that there are n humans participating in the collaborative decision making
process regarding the hypothesis testing problem (2.13). Each human provides a local decision
di for i = {1, . . . , n} by employing the decision rule given in (2.12). Let ri and β i be the random variables that denote the ith human’s observation regarding the PoI and his/her loss aversion
parameter, respectively3 . Analogous to the models presented in the quantitative psychology literature [20, 124] that employ a physical measure to quantify the distance between representations
of the objects on a priori grounds, we establish a measure mij to represent the cognitive profile
difference between humans i and j. To model the perceptual and behavioral similarity among the
local decision makers, we consider that the correlation coefficient between human observations ri
and rj follows an exponential decay model [124]
ρi,j
r = exp(−φr (mij )/l0 )

(2.24)

and the correlation coefficient between human loss aversion parameters βi and βj is given by
ρi,j
λ = exp(−φλ (mij )/l0 )

(2.25)

where φr (·) and φλ (·) are appropriate distance functions that project mij to the correlation measures applicable to r and λ, respectively. l0 is a constant parameter. We hereby assume that the
ith human’s observation ri has PDF fri (r). Since all the humans make observations regarding the
same PoI (2.13), we have fri (r) = f0 (r) under H0 and fri (r) = f1 (r) under H1 for i = {1, . . . , n},
i
with ρi,j
r characterizing their correlation structures. Moreover, let the loss aversion parameter λ
i
j
follow PDF fλi (λ) with ρi,j
λ being the correlation coefficient between λ and λ .
3

It has been demonstrated in the literature that the loss aversion effect has a larger impact on human decision
making compared to diminishing marginal utility phenomenon and the probability weighting distortion phenomenon
[101, 135]. Hence, in this work, we adopt a similar approach by fixing the value of λ = 0.88, α = 1 and focusing on
analyzing how the loss aversion parameter λ affects the decision making of humans.
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Here, in contrast to Section 2.4 where the local decisions were assumed to be independent,
di for i = 1, . . . , n have a dependency structure due to the similarity in human decision makers’
behavioral and perceptual properties. To characterize the quality and correlation of local decisions,
we define an error indicator random variable δi that is equal to 1 if the ith human’s local decision
di is wrong and is equal to 0 if the decision is correct. Let δ = [δ1 , . . . , δn ], so that its mean vector
µδ = [µδ1 , . . . , µδn ] represents the humans’ average probabilities of error and the covariance matrix
Σδ shows the dependency structure of δi .
Following the analysis and notation in Section 2.4, we further denote the acceptance region
(where the human decides 0) and the critical region (where the human decides 1) of the ith human
as R0i and R1i , respectively. Given a particular hypothesis testing problem, both R0i and R1i are
determined by the ith human’s loss aversion parameter λi . Note that δi is equal to 1 if ri ∈ R0i
under H1 or ri ∈ R1i under H0 . Hence, we have the expected value of δi given as

µδi = Eri ,λi ,H (δi )
Z ( Z
Z
i
π0
f0 (r)dri + π1
=
R1i

λi

R0i

)
f1i (r)dri

fβi (λ)dλi

where the expectation is taken with respect to ri , λi and H. Since δi takes its value from {0, 1}, its
second moment is calculated as E(δi2 ) = µδi . Hence, the variance of δi is given by
var(δi ) = E(δi2 ) − E2 (δi ) = µδi − µ2δi

To evaluate the covariance of δi and δj , we need to compute the expected value of δi δj . Note that
δi δj = 1 only when both δi and δj are equal to 1. Hence, we have E(δi δj ) given in (2.26),
Z
Eri ,rj ,λi ,λj ,H (δi δj ) =

(

Z

π0
λi λj

R1i

T

R1j

f0ij (ri rj )dri rj + π1

)

Z
R0i

T

R0j

f1ij (ri rj )dri rj

fλij (λi λj )dλi λj
(2.26)

where fkij (ri rj ) is the joint PDF of observations ri and rj . fλij is the joint PDF of the loss aversion
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parameters λi and λj 4 . Hence, the covariance of δi and δj is given by

cov(δi , δj ) = E(δi δj ) − µδi µδj

At this point, we have been able to compute the values of µδ and Σδ , which will be used to perform
human selection in collaborative decision making in the next subsection.

2.5.2

Portfolio Theory based Human Selection

The objective of this section is to develop a methodology to select a subgroup from a pool of
heterogeneous human decision makers to participate in a binary decision making task. It should be
noted that such a human selection problem is not only complicated by the fact that it is difficult to
evaluate the performance of decision fusion in realistic multi-human decision making applications,
but also by the fact that there exist correlations among the quality of local decisions.
The majority rule is widely adopted as the aggregation rule in collaborative human decision
making due to its simplicity and efficiency. Under the majority rule, the FC collects all the local
P
decisions D = [d1 . . . dn ] where di ∈ {0, 1} and compares the statistic Γ = ni=1 di to a threshold
z = dn/2e. The FC chooses H1 if Γ ≥ z, and chooses H0 otherwise, i.e., whichever hypothesis
that has the majority votes is declared to be true.
In past works on majority rule based collaborative human decision making or crowdsourcing
systems, e.g., [33, 47, 116] and the references therein, it is always the practice to select human
agents whose error probabilities are small. Note that this surrogate approach that selects human
agents with small error probabilities, although intuitive, yields guaranteed level of system performance when the humans make local decisions independently of each other as we prove in the
following.
Proposition 2.3. In collaborative human decision making where the humans submit local decisions
4

The derivation can be easily extended to incorporate the consideration of diminishing marginal utility parameter
λ and probability distortion parameter α by calculating Eri ,rj ,λi ,λj ,βi ,βj ,αi ,αj ,H (δi δj ) instead of Eri ,rj ,βi ,βj ,H (δi δj )
in (2.26).
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independently, the majority rule based decision rule at the FC has lower probability of error when
the average error probability of the humans decreases.
P ROOF : In a group of workers with size n = 2k + 1(k > 0), suppose that each worker provides a
binary answer 0 or 1 independently. The average probability of each worker making an error in the
local decision is po . According to the majority rule, the FC computes the sum of local decisions Γ
and makes the final decision by comparing Γ with z = k +1. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the true answer is 1. In this case, the FC decides 0 (makes an error) only when the number of
1s submitted by the humans is less or equal to k. Note that Γ follows a binomial distribution with a
total of n trials and expected success probability 1 − po . The probability of error can be expressed
using the regularized incomplete beta function:

P r(x ≤ k) = Ipo (k + 1, k + 1)

where
Ipo (a, b) =
and

Zpo
B(po ; a, b) =

B(po ; a, b)
B(1; a, b)

wa−1 (1 − w)b−1 dw.

0

Since B(1, k + 1, k + 1) is a constant given k and B(po , k + 1, k + 1) is an increasing function of
po , it is clear that the probability of error at the FC decreases as po becomes smaller.
When there are correlations among the local decisions, the probability that the majority rule
makes an error, i.e., less than z humans submit correct decisions, is expressed as

Pe =

z X
X

P r(O A )P r(QA0 )

(2.27)

γ=0 A∈Sγ

where Sγ is the set that contains all possible combinations of γ humans out of a total of n humans.
O A represents the event that all the humans in subset A make correct decisions and QA0 represents
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the event that all the humans in the complement set of A make wrong decisions. Quantifying the

value of Pe using (2.27) is difficult because a) the cardinality of Sγ is nγ , which increases quite
rapidly as n and γ becomes large and b) both P r(O A ) and P r(QA0 ) depend on the joint PDFs of
local decisions, which are hard to compute in general applications.
Markowitz’s portfolio theory (MPT) [86,89] is the first to analyze portfolio risk, diversification
and asset allocation in a mathematically consistent framework. In portfolio selection, each asset is
an investment instrument that can be bought and sold in the market, e.g., company stock. The return
value of each asset is modeled as a random value where the mean value represents the expected
value growth of the asset and the variance represents the measure of risk. The expected return
of the portfolio is calculated as a weighted sum of the individual assets’ returns. The portfolio’s
risk is a function of the variances of each asset and the correlations of each pair of assets. MPT
provides the solution of how to construct a portfolio of multiple assets that the expected return is
maximized for a given level of risk.
We aim to solve the human selection problem by mapping it to the portfolio selection problem
under the MPT model. There is an analogy between the two problems where we relate the ith human’s average probability of making a correct decision to the return of asset i. In such an analogy,
1 − δi corresponds to the expected return (equivalently, δi corresponds to the expected cost) and the
covariance matrix Σδ corresponds to the uncertainty (or risk). Similar to assembling the portfolio
of assets under MPT, we select a subgroup of humans that maximizes the sum of their probabilities
of making correct decisions (equivalently, minimizing the sum of their error probabilities) while
constraining the variability of the system performance is below a certain level. Here, note that
minimizing the sum of the humans’ error probabilities is consistent with the objective of human
selection where the humans make decisions independently of each other.

Motivation for Portfolio Theory based Human Selection
Because of the correlation among the local decisions, variability (or variance) of the system performance is an important criterion in determining the subgroup of human participants. Selecting
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humans with a smaller average error probability does not necessarily result in the highest accuracy
at the FC. In the following, we provide a toy example to illustrate this point.
A motivating toy example. Consider that there is a pool of 6 humans and we aim to select 3 of
them to participate in an inference task. Whether or not the humans make a mistake in their local
decisions are modeled as Bernoulli random variables bi for i = 1, . . . , 6 with the probabilities of
error given by p = [p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 ] = [0.25 0.25 0.25 0.3 0.3 0.3]. We assume the case that the
first three decision makers are highly correlated such that they make correct or wrong decisions
at the same time. Hence, we have the correlation coefficient of each pair among the first three
decision makers equal to 1, i.e., ρij = 1 if i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. On the other hand, we assume that each
of the last three human agents i = 4, 5, 6 make the decisions independently of any other decision
maker in the pool. As a result, the correlation coefficient ρij = 0 if i or j ∈ {4, 5, 6} and i 6= j.
Under this model, the covariance matrix of the random variables bi , denoted by Σb , can be written
as


0
0 
0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0


0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0

0
0






0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0
0
0 


Σb = 

 0
0
0
0.21 0
0 




 0

0
0
0
0.21
0




0
0
0
0
0 0.21
where the variance of a Bernoulli random variable is obtained by var(bi ) = pi (1 − pi ) and the cop
variance is given by cov(bi , bj ) = ρij var(bi )var(bj ). To select 3 out of the 6 decision makers to
perform the inference task without considering their dependency structure, firstly, we choose those
that have low error probabilities. In the above problem, the first three humans i = 1, 2, 3 have the
lowest error probabilities so that we choose the human selection vector to be s1 = [1 1 1 0 0 0],
where 1 represents the selection of the corresponding human and 0 represents no selection. When
the local decisions are aggregated via the majority rule, the subgroup selected by s1 has the proba-
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bility pe1 = 0.25 to make a mistake as the participants make wrong decisions at the same time with
a probability of 0.25. On the other hand, if we set s2 = [0 0 0 1 1 1] and select the last three humans whose error probabilities are larger, the majority rule based decision rule has the probability


of error pe2 = 32 (0.3)2 (1 − 0.3) + (0.3)3 = 0.216, where 32 = 3 represents the number of combinations of selecting 2 humans out of 3 humans. We find that although the last three humans have
higher error probabilities, the selection of humans using s2 achieves a better system performance
compared to the selection using s1 . Since the humans i = 4, 5, 6 act independently of each other,
it allows for more freedom in terms of diversification, which reduces the probability that two or
more humans make mistakes together.
In the MPT model, an investor can reduce the risk by holding a combination of assets that are
not perfectly positively correlated. In collaborative human decision making, let CN denote the
number of selected humans that make incorrect decisions. When the recruited human decision
makers are less correlated with each other, the variance of CN becomes smaller. To provide an
intuition, we continue with our toy example and compute the variances of CN when employing the
selection vector s1 and s2 :
varCN (s1 ) = s1 Σb s1 0 = 1.6875
varCN (s2 ) = s2 Σb s2 0 = 0.63
where the superscript 0 represents the transpose of the vector. Compared to s1 , the selection of
independent decision makers using s2 has a smaller value of CN ’s variance. When the correlation
among humans is low, it is unlikely that they make mistakes at the same time. In such a case,
CN remains small most of the time and the probability that CN takes a large value is negligible,
which makes the variance of CN small. On the other hand, when the local decisions have strong
correlation, there is a relatively large chance that they make mistakes at the same time, causing the
variance of CN to be large. It was also shown that along with the smaller variance achieved by s2 ,
the average probability of error pe2 is smaller. This motivates the application of MPT in our human
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selection problem in the sense that a smaller variance of CN corresponds to diversification among
human decision makers (i.e., the local decisions are not highly correlated with each other), which
avoids the possibility of concurrent failures so that the system performance can be improved.

MPT based Human Selection and Optimization Method
Following MPT, the risk-averse investors wish to design portfolios that have the best expected
return-risk trade-off. In our problem, the portfolio set corresponds to the pool of human workers
and we wish to select a subgroup to participate in an inference task to ensure the quality of system
performance. The expected means and the covariance matrix of the random variables that represent
that the ith local decision is incorrect are given by µδ and Σδ , which have been derived in Section
2.5.1. We seek to select the subgroup to achieve two objectives, i.e., minimize the sum of expected
error probabilities5 and reduce the variance of CN .
Let s = [s1 , . . . , si , . . . , sn ] denote the human selection vector where si represents whether or
not the ith human is selected. In the first formulation, we aim to minimize the sum of the error
probabilities of the selected humans while keeping the variance of CN below a target value σt2

min

µs = sµ0δ

(2.28a)

s.t.

σs2 = sΣδ s0 ≤ σt2 ,

(2.28b)

s10 = m and si ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , n

(2.28c)

s

where 1 represents the all-one vector. In (2.28c) we constrain that a total number of m humans are
selected and each si has to be a Boolean variable. In MPT, the problem of maximizing the expected
return at a given level of risk has an equivalent dual representation where we minimize the variance
of the portfolio subject to a target value of expected return. Hence, the dual formulation of the
5

This objective coincides with the surrogate criterion for human selection when they make local decisions independently, i.e., minimizing the average error probability of the selected crowd workers as shown in Proposition 2.3.
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optimization problem (2.28a)-(2.28c) is given by

min

σs2 = sΣδ s0

(2.29a)

s.t.

µs = sµ0δ ≤ µt ,

(2.29b)

s10 = m and si ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , n

(2.29c)

s

where µt in (2.29b) denotes the threshold that upper bounds the sum of selected humans’ error
probabilities. The advantage of the second formulation given in (2.29a)-(2.29c) compared to the
one given in (2.28a)-(2.28c) is that it is preferable to constrain the value of µt rather than the target
variance levels σt2 . This is because typically it is hard for the project manager to quantitatively
relate the value of σt2 to a specific level of variability.
In contrast to MPT where the optimization variable is continuous, we have si ∈ {0, 1} so that
s is in a non-convex set, making the problem generally impossible to solve as the solution requires
an intractable combinatorial search. We employ the reweighted `1 minimization approach [15] to
solve this binary constrained optimization problem by assigning the weight wi to each element
si , where the algorithm iteratively alternates between optimizing s and redefining the weights.
After a certain number of iterations, s converges to a steady state and the entries that have large
weights are set equal to 1, indicating that the corresponding humans will be selected. To provide an
example, we show the detailed procedures to solve the problem (2.29a)-(2.29c) in Algorithm 1. In
this section, we propose a collaborative human decision making mechanism while using prospect
theory to model the correlations of the workers’ decisions and using concepts from portfolio theory
for worker selection. If the desired system performance does not achieve a certain level of accuracy,
the FC may expand or re-select the worker pool to enhance heterogeneity and improve system
performance. The flow chart of the system is presented in Fig. 2.13.

2.5.3

Simulation Results

We further conduct experiments for the worker selection problem from a 30-human pool where
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Algorithm 1 Solving the optimization problem (2.29a)-(2.29c)
1: PROCEDURE: Find the human selection vector s
(t)
2: Set the iteration count t = 0 and the initial weights wi = 1, i = 1, . . . , n.
(t) (t)
(t)
3: Construct the weight matrix W t = diag([w1 w2 . . . wn ]0 ).
4: Solve the minimization problem
st = arg min sΣδ s0 + φ W t s0
s

s.t.

`1

≤ µt , s1 = m,
0 ≤ si ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , n

sµ0δ

0

where φ is a properly designed parameter that is positive.
5: Update the weights for i = 1, . . . , n
wit+1 =

6:
7:

1
+

|sti |

where  > 0 is a parameter to provide stability to the algorithm.
Repeat step 3-5 until a specified maximum iteration number tmax is reached.
For the largest m entries from the final weight vector, set the corresponding entries in s to be
1. Set the other entries in s to be 0.

Fig. 2.13: Flowchart of the prospect theory and portfolio theory based collaborative human decision making system.
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we assign the label i to each human: i = 1, 2, . . . , 30. For the correlation coefficient equations
(2.24) and (2.25), we assume that the human i and j have cognitive profile difference given by
mij = 0.2 |i − j| for i, j ∈ 1, . . . , 30. For simplicity, the projection functions φr (·), φλ (·) are
assumed to be identity functions and the constant parameter l0 = 1. In this case, we have ρi,j
r =
i,j
= exp(−mij ). Moreover, the loss aversion parameter of the ith human λi is assumed
ρi,j
λ = ρ

to follow a Beta distribution Beta(ai , bi ) with support [0 3] and the parameters ai = 2 + i, bi = 3.
Meanwhile, the ith and j th humans’ observations ri , rj as well as their loss aversion parameters
λi , λj have a correlation structure with correlation coefficient ρi,j . In simulations using Matlab, for
example, we use the mvnrnd function to generate correlated Gaussian random variables r1 , . . . , rn .
To generate correlated Beta distributed random variables, we first exploit the copularnd function
to get a vector of random variables generated from a Gaussian copula with a certain correlation
structure, and then, employ the betainv function to transform the output of copularnd into random
numbers that follow the beta distribution.
Without loss of generality, we assume that H1 is true so that the ith human makes a wrong
decision (i.e., δi = 1) when he/she submits di = 0 and makes a correct decision (i.e., δi = 0) when
he/she submits di = 1. We obtain the mean vector µδ and covariance matrix Σδ that characterize
the quality and dependency structure of the humans’ local decisions. We formulate the MPT based
optimization problem for human selection as given in (2.29a)-(2.29c), where we set the target
error probabilities µt = 0.3m, indicating that the selected humans should have their averaged error
probability below 0.3. Algorithm 1 is used to solve the optimization problem where m out of 30
humans are selected to participate in the inference problem.
As m takes its value from {3, 5 . . . , 21}, we plot the error probability of the majority rule
based decision fusion with respect to m in Fig. 2.14. The blue curve represents the scenario
where humans are selected using our proposed approach based on MPT optimization. The red
curve corresponds to the case in which humans with the lowest individual error probabilities are
selected without considering their correlation structure. As m increases, the FC’s error probability
decreases for both of the scenarios and it is observed that our proposed method performs better for
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Fig. 2.14: FC’s probability of error as m increases
every value of m. By minimizing the variance of the number of humans that make mistakes, our
algorithm does not favor selecting highly correlated local decision makers. The diversification (or
independence) among the selected humans ensures that they are not likely to make mistakes at the
same time. Therefore, the system performance improves.
Finally, we vary the optimization parameter µt in (2.29b) and see how it affects the system performance. It should be noted that µt controls the trade-off between the two conflicting objectives:
1) minimizing the average error probability of the selected humans and 2) reducing the variance
of CN . A small value of µt gives more emphasis to the first objective and a large value of µt gives
more emphasis to the second objective. On one hand, µt can not be too small as it limits the human
selection pool to a small range, where heterogeneity might not be promoted. On the other hand, µt
can not be too large, otherwise we might select humans whose error probabilities are quite large
(such as spammers, Byzantines, etc.,) where the quality of the system performance is not guaranteed. In the previous simulation, we fixed the value of µt to be µt = 0.3m, which might not
necessarily be optimal. In Fig. 2.15, we set µt = tm and let t vary. We plot the FC’s probability
of error for different values of t for m ∈ {3, 5}. We also fit a 4-degree polynomial curve to the
data samples and show that how the system performance change with respect to t. It is observed
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Fig. 2.15: FC’s detection performance as a function of optimization parameter t.
that in each case, there is a certain value of t that achieves the best system performance. It should
also be noted that the optimal parameter t when m = 3 is larger than the optimal value of t when
m = 5, indicating that when the number of selected humans is small, it is desirable to enhance the
emphasis on heterogeneity to improve the performance of group decision making.

2.6

Summary

In this chapter, we have explored the use of utility theory based hypothesis testing in human decision making. When humans are treated as rational agents who maximize their expected utilities,
the results derived at the FC are not likely to be accurate. Humans have cognitive biases and
make decisions so as to maximize their subjective utilities. The use of PT allows us to capture
the non-rationality of humans. Specifically, we derived the subjective utility based decision rule
for cognitively biased human agents modeled by PT. Three decision making systems involving
humans’ participation were explored, and we studied the impact of human behavioral biases on
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the quality of the final decisions. We also analyzed collaborative decision making composed of
independent and correlated local decision makers.
This chapter was able to reveal fundamental features of human decision making under behavioral biases, as well as the significant differences between decision fusion involving human
participants and information fusion with only physics-based sensors. Through the simple decision
making systems discussed in this chapter, we provided insights into the optimum design and task
allocation of collaborative human-machine networks, as well as the development of more complicated human-centric intelligent systems. It will be worthwhile to study the optimal decision
making architectures for particular applications in future work. We also plan to study the correlation among parameters that represent different aspects of behavioral biases, and design applicable
strategies to help human rectify the behavioral biases so as to make higher quality decisions.
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C HAPTER 3

P ROSPECT T HEORY BASED
C ROWDSOURCING FOR C LASSIFICATION
IN THE

3.1

P RESENCE OF S PAMMERS

Introduction

Crowdsourcing has attracted intense interest in recent years as a new paradigm for distributed
inference. It harnesses the intelligence of the crowd, by exploiting the inexpensive and online labor
markets in an effective manner [62, 76, 131, 132, 157]. Crowdsourcing enables a new framework
to utilize distributed human wisdom to solve problems that machines cannot perform well, like
handwriting recognition, anomaly detection, voice transcription, and image labelling [14, 46, 106].
While conventional group collaboration and cooperation frameworks rely heavily on a collection
of experts in related fields, the crowd in crowdsourcing usually consists of non-experts. Therefore,
the responses obtained from the crowd have diverse quality levels, which makes decision fusion in
the problem of classification via crowdsourcing quite challenging.
Although crowdsourcing has been applied in many applications, the quality of the aggregated
result is relatively low [2,64,95] due to the following reasons. First, the worker pool is anonymous
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in nature, which may result in an unskilled and unreliable crowd [141]. Second, the assumption
that the workers are sufficiently motivated, extrinsically or intrinsically, to take part seriously in
the crowdsourcing task, is highly questionable [57, 139]. Third, for the non-expert crowd to successfully complete the crowdsourcing work, some tasks are specifically designed to be composed
of easy but tedious microtasks [145], which might cause boredom and result in low-quality work.
Finally, noisy and unreliable responses to the tasks cannot be detected and tagged before aggregation so that appropriate weights could be assigned to responses [156]. For this reason, simple
majority voting is widely used as the aggregation rule and it takes all of the answers (including the
noisy and low quality ones) into account with the same weight [120].

3.1.1

Related Work

Different methods have been developed to deal with the above problems [57, 141, 145, 156], [69,
70,114,121,158]. In [70], the authors decompose a complex task into simple binary questions that
are easy for the workers in the crowd to accomplish. It is expected that very little knowledge would
be needed to complete the microtasks, and typically common sense or observation is good enough
for such microtasks. The authors in [145] employ taxonomy and dichotomous keys in the design
of the simple binary questions and the optimal question ordering problem in crowdsourcing is
considered in [50]. These schemes that break hard questions into simple ones lower the chance for
the workers to make mistakes in responding to each of the questions. Different decision fusion rules
are developed in order to deal with the unreliability of the crowd and increase the classification
accuracy [121, 156]. Varshney et al. [141] and Vempaty et al. [145] have proposed the use of
coding and decoding algorithms for reliable classification with unreliable crowd workers. The
comparison between group control and majority voting techniques are presented in [57], which
suggests that majority voting is more cost-efficient on simple binary tasks.
In the past literature, crowd workers could only submit a definitive yes/no answer in responding to a binary microtask/question. However, research in psychology [34] indicates a frequent
tendency to select the reject option (no choice) when the choice set offers several attractive alter-
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natives but none that can be easily justified as the best. In such cases, the workers may be unsure
in answering some of the questions because of their lack of expertise. For instance, phonemes in
some languages are very hard to distinguish, especially for foreigners [140]. To avoid requiring
workers to respond to microtasks beyond their expertise resulting in random guesses, Li et al. [79]
considered the optimal design of the aggregation rule in crowdsourcing systems where the workers
are not forced to make a binary choice when they are unsure of their response and can choose not to
respond. As shown in [66], the quality of label prediction can be improved by adopting a decision
rejection option to avoid results with low confidence. The reject option has also been considered
in machine learning and signal processing literature [7, 28, 110, 138]. With a reject option, the
payment mechanism is investigated in crowdsourcing systems where the workers can also report
their confidence about the submitted answers [123].
Additionally, in crowdsourcing systems, there can be greedy crowd workers, also known as
spammers, who aim to earn more monetary rewards by answering as many questions as possible.
They often submit random guesses independent of the questions being asked. The presence of
spammers degrades the system performance and has posed a threat to many crowdsourcing applications [148]. Currently, there are two categories of anti-spammer techniques in crowdsourcing:
a priori reputation system [33, 116] and a posteriori quality control [35, 36, 82]. The first method
aims to manage a pool of honest workers with high reputation, so as to ensure the reliability of
their answers. However, since the crowd is usually large, anonymous and transient, it is impractical to keep track of the workers’ answers and build up a trust relationship. In quality control
schemes, several verifiable (golden standard) questions are inserted for the workers to answer and
those who do not perform well on these questions are identified as spammers. However, due to the
heterogeneous expertise levels of the crowd workers and the subjective criterion used to decide on
a spammer, it is easy to mistakenly identify an honest worker to be a spammer, which discourages
the worker from participating in answering the questions next time. According to the study in [3],
it is better to treat all the crowd workers to be honest, than risking to identify honest workers as
spammers.
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We study the presence of spammers in the context of a scenario where crowd workers answer
questions with a reject option. The payment mechanism proposed in [123], which encourages the
workers to skip/reject answering a question below some confidence threshold, is employed. In this
scenario, both the honest workers and the spammers choose either to ‘answer a question’1 or ‘skip
a question’ to maximize their monetary rewards. In [123], the authors assume that the workers
are rational decision makers in the sense that they can perceive the expected payoff of taking each
decision without biases.

3.1.2

Major Technical Contributions

Since the crowd workers/spammers are humans, they are subject to cognitive biases in decision
making and have disparate behavioral properties. We employ Prospect Theory (PT) to model
the rationality of the crowd workers, and study their behavior while answering or skipping the
microtasks/questions2 in crowdsourcing that has a reject option. Based on the behavioral difference
between the honest workers and the spammers, we design the optimal aggregation rule at the fusion
center (FC) to combat the effects of spammers. The contributions of this chapter are two fold:
• By applying PT to model human cognitive biases, we study the optimal behavior of the honest workers and the spammers based on the payment mechanism proposed in [123]. This
payment mechanism has been proved to be the only mechanism that satisfies the “no-freelunch” rule and exhibits incentive compatibility. We find that the spammers should either
complete or skip all the microtasks in order to get the maximal reward. The statistical behavioral properties of the crowd determine whether the spammers should complete or skip
all the microtasks.
• We provide methods for estimating the number of spammers that is used for weight assignment. We also design an optimal aggregation rule where the workers are assigned appro1
2

In this case, honest workers submit their true answers and the spammers submit random guesses.
The terms ‘microtask’ and ‘question’ are used interchangeably in the chapter.

65
priate weights3 . The probability of correct classification and asymptotic performance of our
method are derived.
It should be noted that our approach only requires the workers to respond to several microtasks
in one session without identifying themselves. Hence, our proposed method can be employed in
many applications where the workers remain anonymous and, therefore, it is not required to keep
track of the workers’ profiles. On the other hand, instead of detecting the spammers, we estimate
and employ the number of spammers while designing the optimal counter-measure to ameliorate
their effects. The spammers still get paid according to the payment mechanism. As a result, the
risk of declaring honest workers as spammers and preventing them from further participation is
avoided.

3.2

Classification via Crowdsourcing with a Reject Option

We formulate the classification problem via crowdsourcing with a reject option in this section.
Assume that we have W workers participating in an M -ary classification task. There are N =
dlog2 M e simple binary questions to be answered by each worker, where we consider that the binary
questions are independent of each other and are of the same difficulty. For each of the questions,
the worker can either provide a definitive answer “1” (Yes) / “0” (No) [118, 145], or has a reject
option to skip the question, where a skipped answer is denoted as δ. Let aw represent the N -bit
word that contains the wth worker’s ordered answers to all the microtasks, where aw (i) ∈ {1, 0, δ}
for i = 1, . . . , N . We assume the following statistical properties for the honest workers in the
crowd: let pw,i be the probability that the wth worker submits δ to the ith question, i.e, aw (i) = δ,
and let rw,i be the probability that aw (i) is the correct answer to the ith question, given that the
worker has provided definitive answers “1” or “0”. Since the workers in the crowd are anonymous
and have diverse expertise levels, we consider that pw,i and rw,i are random and follow certain
probability density functions (PDFs) fp (p) and fr (r), respectively. The expected values of pw,i
3

A brief discussion on the weight assignment was presented in [78]. In this work, we elaborate on details and
explanations related to this model.
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and rw,i , namely, the average probability that a worker submits δ to a question, and the average
probability that an answer is correct given a definitive answer has been submitted, are denoted by
m and µ, respectively.
After the N -bit words regarding an object from all the workers are collected by the FC, the
object needs to be classified to a class dj ∈ D, j = 1, . . . , M , where D is the set of all the object
classes and dj is the jth class. From the N -bit word aw (i) submitted by the wth worker, one can
infer the classification decision of the wth worker namely the subset of classes Dw 4 to which the
object belongs to. At the FC, each class dj inside Dw increments its candidate score by the weight
assigned to the wth worker Ww . After incorporating the responses from all the W workers, the FC
determines the class with the highest overall candidate score to be the final classification result:

d∗ = arg max
dj ∈D

(W
X

)
Ww IDw hdj i , j = 1, . . . , M,

(3.1)

w=1

where IDw hdj i = 1 if dj ∈ Dw and IDw hdj i = 0 otherwise. The objective is to find the appropriate
weight assignment Ww for every worker in the crowd, so that the best classification performance
can be achieved. One approach is to split the M -ary classification task into N binary hypothesis
testing problems, each of which determines a bit in the N -bit word. For each hypothesis testing
r

problem, the Chair-Varshney rule gives the optimal weight as Ww = log 1−rw,iw,i [19]. However, this
requires the prior knowledge regarding rw,i for every worker, which is not available in practice.
One may also look into the minimization of the misclassification probability, for which a closedform expression for Ww cannot be derived due to the lack of prior knowledge of pw,i and rw,i .
We developed a weight assignment scheme to optimize the crowd workers’ weights [79]:
maximize EC [W]

(3.2)

subject to EO [W] = K
where EC [W] denotes the crowd’s average weight contribution to the correct class and EO [W]
If all the responses from the wth worker are definitive, Dw is a singleton. Otherwise, Dw contains multiple
classes.
4
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denotes the average weight contribution to all possible classes. We set K to be a constant so that
the portion of weight contribution to the correct class is maximized while the weight contribution
to all the classes remains fixed. By assuming that there are no spammers in the crowd, we showed
that the weight assigned to the wth worker is Ww = µ−n , where n represents the number of definitive answers the worker submits in total. This method significantly outperforms the conventional
majority voting approach.
In this following sections, we investigate the impact of spammers on system performance.
Based on the payment mechanism that encourages the workers to skip the questions about which
they are not sure, we characterize the behavior of both honest workers and spammers in realistic
environments where they are subject to cognitive biases while decision making. With this information, we estimate the number of spammers in the crowd and design the weight assignment strategy
for every worker to ameliorate the impacts of the spammers and maximize the system performance.

3.3

Behavior of the Honest Crowdworkers

In this section, we consider that there are no spammers in the crowd and explore the workers’
behavior in answering or skipping a microtask. We adopt the payment mechanism proposed in
[123], which encourages the use of the reject option when the confidence of answering a question
is low. The mechanism was proved to be the only incentive-compatible mechanism that satisfies
the “no-free-lunch” axiom (“no-free-lunch” axiom requires that the payment is minimum possible
if all the answers attempted by the worker in the gold standard questions are wrong). Under this
payment mechanism, we discuss the optimal behavior for the honest workers when they are rational
decision makers and want to maximize their monetary rewards. Next, considering that the honest
workers are human decision makers that are subject to cognitive biases in practice, we employ
Prospect Theory to model their behavioral property and analyze their decision making strategy in
realistic environments. Compared to the case where the workers are assumed to behave rationally,
it is shown that the behavioral factors captured in PT may cause the humans to act quite differently.
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3.3.1

Payment Mechanism and Optimal Behavior of Rational Crowd
Workers

The payment to the worker is based on the answers that the worker gives to the G gold standard
questions (which are not known to the crowdworkers in advance). The goal of the mechanism is
to incentivize the worker to skip the questions for which its confidence is lower than a threshold
T , where confidence about an answer is the probability of this answer being correct. The value
of T ∈ [0, 1] is chosen a priori based on factors such as the targeted performance quality. A
larger value of T leads to a higher probability that a question is skipped (or equivalently, a lower
probability that this question is answered). When T is large, the answer has a higher probability
of being correct given that a definitive answer has been submitted. Let f denote the payment rule,
which is proposed in [123] and is written as

f (x1 , . . . , xG ) = κ

G
Y

αxi + µmin

(3.3)

i=1

where xj ∈ {−1, δ, +1}, 1 ≤ j ≤ G, are the responses to the gold standard questions. “−1” denotes that the worker attempted to answer the microtask and the answer was incorrect, “δ” denotes
that the worker skipped the microtask, and “+1” denotes that the worker attempted to answer the
microtask and the answer was correct. Set α−1 = 0, αδ = 1, α+1 = T1 , and κ = (µmax − µmin ) T G
with budget parameters µmax and µmin denoting the maximum and minimum payments respecG
Q
tively. Note that µmin is a constant that represents the fixed reward, and κ αxi represents the
i=1

variable reward that is determined by the worker’s answers. According to the payment mechanism, the variable reward is multiplied by a factor of

1
T

when the worker answers the microtask

and the answer is correct, and the variable reward reduces to 0 if the answer is wrong. Therefore,
only when the worker’s confidence towards a microtask is higher than T , the expected payoff is
positive and it is beneficial for the worker to answer the microtask. Otherwise, there is a loss in
expected reward if the answer to the microtask is incorrect and in this case the worker should use
the skip option. Note that when the confidence is exactly equal to T , the worker can choose to
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either answer or skip the microtask. Under this payment mechanism, the workers are encouraged
to use the reject option when they are not sure of their answer, i.e., when the confidence regarding
the question is smaller than T . Next, we employ PT to model the rationality of the crowd workers
in deciding to answer or skip a microtask.

3.3.2

Behavior of Crowdworkers Predicted by Prospect Theory

In this subsection, we analyze the behavior of the honest workers while considering their cognitive
biases. According to the expected utility theory (EUT) [97], when a decision maker selects an
action from a set of alternative choices, the one that results in a higher expected payoff is always
preferred. In realistic decision making environments, we employ PT to model the rationality of the
crowdworkers and study their strategy in responding to the microtasks. In our set up, the crowdworker has to decide whether to answer or skip a particular microtask based on the confidence
t, i.e., the probability of correctly answering the microtask. Under PT, we use the value function
(2.1) to model the workers’ valuation towards gains and losses, and use the weight function (2.2) to
model the workers’ perception of probabilities. We show that a behaviorally biased crowdworker
makes decisions according to the following theorem to maximize the subjective payoff.
Theorem 3.1. If the confidence of a crowdworker with behavioral parameters α, β and λ towards
a question is t, then he/she decides to answer or skip a question according to the following rule:
t
1−t
P ROOF :

answer

≷

skip



βT
1−T

 αλ
, η.

(3.4)

Let the perception of the variable reward before answering the question be denoted

as Z. According to the payment mechanism (3.3), Z = (µmax − µmin )T G before answering any
question. In case that the worker has already provided definitive answers to i = 1, . . . , L questions,
Q
the expected variable reward is Z = (µmax − µmin )T G Li=1 tTi , where ti is the worker’s confidence
on the ith question. Hence, we have Z > 0.
If the worker decides to answer the question, there is a probability of t that the answer is correct
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and Z is multiplied by T1 , and a probability of 1 − t that the answer is wrong leading to Z = 0. By
using the current expected reward Z as a reference point, and applying the value function to the
gains (losses) and the probability weighting function to the probabilities, the subjective payoff if
the worker answers this question is expressed as:

SP (t) = w(t)v(Z(

1
− 1)) + w(1 − t)v(−Z)
T

(3.5)

On the other hand, if the worker skips the question, the expected reward Z stays the same and
hence, the subjective payoff is 0. The worker makes a decision by choosing the action which
answer

yields a higher subjective payoff: SP

≷

0, which becomes the result of Theorem 1 after

skip

simplification.
Note that (3.4) can be written as:
answer

t

≷

skip

t∗ ,

η
.
1+η

(3.6)

For a rational decision maker with α = β = λ = 1, t∗ = T and the decision rule (3.4) suggests
answering the question if t > T , and skip the question otherwise. We find that when βT ≥ 1 − T ,
t∗ becomes larger, i.e., the worker is more likely to skip the question, as β, λ increase and α
decreases. Otherwise, t∗ becomes smaller as λ increases and α, β decrease.
We consider that all the binary questions are equally difficult and the wth crowd worker has
average confidence t of answering a question correctly. Let t follow the PDF ftw (t). According
to the behavior characterized in (3.6), the probability that the wth crowd worker skips a question
R t∗
can be expressed as pw = 0 ftw (t)dt. The probability that the answer is correct, given the wth
R1
worker has submitted a definitive answer, can be expressed as rw = t∗ ftw (t)dt. Statistically, pw
determines the number of definitive answers n of the wth worker and rw determines µ. Recall
that the weight assignment scheme in [79] is Ww (n) = µ−n . The variations of pw and rw in
the crowd may lead to different weights assigned to the workers. Given the confidence PDFs of
all the workers Ft = {ft1 (t), . . . , ftW (t)} and a priori T , the classification performance obtained
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assuming that the workers are rational is not accurate in predicting the system performance in
realistic situations, where the crowd workers make decisions under cognitive biases. The first part
of our simulations in Section 3.6 provides comparisons between the system performance for a
crowd with different behavioral properties.

3.4

Classification in the Presence of Spammers

Spammers are known to exist in large numbers on crowdsourcing platforms. They submit their
answers randomly without being relevant to the question being asked, in the hope of earning some
extra money. In this section, we determine the optimal behavior of the spammers that maximizes
their expected monetary reward based on the payment mechanism (3.3). By optimal behavior, we
mean the optimal number of questions to be skipped by the spammers. We assume that a spammer
skips g out of G gold standard questions, and answers the remaining G − g by random guesses.

3.4.1

Spammers are Rational

First, we assume that the spammers behave rationally, i.e., they do not have cognitive biases while
calculating the expected payoffs of answering or skipping a question. We hereby define the spammers that skip all the microtasks as Type I spammers, and the spammers that complete all the
microtasks as Type II spammers.
Proposition 3.1. To maximize the expected monetary reward, a rational spammer completes all
the microtasks (Type II) if T < 12 , and skips all the microtasks (Type I) otherwise.
P ROOF : If a spammer skips g out of G gold standard questions and answers the remaining G − g
with random guesses, the expected monetary reward E for the spammer is expressed as

E = (µmax − µmin )T

G

G
Y

αxi + µmin

i=1

1
1
= (µmax − µmin )T G ( )G−g ( )G−g + µmin
2
T
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1
= (µmax − µmin )( )G (2T )g + µmin ,
2

(3.7)

where X = {x1 , . . . , xG } are the spammer’s responses to the gold standard questions. Since
0 ≤ g ≤ G, E is maximized as following

if T <

1
1
⇒ g = 0, if T > ⇒ g = G.
2
2

(3.8)

The above proposition gives the optimal strategy for the spammers to participate in the crowdsourcing task. Since a spammer can not distinguish the gold standard ones from the other questions, the result derived in Proposition 3.1 indicates that the spammers should either complete or
skip all the questions according to the value of T to maximize their expected monetary reward.
In realistic applications, the FC selects T (T > 1/2) to ensure the high quality of the workers’
definitive answers (note that the workers’ minimum possible value of the confidence regarding a
question is 1/2, when the answer is a random guess). In this case, according to Proposition 3.1,
all the spammers are Type I and choose to skip all the microtasks. It is shown later in Appendix
A.3 that the answers from Type I spammers who respond δ to all the microtasks are not aggregated
for decision fusion. In other words, the weights assigned to Type I spammers do not affect the
aggregation result and in this sense, we can consider all Type I spammers to be honest. As a result,
by assuming that spammers behave rationally, all the workers in the crowd can be treated as honest
ones and the weight assignment scheme is Ww (n) = µ−n .

3.4.2

Spammers are Modeled by PT

As the spammers are also human decision makers, we employ PT to model their rationality and
predict their behavior in completing the micro-tasks. From the result of Theorem 3.1, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. To maximize the subjective monetary reward under PT, a spammer with behavioral
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parameters α, β, λ completes all the microtasks (Type II) if T >

1
,
β+1

and skips all the tasks (Type

I) otherwise.
P ROOF : Since a spammer employs random guesses to respond to the microtasks, t = 1/2. From
the result of Theorem 3.1 and note α > 0, λ > 0, the corollary follows.
Based on the above analysis of the spammers’ behavior, we study the optimal weight assignment strategy at the FC and the classification performance in this section. As mentioned earlier, the
workers/spammers in crowdsourcing systems have different backgrounds and are heterogeneous in
their behavioral parameters α, β, λ. Considering that the spammers behave according to Corollary
3.1, we need the loss aversion coefficient β to predict whether the spammers answer or skip all
the questions. Since the spammers remain anonymous in the crowd and certainly do not want to
expose themselves, elicitation of parameter β for the spammers is not possible. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that among the crowd workers of size W , there are a total of
M = M0 + MN spammers, with M0 Type I spammers skipping all the microtasks and MN Type
II spammers completing all the N microtasks.
The presence of spammers will significantly affect the classification performance of the crowdsourcing system, which may make it even worse when the spammers are starting to act strategically.
To ameliorate the spammers’ impact on system performance, we propose the aggregation rule for
the FC by maximizing the candidate score assigned to the correct classification class as in (3.2).
We denote our method as Amelioration of Spammers under PT (ASPT).
Proposition 3.2. In a crowd with M0 Type I spammers and MN Type II spammers, the weight for
the wth worker’s answer under formulation (3.2) is given by
−1
δ (n − N )
Ww (n) = (W − M ) µ +
2N (1 − m)N


n

MN

(3.9)

where n represents the number of definitive answers submitted by the wth worker, and δ(·) is the
Dirac lambda function.
P ROOF : See Appendix A.3.
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Since the answers from Type I spammers who respond δ to all the microtasks are not aggregated
for decision fusion, M0 does not appear in the expression (3.9). In our scheme, the honest workers
whose answers are not all definitive employ weights equal to Ww (n) =

1
.
(W −M )µn

This is the same

as the weight assignment Ww (n) = µ−n developed in [79], where all the workers are assumed to
be honest5 . For workers who submit all definitive answers, the weight is decreased to a smaller
value by adding

MN
2N (1−m)N

to the denominator of

1
.
(W −M )µn

The weight assigned to a worker with

all definitive answers, namely, Ww (N ) can not be large because it is likely that this worker is a
spammer. On the other hand, since it is possible that this worker is honest, Ww (N ) can not be too
small. Essentially maximization of the candidate score for the correct classification class gives the
optimal value of Ww (N ), leading to the expression in (3.9). The larger MN is, the more likely that
a worker with all definitive answers is a spammer. Correspondingly, Ww (N ) is smaller.

3.5

Parameter Estimation and Performance Analysis of ASPT

In this section, we present the parameter estimation technique used in our proposed method. Classification performance and asymptotic performance will also be examined.

3.5.1

Parameter Estimation

The FC needs to estimate the crowd parameters µ, m, MN , M0 before assigning weights to the
workers. Following [79], either the Training-based or the Majority-voting based method is adopted
to estimate µ. The estimate of m is given by the ratio of the sum of skipped questions and all the
questions attempted by the crowd. Since m and µ represent statistical parameters for the honest
workers in the crowd, the workers completing or skipping all the questions are not incorporated
in the parameter estimation procedure to mitigate the impacts of spammers. The number of Type
I and II spammers M0 and MN are jointly estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) method. G gold standard questions are inserted into the N classification questions, so that
5

W − M is a constant representing the number of honest workers in our scheme. Here, this constant acts as a
scaling parameter.
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a worker responds to a total of N + G questions. After answers from all the workers are collected
by the FC, we count the number of workers submitting N + G definitive answers and skipping
all the microtasks, denoted be WN +G and W0 , respectively. Given the numbers of Type I and II
spammers M0 and MN , the joint PDF of WN +G and W0 , f (WN +G , W0 |MN , M0 ), is expressed in

a!
(3.10), where m̂ is the estimated m, and ab = (a−b)!b!
.


W − M0 − MN
f (WN +G , W0 |MN , M0 ) =
(m̂N +G )W0 −M0 (1 − m̂N +G )W −W0 −MN
W0 − M0


W −WN +G −W0
W − W0 − MN
(3.10)
×
(1 − m̂)(N +G)(WN +G −MN ) 1 − (1 − m̂)N +G
WN +G − MN
Therefore, by the MLE method, the estimates of M0 and MN , which are denoted by M̂0 and M̂N
respectively, can be obtained as
n
o
M̂N , M̂0 = arg

max

{MN ,M0 }≥0

f (WN +G , W0 |MN , M0 ).

(3.11)

By writing W = W0 , . . . , Wi , . . . , WN +G where Wi is the number of workers submitting i definitive answers for i = 0, . . . , N + G, MN and M0 can be more accurately estimated according
to
n
o
M̂N , M̂0 = arg

max

{MN ,M0 }≥0

f (W|MN , M0 ).

(3.12)

However, the likelihood function f (W|MN , M0 ) becomes very complicated to compute. As we
will see later in the simulation results section, the approach using (3.11) is sufficient to get a
relatively accurate estimate of MN and M0 . After the estimates of µ̂, m̂, M̂N , and M̂0 are obtained,
the FC can assign the appropriate weight to each worker based on (3.9) and use the answers for
aggregation.
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3.5.2

Performance Analysis

In this section, we assume that there are M0 Type I spammers and MN Type II spammers in a
crowd population of size W . The spammers attempt to maximize their monetary rewards under
the PT model as presented in Section 3.4. The probability of correct classification Pc is investigated
for the weight assignment scheme (3.9). For simplicity, we assume that the prior probabilities of
the true answers for each microtask to be “0” or “1” are equal. Note that we have a correct overall
classification only when all the N microtasks are correctly labeled.
Proposition 3.3. The probability of correct classification Pc in the crowdsourcing system is




iN
1 X W, M
1 X W, M
0
0
Pc =
+
(F (G) − F (G)) +
(F (G) − F (G))
2 2 S
4 S0
G
G
h1

(3.13)

with


q−n+qn
 MNY
N
N −1
1
q−n qn
n N −n
(1−µ) µ
(1−m) m
F (G) = m
2
n−1
n=1

(3.14)



q−n+qn
 MNY
N
N −1
1
qn q−n
n N −n
(1−µ) µ
(1−m) m
F (G) = m
2
n−1
n=1

(3.15)

q0

and

0

q0

where

G=

{(q−N , q−N +1 , . . . qN , MN0 , MN00 )

:

N
X

qn = W − MN − M0 , MN0 + MN00 = MN }, (3.16)

n=−N

and qn , MN0 , and MN00 take values from natural numbers {0, 1, . . . },
(
S = G:

N
X
n=1

)
0
00
(qn −q−n )Ww (n)+(MN
−MN
)Ww (N ) > 0 ,

(3.17)
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(
0

S = G:

N
X

)
0
00
(qn −q−n )Ww (n)+(MN
−MN
)Ww (N )

=0 ,

(3.18)

n=1

and

W,M
G



=

(W −M0 )!
Q
.
0 !M 00 ! N
MN
n=−N qn !
N

P ROOF : See Appendix A.4.

3.5.3

Asymptotic Performance Analysis

In a practical situation, the number of workers for the crowdsourcing task is relatively large (normally in the hundreds). Then, it is of great value to investigate the asymptotic system performance
when W approaches infinity. Here, we give the asymptotic performance characterization for a
large crowd, i.e., for a large W .
Proposition 3.4. As the number of workers W approaches infinity, the probability of correct classification Pc can be expressed as
 
N
M
Pc = Q − √
,
V
where Q(x) =

√1
2π

R∞
x

e

−t2
2

(3.19)

dt, and M and V are given in (3.20)

N −1

(W − M ) (2µ − 1) (1 − m)N ZM
(2µ − 1) (1 − m) 1 − m
M=
+m
+
µ
µ
(W − M ) µN ZM + MN
 2

N −1
(W − M )(1 − m)N + MN ZM
1−m
1−m
M2
V=
+
m
+
−
. (3.20)
(W − M ) µ2
µ2
W −M
((W − M )µN ZM + MN )2
with ZM = 2N (1 − m)N .
P ROOF : See Appendix A.5.
As stated above, the size of the crowd in practice can be fairly large and the asymptotic result
derived in (3.19) is a good characterization of the actual performance. We further consider that the
percentages of Type I and Type II spammers in the crowd are γ and  respectively and give the
analysis for the following two cases:
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= γ > 0, lim MWN =  = 0. In this situation, we have M =
W →∞

N −1
(2µ−1)(1−m) 1−m
(2µ−1)(1−m)N
+m
+
, which is a constant given m, µ and N . V =
µ
µ
µN


(1−m)N
1
1−m 1−m
N −1
2
( µ2 + m)
+ µN − M . Note that W (1 − γ) represents the number
W (1−γ)
µ2

• Case 1:

lim MO
W →∞ W

of honest workers in the crowd. As there are more honest workers in the crowd, V becomes
smaller and the probability of correct classification becomes larger. The expressions of M
and V analytically show that as long as the number of honest workers is fixed, the number of
Type I spammers have no impact on the system performance.
MO
W →∞ W
(2µ−1)(1−m)N ZM
.

µN ZM + 1−

• Case 2: lim

MN
W →∞ W

= γ = 0, lim

=  > 0. We have M =

(2µ−1)(1−m)
µ



1−m
µ

N −1
+m
+

As the percentage of Type II spammers in the crowd  increases, M be-

comes smaller and the classification performance in terms of Pc deteriorates. In this scenario,
it is not easy to show the monotonicity of V with respect to  and we rely on simulations to
show that the probability of correct classification decreases as  is larger.

3.6

Simulation Results

In the first part of this section, we consider that there are no spammers in the crowd. Simulations
are provided to illustrate how PT affect the workers’ behavior and system performance.

3.6.1

Crowdsourcing without Spammers

We plot the actual confidence thresholds of cognitively biased crowdworkers t∗ with respect to
the pre-designed threshold T in Fig. 2 for humans with different behavioral properties. It can be
observed that t∗ becomes larger as T increases. Since we restrict that T ≥ 0.5, βT > (1 − T ) is
satisfied. As a result, in Fig. 3.1(a) we see that t∗ becomes larger as β increases and in Fig. 3.1(b)
we see that t∗ becomes smaller when α increases. Note that in the green curve in the upper subplot,
α = 0.69, β = 2.25 and λ = 0.88 are the mean values of behavioral parameters of the humans
from the experiment in [135]. Hence, for this group of population, the green curve represents the
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average t∗ employed by the nominal cognitively biased workers. Since t∗ > T , we can see that the
workers are more likely to use the skip option in practice.

Fig. 3.1: Confidence thresholds of cognitively biased crowdworkers based on PT
Next, we assume that the confidence t of the crowd workers follows a uniform distribution
U (0.5, x) where x is uniformly distributed in [0.7, 0.9]. The size of the crowd is W = 30 and the
confidence threshold T is set equal to 0.6. There are N = 3 microtasks and G = 3 gold standard
questions. In Fig. 3.2 , we plot the system performance in terms of probability of correct classification Pc for crowds with different behavioral parameters. If the workers in the crowd are assumed
to be rational, i.e., α = β = λ = 1, we obtain that Pc = 0.8445 and as the behavioral parameters change, Pc has different values. Basically, given the distribution of the workers’ confidence
t, different behavioral parameters lead to different confidence threshold t∗ , which in turn causes
variations of the statistical parameters m and µ of the crowd, leading to different classification performances. In the upper subplot where the probability distortion factor α = 0.68, Pc first increases
and then decreases as the loss aversion parameter β becomes larger. Besides, Pc is higher as the
diminishing marginal utility parameter λ has a smaller value. In this case, appropriate values of β
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and λ counter the probability distortion factor α and improve the system performance. The behavioral parameters α, β and λ jointly determine the overall probability of correct classification Pc .
Moreover, we can observe that the best achievable Pc in this subplot is higher than Pc = 0.8445
when the crowd workers are assumed to be rational. In the lower subplot where β = 2.25, Pc
monotonically decreases as α decreases from 1 to 0.5. Same to the upper subplot, we have Pc
become larger as λ has a smaller value.

Fig. 3.2: Classification accuracy when crowd workers have different behavioral parameters.

3.6.2

Crowdsourcing in the Presence of Spammers

In this subsection, we present some simulation results to illustrate the advantage of our proposed
method ASPT, in which PT is employed to characterize the behavior of spammers. W = 50
workers participate in a crowdsourcing task with N = 3 microtasks and G = 3 gold standard
questions. fp (p) is chosen as a uniform distribution U (0.2, 0.8), so that the average probability
of a honest worker skipping a task is m = 0.6. Let fr (r) be a uniform distribution expressed as
U (x, 1) with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and thus we can have µ varying from 0.5 to 1.
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Table 3.1: Estimates of the number of spammers M0 and MN
M N M0

1

3

5

7

9

11

13

15

17

19

1

1,0 1,3 1,5 1,8 2,9 2,12 1,14 2,15 2,17 2,20

3

3,1 3,2 3,5 4,7 4,9 3,11 3,14 3,15 3,18 3,20

5

5,2 5,3 5,6 6,7 5,9 6,11 6,14 5,17 6,18 5,19

7

7,0 8,4 7,5 8,8 7,10 8,12 7,13 7,17 7,17 8,20

9

9,1 9,4 9,5 10,7 9,9 11,11 9,13 10,15 11,17 9,20

11

11,1 11,5 11,5 12,8 11,6 12,11 11,13 11,16 11,17 12,19

13

13,2 13,6 13,5 14,8 13,9 13,11 14,13 13,16 13,17 14,19

15

15,1 15,3 16,6 16,7 15,9 17,11 15,13 15,15 15,17 15,19

17

17,1 18,4 17,5 17,8 17,9 17,12 18,13 17,16 18,17 18,19

19

20,2 19,2 19,5 19,8 19,9 19,11 19,13 19,16 20,17 21,19

21

21,2 21,3 22,5 21,7 21,9 22,12 21,13 21,15 21,17 21,19

23

23,1 24,3 25,5 23,9 24,9 24,11 25,13 23,16 23,17 23,19

25

26,1 26,3 25,6 25,7 26,9 26,12 25,13 25,15 26,17 25,20

First, we show the efficiency of our methods for estimating the parameters M0 and MN . Table
3.1 shows the estimation results of M0 and MN , when the true numbers of spammers are M0 =
{1, 3, . . . , 19} and MN = {1, 3, . . . , 25}. Here, µ is set as 0.75. The estimation process is based on
the distribution of the number of workers completing and skipping all the questions WN +G and W0 ,
and we can see from the table that most pairs of numbers M0 and MN can be exactly estimated,
and the estimation errors are at most ±1.
We present the performance comparison between different aggregation rules in Fig. 3.3, where
the quality of the crowd µ varies. For illustration, we assume that there are 14 spammers in a crowd
of 50 workers, and we have 7 spammers completing all the questions and the other 7 skipping all
the questions. As µ increases, we plot the probability of correct classification Pc of four different
weight assignment methods. The first one is the ASPT developed in this chapter, where we employ
PT for modeling the behavior of the spammers. In the second approach, we exclude the workers
who submit all definitive answers and treat the remaining workers to be honest. The weights
assigned to the honest workers are given by Ww = µ−n [79]. The third one is where we consider
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Fig. 3.3: Performance comparison with spammers as µ increases.
the existence of spammer without incorporating PT, where all the spammers are assumed to be
Type I and the FC treats all the workers to be honest, i.e., weight assignment rule is Ww = µ−n no
matter whether the workers submit all definitive answers or not. The last approach is conventional
majority voting without a reject option, where all the workers are assigned the same weight. It can
be seen in Fig.4 that at µ = 0.5, all the four curves merge to the same point. It is because when
µ = 0.5, even the honest workers are making random guesses like a spammer. In this case, the
FC collects no useful information from the crowd and the choice of weight assignment schemes
does not make a difference. As the quality of the crowd, µ, improves, the system performance
also improves as expected. The proposed ASPT performs better than the method that excludes
the workers with all definitive answers and the method that treats all the workers to be honest,
which outperform the conventional majority voting approach that does not have a reject option. It
should be noted that the second and the third methods have very similar performances. Compared
to treating all the workers as honest ones, excluding the workers who submit all definitive answers
has the advantage of removing the side effects of Type II spammers. At the same time, however, the
second method may also remove the honest workers who submit all definitive answers for decision
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fusion, leading to a potential deterioration. Hence, this trade-off determines whether the second
approach performs better than the third approach or not.

Fig. 3.4: Performance comparison with different numbers of spammers.
In Fig. 3.4, we plot the performance comparison when the number of spammers changes. For
simplicity, we set that M0 = MN , and µ is fixed at 0.75. As the number of spammers increases,
the classification performance degrades, where the ASPT method gives the best performance. Furthermore, there are two phenomena that need to be discussed:
1): When the number of spammers is small, the conventional majority voting method is outperformed by the one that treats all the workers as honest. However, this is not the case when the
number of spammers is large. The reason is that with honest workers, the FC assigns a greater
weight to the worker with a larger number of definitive answers. In the regime where MN is large,
which means that the number of spammers completing all the questions is large, the impact from
the spammers is much more severe on the performance with such a weight assignment scheme.
Thus, the corresponding performance degrades significantly.
2): When the number of spammers is small, the method that excludes the workers who submit
all definitive answers performs better than the method that treats all the workers to be honest, and
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vice versa. It can be explained by the fact that in the crowd when the percentage of spammers is
small, the second method (the one that excludes the workers who submit all definitive answers) has
a smaller probability to remove Type II spammers and has a higher probability to remove honest
workers. On the other hand, when the percentage of spammers is large, the probability of excluding
Type II spammers is large and that of excluding honest workers is small.

Fig. 3.5: Performance comparison as W increases.
Lastly, we keep the number of spammers in the crowd fixed, with M0 = MN = 7 and plot
the asymptotic performance as the crowd population W increases in Fig. 3.5. We can see that our
proposed approach has the best performance among all the weight assignment strategies. Analogous to the explanations provided for results presented in Fig. 3.4, we observe that when W is
small, i.e., when the percentage of spammers is large, the method that excludes the workers with
all definitive answers and the majority voting method outperform the method that treats all the
workers to be honest, and vice versa.
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3.7

Summary

We have explored a novel framework of crowdsourcing systems to solve classification problems,
where the crowd workers may skip a microtask if the confidence regarding the question being
asked is lower than a threshold. Our scheme is extremely effective in dealing with spammers as
it: (a) exploits the behavioral differences of honest workers and spammers in realistic situations,
where the rationality of humans is modeled via PT; (b) estimates the number of spammers in the
crowd and (c) designs the optimal weight for every worker in the weighted majority voting fusion
rule. We provided analytical expressions for probability of correct classification and asymptotic
system performance. Compared to rational decision makers, the honest crowd workers and spammers behave in a different manner if PT is incorporated to model their rationality. To accurately
characterize the system performance, the behavioral property of the crowd must be taken into consideration. Simulation results illustrated the efficiency of our method compared to other weight
assignment schemes that do not include the humans behavior using a prospect theoretic approach.
This chapter employed a psychologically accurate description of human behavior in crowdsourcing environments. We provided insights in designing strategies to ameliorate the side impacts
of human spammers. Our study can also be applied to analyze and model sophisticated human behavior under different payment mechanisms in many applications. Our future work includes the
study of task allocation in crowdsourcing considering the behavioral differences of the crowd. As
the security issues of distributed inference systems are becoming increasingly important, we also
plan to investigate the robustness of the proposed crowdsourcing algorithm against adversarial
attacks.
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C HAPTER 4

D ECISION T REE D ESIGN FOR
C LASSIFICATION VIA C ROWDSOURCING

In this chapter, we present a novel sequential paradigm for classification via a decision tree in
crowdsourcing systems. Considering that workers are unreliable and they perform the tests with
errors, we study the construction of decision trees so as to minimize the probability of misclassification. By exploiting the connection between the probability of mis-classification and
entropy at each level of the decision tree, we propose two algorithms for decision tree design.
Furthermore, the worker assignment problem is studied when workers can be assigned to different tests of the decision tree to provide a trade-off between classification cost and resulting error
performance.

4.1

Introduction

In recent work on classification in crowdsourcing systems, complex questions are often replaced
by a set of simpler binary questions (microtasks) to enhance classification performance [78, 79,
145]. This is especially helpful in situations where crowd workers lack expertise for responding to
complex questions directly. Each worker is given the entire set of questions in a batch mode and
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the workers provide their responses in the form of a vector. These binary questions can be posted
as “microtasks” on crowdsourcing platforms like Amazon Mechanical Turk [13]. To improve
classification performance in crowdsourcing systems, most of the works in the literature focus on
enhancing the quality of individual tests, by designing fusion rules to combine decisions from
heterogeneous workers [32, 64, 78, 79, 145], and by investigating the assignment of different tests
to different workers depending upon their skill level [58, 119]. These problems have also been
considered for budget-constrained environments to improve classification performance [59,70,83].
In this chapter, we present a new paradigm for classification in crowdsourcing systems in which
binary questions (micro-tasks) are asked in a sequential manner. This novel sequential paradigm
in terms of a decision tree has not been considered in the literature. This paradigm provides the
opportunity to order the sequence of tests for more efficient classification by reducing the number
of questions asked on an average. Furthermore, we can obtain a trade-off in terms of cost (number
of questions asked) and performance by performing task assignment and using only a subset of
workers per node of the decision tree. Best performance with the decision tree paradigm can be
achieved when all workers respond to every test in the decision tree. However, as shown in this
paper, the performance with the proposed worker assignment, where each worker only responds to
one test as opposed to all the tests in the tree, is comparably when the number of workers is large.

4.1.1

Related Work

Information theoretic methods have been used to construct effective decision trees [54, 94]. Classical algorithms utilize a top-down tree structure, such as ID3, C4.5, and CART [11, 112, 113].
They categorize the objects at each node(test) into tree branches until a leaf is reached, and objects
in this leaf are considered to belong to the same class. At each node, these algorithms employ a
thresholding-based test on a certain attribute, such that the test can categorize the objects. ID3 and
C4.5 construct the decision tree by maximizing the information gain at each node, which is defined
as reduction in entropy. In CART, the Gini impurity is minimized in test selection at each node.
The first strong assumption in traditional algorithms is that all the tests are error-free in de-
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termining whether or not an attribute exceeds the threshold. However, in practical crowdsourcing
systems, due to the noise in observing or measuring the attribute, there exist errors and uncertainties
when workers perform the tests. For objects belonging to different classes, the error probability
corresponding to a specific test could also be different. Existing algorithms fail to address the
concern that the error probabilities of tests play an important role in the design of the decision tree.
Another limitation of these algorithms is the assumption of completely known information of
the attributes of the objects to compute the information gain and Gini impurity, i.e., probability
p(cj |ci , t) at node t, cj , ci ∈ C, where ci is the correct class and cj is the result of the test. Even
though some algorithms [113] can handle missing attributes information, they simply discard the
missing attributes and use the remaining ones for the decision tree construction. In the process of
decision tree construction, they need to decide not only which attribute to use, but also the optimal
threshold. The run time complexity goes up to O(XY 2 ), where X is the number of objects and Y
is the number of attributes [81]. Moreover, in practical crowdsourcing applications, we might not
have the complete information p(cj |ci , t) available. What we have are a limited number of tests
(binary questions), and the corresponding test results. This important problem of decision tree
design for practical scenarios is considered in this chapter.

4.1.2

Major Technical Contributions

Instead of assuming that each test in a decision tree is perfect, we consider the fact that there may
be errors when tests are performed and develop an efficient algorithm to construct decision trees for
the imperfect test scenario. The resulting tree is applicable to many practical problems including
to classification performed by unreliable crowdsourcing workers. In our algorithm, the decision
tree is constructed by utilizing a given set of tests, where each test gives a binary result 0 or 1
depending on which class the object belongs to. We do not assume the availability of complete
knowledge of p(cj |ci , t). We provide performance guarantees in terms of an upper bound on the
probability of mis-classification (or a lower bound on the probability of correct classification). The
time complexity of our algorithm is polynomial of M , which is the number of tests. Since M is
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usually much smaller than X and Y , our complexity is reduced significantly compared to the other
methods, e.g., the one proposed in [81]. After the decision tree is constructed, we employ it for
classification via crowdsourcing. To reduce cost in terms of the number of questions asked while
maintaining low probability of mis-classification, we further develop an algorithm to efficiently
assign workers to different tests, to obtain a trade-off between the probability of mis-classification
and the cost of crowdsourcing.

4.2

System Model

Consider a classification problem that is to be solved via crowdsourcing. Suppose there is a set of
objects O, and each object within the set needs to be classified to a class ci ∈ C, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }.
The prior probability that an object in O belongs to ci is denoted as p(ci ). An unknown object
passes through a series of simple tests (nodes in the decision tree) until it reaches a leaf node and
gets classified. We consider that each test Tm ∈ {T1 , T2 , . . . , TM } provides a binary output for a
subset of O, thus bifurcating the subset of objects into two output subsets. If an object belonging to
ci gets mis-categorized at test Tm , a misclassification will happen in the end and this corresponding
error probability is demoted by pi,m . Table 4.1 gives an example of decision table along with the
probability assignment and Fig. 4.1 gives two possible testing algorithms. As indicated by Table
4.1, tests {Ti }4i=1 can bifurcate the entire set O and T5 can only bifurcate a subset of objects
belonging to the classes {c1 , c2 , c3 , c5 }. Assuming that all the tests have the same error probability
pi,m = 0.05, the final misclassification probabilities in Fig. 4.1 (a) and Fig. 4.1 (b) are 0.068 and
0.05 respectively. Thus, we can see that even though the same set of tests are employed, different
decision tree structures (ordering of tests) have different probabilities of mis-classification. Our
goal is to build a decision tree that minimizes the mis-classification probability.
Define the test level Ld , d ∈ {0, 1, . . . , D} as in Fig. 4.2, where D is the depth of the tree
structure. At each level Ld , define the partitions of classes induced by the tests applied so far to
be γd = {γd1 , γd2 , . . . , γd,|γd | }, where |γd | is the cardinality of the partition set γd and it implies the
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Table 4.1: Decision Table
Class
c1
c2
c3
c4

Test
p(ci )
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5

0.20
0
1
0
0
0

0.05
0
0
1
1
1

0.10
0
0
0
0
1

c5

0.60
1
1
0
1
-

0.05
0
1
1
1
1

c1 , c2 , c3 , c4 , c5
T1
c1 , c2 , c3 , c4 , c5

c1 , c2 , c3 , c5

T3

T5

c1 , c3 , c4

c2 , c5

T4

T2

c1 , c3 c4

c2

c4

c2 , c3 , c5

c1

T3
c5

c2 , c5

c3

T5
c1

T2
c3

c2

(a) Algorithm 1

c5

(b) Algorithm 2

Fig. 4.1: Two testing algorithms
degree of completion of the classification task. A larger |γd | indicates that the solution is closer to
the completion of classification. In the example given in Fig. 4.2, we have:

γ0 = {{c1 , c2 , c3 , c4 , c5 }}
γ1 = {{c1 , c3 , c4 }, {c2 , c5 }}
γ2 = {{c1 , c3 }, {c4 }, {c2 }, {c5 }}
γ3 = {{c1 }, {c2 }, {c3 }, {c4 }, {c5 }}
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Fig. 4.2: Illustration of Test Levels
Note γD is where each class has been individually distinguished. Let Γd denote the partition
induced in γd . We define the entropy at level Ld as:

H(Ld ) = H(ΓD |Γd )
X
=−
p(γDn , γdk )log2 p(γDn |γdk )
n,k

=

X

p(γdk )H(ΓD |Γd = γdk )

(4.1)

k

where p(γDn , γdk ) is the joint probability of partitions γDn and γdk . Following this definition,
N
P
H(L0 ) = − p(ci )log2 p(ci ), and H(LD ) = 0. The entropy at each level will be exploited in
i=1

choosing the tests for the next level to minimize the final probability of mis-classification.

4.3

Proposed Decision Tree Design Algorithms

In this section, we focus on the algorithms for decision tree design. We use two types of criteria
for decision tree construction, namely, the minimization of the upper bound on mis-classification
probabilities, and the maximization of the lower bound on correct classification probabilities. Previous work [54], with the objective of minimizing the upper bound of test cost, e.g., memory,
execution time, does not consider error in tests (noisy tests), which is very different from the work
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in this chapter.

4.3.1

Bounding the Probability of Mis-classification

In a decision tree, the probability of mis-classification error is given by:

Pm =

N
X

p(ci )pm (ci ) =

N
X

i=1

D
Y
p(ci ) 1 − (1 − p∗i,d )

i=1

!
(4.2)

d=1

where pm (ci ) is the probability that an object belonging to ci is mis-classified in the system. p∗i,d
is the error probability associated with the unknown object belonging to ci as it traverses the node
between levels Ld−1 and Ld . Note that if an object does not pass through a test, the corresponding
error probability is 0.
Typically, the error probability for each test is small. Otherwise, the corresponding test should
be replaced by a better test, or additional tests should be introduced to reduce the error probability. Since the error probability of each test is small, the probability of mis-classification can be
approximated by dropping the higher order terms in (4.2) as

Pm ≈

N
X
i=1

p(ci )

D
X

p∗i,d

(4.3)

d=1

This can be simplified as

Pm ≈

N
X
i=1

p(ci )

D
X

p∗i,d

d=1

=

D X
N
X

p∗i,d

d=1 i=1

=

D
X

g(d − 1, d)

(4.4)

d=1

where g(d − 1, d) represents the error probability induced by the tests from level Ld−1 to level Ld .
Recalling the definition of H(Ld ) in (4.1), and using the fact that H(LD ) = 0, we can write

H(L0 ) = H(L0 ) − H(L1 ) + H(L1 ) − H(L2 ) + · · · + H(LD−1 ) − H(LD )
=

D
X
H(Ld−1 ) − H(Ld )
d=1

g(d − 1, d)

g(d − 1, d)
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=

D
X

F m (d − 1, d)g(d − 1, d)

(4.5)

d=1

where F m (d − 1, d) =

H(Ld−1 )−H(Ld )
g(d−1,d)

is the metric we use for decision tree construction. It is the

reduction in entropy from Ld−1 to Ld , divided by the error probability induced between these two
levels. Essentially, it indicates the sensitivity to error for reducing impurity in decision tree design
m
m
at a certain level. Define Fmin
= min F m (d − 1, d), and Fmax
= max F (d − 1, d). Due to the
d=1,...,D

d=1,...,D

fact that H(Ld−1 ) − H(Ld ) ≥ 0, and g(d − 1, d) > 0, it follows that F (d − 1, d) ≥ 0. Substituting
(4.4) into (4.5), we have

m
m
Fmin
Pm ≤ H(L0 ) ≤ Fmax
Pm ,

which leads to
H(L0 )
H(L0 )
≤ Pm ≤
m
m
Fmax
Fmin
0)
for the design of the decision
Since our goal is to minimize Pm , we minimize the upper bound H(L
Fm
min

tree. Since HL0 is fixed, we need to maximize

m
Fmin

m

= min F (d − 1, d). During the construcd=1,...,D

tion of the testing algorithm, it is sufficient to maximize each of F m (d − 1, d) =

H(Ld−1 )−H(Ld )
,
g(d−1,d)

d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D}. When we construct the decision tree from level d − 1 to level d, we select the
tests that maximize the value F m (d−1, d), and the construction step ends when it reaches the D-th
level.

4.3.2

Bounding the Probability of Correct Classification

In this section, we focus on decision tree design to maximize the probability of correct classification, which can be written as

Pc =

N
X
i=1

p(ci )pc (ci ) =

N
X
i=1

D
Y
p(ci ) (1 − p∗i,d ).
d=1

(4.6)
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where pc (ci ) is the probability that an object belonging to ci is correctly classified in the system.
Since the effect of higher order terms is negligible as typically they are small, we approximate Pc
as

Pc ≈

D X
N
Y

p(ci )(1 −

d=1 i=1

p∗i,d )

=

D
Y

b(d − 1, d),

(4.7)

d=1

where b(d−1, d) represents probability of correct classification from Ld−1 to Ld , d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D}.
Then, we provide the entropy in the form of product as

H(L0 ) + 1 =
=

=

H(LD−1 ) + 1
H(L0 ) + 1 H(L1 ) + 1
×
× ... ×
H(L1 ) + 1 H(L2 ) + 1
H(LD ) + 1
D
Y
d=1
D
Y

H(Ld−1 )+1
H(Ld )+1

b(d − 1, d)

b(d − 1, d)

F c (d − 1, d)b(d − 1, d)

(4.8)

d=1

c

where F (d−1, d) =

H(Ld−1 )+1
H(Ld )+1

b(d−1,d)

is the metric based on which we select the tests. It is the generalized

entropy ratio of Ld−1 to Ld , divided by the probability of correct classification between these
two levels. Essentially, it indicates the degree of reduction in impurity when the test correctly
c
=
bifurcates the objects. Define Fmin

c
= max F c (d − 1, d).
min F c (d − 1, d), and Fmax

d=1,...,D

d=1,...,D

c

Since F (d − 1, d) ≥ 0, substitute (4.7) into (4.8) and we have

c
c
Fmin
Pc ≤ H(L0 ) + 1 ≤ Fmax
Pc ,

which leads to
H(L0 ) + 1
H(L0 ) + 1
≤
P
≤
.
c
c
c
Fmax
Fmin
As we desire to maximize the probability of correct classification Pc , we maximize its lower bound
which is

H(L0 )+1
.
c
Fmax

c
Since H(L0 ) + 1 is fixed, we need to minimize Fmax
. During the construction of
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c

the decision tree, it is sufficient to select the tests that minimize the value F (d − 1, d) =

H(Ld−1 )+1
H(Ld )+1

b(d−1,d)

from level d − 1 to level d.
The additive approximation in Section 4.3.1 is obtained by discarding second to Dth order
terms of p∗i,d , while the multiplicative approximation in Section 4.3.2 discards Dth order of p∗i,d .
Thus, multiplicative approximation is more accurate than additive approximation. However, the
tightness of the bounds on probability of correct classification in the multiplicative method depends
on the metric

4.4

H(Ld−1 )+r
.
H(Ld )+r

In this paper, we choose r = 1, which might not be optimal.

Efficient Strategy for Worker Assignment

After designing the decision tree, the next step is to assign the available crowd workers to the
nodes of the decision tree. The naive and the most costly approach will be to have all available
workers answer questions corresponding to each node. This will mean that the number of questions
answered will be M0 N0 , where M0 is the number of nodes in the decision tree and N0 is the total
number of workers. The goal in this section is to investigate the trade-off between the saving in
the number of questions answered (cost) and the degradation in performance as well as to develop
an efficient algorithm to assign subsets of workers to different nodes of the tree. In particular, each
node must have at least one worker assigned to it; the goal is to find an algorithm to optimally
distribute remaining crowd workers among the nodes of the decision tree. When subgroups of
workers are assigned to perform different tests at individual nodes, the workers’ local decisions
are collected by a fusion center (FC). Majority voting is used in this chapter for decision fusion
for crowdsourcing. In a subgroup of workers with size n = 2k + 1, k = 0, 1, . . . , each worker
completes the same test that will produce binary results 0 or 1. The probability of error of the ith
worker for the corresponding test is pie . In majority rule, if at least k + 1 workers declare 0 to be
the result, FC will decide 0; otherwise, it will decide that 1 is true. For a specific test, we provide
the worker assignment scheme.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose the expected probability of error of each worker for a specific test is
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E(pie ) = pe . When pe < 0.5, the probability of error at FC fe (k) is a decreasing function
of k. The reduction in probability of error at the FC decreases as well, as k increases, i.e.
|fe (k1 + 1) − fe (k1 )| ≤ |fe (k2 + 1) − fe (k2 )| for k1 > k2 ≥ 0
P ROOF :
In majority voting with n = 2k + 1 workers where each worker has an expected probability of
success 1 − pe , the probability of miss classification at FC can be expressed as the probability that
a Binomial random variable x ∼ B(2k + 1, 1 − pe ) is less than or equal to k:

fe (k) = P r(x ≤ k) = F (k, 2k + 1, 1 − pe )

where F (k, 2k + 1, 1 − pe ) represents the cumulative distribution function of a Binomial random
variable, which can be re-written using the regularized incomplete beta function:

fe (k) = F (k, 2k + 1, 1 − pe ) = Ipe (k + 1, k + 1)

where Ir (a, b) =

B(r;a,b)
B(1;a,b)

and B(r; a, b) =

Rr

ta−1 (1 − t)b−1 dt.

0

Note that k can be any real value k ≥ 0. Taking partial derivative of Ipe (j, j) with respect to j
yields
dIpe (j, j)
= B −2 (1; j, j) ×
dj

Zpe Z1
0

(t − t2 )j (s − s2 )j ln

t − t2
dsdt
s − s2

0

Zpe 1−p
Z e
t − t2
−2
= B (1; j, j) ×
dsdt
(t − t2 )j (s − s2 )j ln
s − s2
0

(4.9)

(4.10)

pe

From (4.9) to (4.10), we use the symmetry of t − t2 with respect to 0.5, and the fact pe < 0.5.
Finally, notice that s − s2 > t − t2 > 0 in the interval s ∈ (pe , 1 − pe ), and t ∈ (0, pe ), thus
2

t−t
ln s−s
2 < 0 and

dIpe (j,j)
dJ

is strictly negative. Since j = k + 1, it follows that fe (k) is decreasing

with respect to k. Besides, as j increases, the magnitude of

dIpe (j,j)
dj

strictly decreases because
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|t − t2 | ≤ 1 and |s − s2 | ≤ 1. Thus, the magnitude of derivative decreases as k increases. Hence,
we show that fe (k) is a decreasing function of k and the reduction in probability of error at the FC
decreases as k increases.
Under the assumption of Proposition 4.1: E(pie ) = pe , after we have constructed a testing algorithm, for example the one shown in Fig. 4.1(b), each test is assigned a randomly chosen worker.
After that, we assume that we have a group of additional n = 2K workers available to reduce the
error probabilities of one or more tests. Let 2km , m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M } be the number of workers
assigned to test Tm . By doing so, we ensure that the number of workers performing test Tm is odd,
M
P
and
km = K. We address the problem of how to assign these 2K workers to different tests,
m=1

i.e., to determine the values of {k1 , k2 , . . . , kM }, such that we can achieve minimum probability of
mis-classification.
From the result of Proposition 1, as more workers are assigned to the same test, the rate of
reduction in error probability decreases. Thus, we are encouraged to allocate two workers at a
time to a certain test, to guarantee the odd number of workers for each test, and to ensure the
maximal rate of reduction in error probability each time. Using the methods proposed in Section
4.3, we can construct the decision tree and find the level d0 that has the minimal F m (d0 − 1, d0 ) or
maximal F c (d0 − 1, d0 ) (both decision tree construction algorithms provide the same result). For
the tests between level Ld0 −1 and Ld0 , we add two workers to the test that gives the most increase in
F m (d0 − 1, d0 ) or the most decrease in F c (d0 − 1, d0 ). We provide the following worker assignment
algorithm:

4.5

Simulation Results

We provide simulation results with the problem setting as is shown in Table 4.1. Fig. 4.3 shows
the efficiency of the proposed decision tree design algorithm by comparing its probability of misclassification (blue curve) with the case where we let each objects randomly pass through a series
of tests (red curve). When the error probability of each test is p∗ , the testing algorithm in Fig. 4.1
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Algorithm 2 Worker Assignment
1: procedure A SSIGN 2K WORKERS
2:
Initialize k1 = k2 = · · · = kM = 0.
3:
while n = 2K > 0 do
4:
Find d0 .
5:
From Ld0 −1 to Ld0 , add two workers to Tm that gives most increase in F m (d0 − 1, d0 ),
or most decrease in F c (d0 − 1, d0 ).
6:
km ← km + 1
7:
Update the value F m (d0 − 1, d0 ), or F c (d0 − 1, d0 ).
8:
K ← K − 1.
9:
end while
10:
end
11: end procedure
(b) is what we end up with, after we employ the two proposed methods. As we can see from the
figure, the performance is significantly improved with our methods, and the improvement becomes
more prominent as p∗ increases.
Fig. 4.4 plots the average probability of mis-classification when the number of workers increases. The blue curve represents that we assign all the workers to a single test (randomly chosen); the red curve indicates the scenario where each worker is randomly assigned to a test, and the
yellow curves represents the proposed worker assignment rule associated with metric F m (d−1, d).
We can see from the figure that one should not assign workers in a highly unbalanced fashion as
is indicated by the blue curve. Random worker assignment achieves better performance, which is
outperformed by our proposed method.

4.6

Summary

This chapter presented a novel sequential paradigm for crowdsourced classification and also addressed the test ordering problem. With limited knowledge of worker’s reliability in performing imperfect tests, we developed a greedy decision tree design to minimize the probability of
mis-classification. Two different methods were used to approximate the probabilities of misclassification and correct classification. We also investigated the worker assignment problem,
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by studying the assignment of a limited number of workers to different tests. Numerical results
showed the superiority of our testing algorithm, as well as the efficiency of the worker assignment
strategy. While our greedy level-by-level decision tree construction only achieves local optimality,
in future work, we will explore the possibility of obtaining globally optimal solutions.
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C HAPTER 5

C OGNITIVE M EMORY C ONSTRAINED
H UMAN D ECISION M AKING BASED ON
M ULTI - SOURCE I NFORMATION

5.1

Introduction

In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we have employed Prospect Theory to model the rationality of humans
and studied human decision making behavior under cognitive biases. In this chapter, our goal is
to model and analyze how humans make decisions based on multiple information sources under
the limits of cognitive working memory. In particular, we consider that the internal source of
information is the human’s direct observation of the world, while the external source of information
is a machine/sensor1 that sends its local decisions regarding the phenomenon of interest (PoI)
to the human. Sensors can be deployed in hazardous and dangerous workplaces for monitoring
and gathering intelligence. This is not only because of the associated risks for humans but also
because sensors are efficient in processing tedious raw data that are beyond humans’ capabilities.
1

We will use the term sensor to represent a physical entity that may be a sensor or a machine in the rest of the
chapter.
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In numerous applications, one may utilize the sensor as a consultant or an advisor who provides
local decisions that assist human decision making. The human combines the suggestions from
the sensor and her own observations to make the final decision. For instance, in national security,
the commander may combine her own judgment as well as the recommendation from electronic
warfare systems to design countermeasures in case of invasion.
Since the sensor’s suggestion is from an external information source, individuals often must
infer not just about the state of the PoI (“what is the state of the world?”), but also about the credibility of the sensor (“how much faith should I put in the sensor and its suggestion?”). Psychology
literature has shown that the working memory of humans, which supports the ongoing cognition
to perform logical analysis and numerical calculations, is a fairly capacity-limited resource [40].
Because of this limitation, people perform cognitive tasks, e.g., update the two beliefs regarding
the PoI and the sensor’s credibility, serially, and not in parallel [40, 103]. A core feature of the
sequential updating of beliefs is the mechanism that discards outdated information so that working memory focuses on processing more relevant information at a given time. Such a process
may cause the human to generate a biased posterior belief compared to the canonical Bayes’ rule
employed by rational decision makers [27, 74].
In this chapter, we present a framework where the human is subject to cognitive memory limitations, and she makes the final decision by sequentially exploiting her own observation and a
sensor’s suggestion. When the human examines the sensor’s suggestion, she sequentially updates
the belief regarding the state of the PoI and the belief regarding the sensor’s credibility. We investigate the behavioral difference of humans as it pertains to decision making when they process
information and update their beliefs in different orders. We evaluate the decision quality of cognitive memory limited humans and provide measures for performance comparison. It is shown that
an appropriate ordering of information sources helps humans make better decisions.
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5.2

System Model

Consider a binary decision making problem where a human infers the state of a PoI based on
her self-observation and a sensor’s suggestion as illustrated in Fig. 5.1. As the psychology literature suggests, humans are limited in the capacity of working memory so that they process
tasks/information in a sequential manner instead in parallel. When there are multiple sources
of information, it is often necessary for the human to discard old information before processing
new information to ensure that cognition ability functions properly.
However, the order in which information is processed and discarded is different from one
human to another, leading the human to behave quite differently compared to rational decision
makers in two aspects: 1) There are biases in human belief updating based on the suggestion
from an outside source of information, i.e., the sensor; 2) The order in which different sources
of information are observed affects the human decision making performance. It is shown in Fig.
5.1(a) that the human first exploits the sensor’s suggestion to update her belief regarding the PoI,
and then, makes use of her own observation to develop a final decision, while the reverse order of
using the information sources is shown in Fig. 5.1(b).

(a) Sensor-Self updating

(b) Self-Sensor updating

Fig. 5.1: Sequential updating in human decision making
In the rest of this section, we present the behavioral biases of cognitive memory limited humans
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when they update their beliefs regarding the PoI using the sensor’s suggestion.
Consider that the two hypotheses regarding the state of PoI are denoted by H0 and H1 . Let
πt = (πt (i), i ∈ {0, 1} represent the prior probability that hypothesis Hi is true at time t2 . We
define the belief or confidence regarding the hypothesis H1 as λt =

πt (1)
,
πt (0)

where it is assumed that

πt (0) 6= 0. We consider that the human receives a binary suggestion s ∈ {0, 1} from the sensor,
whose credibility status can be either high or low. In applications such as wireless communications
and distributed detection, high status indicates that the sensor is operating properly and provides a
reliable suggestion, whereas low status means that the sensor is damaged, attacked by a Byzantine
or running out of battery so that it sends random suggestions. Under the high/low status, we
assume that the sensor sends a correct suggestion with the probability P(s = i|Hi ) = h and
P(s = i|Hi ) = l, respectively for i = {0, 1}, where h > l. Correspondingly, the probability that
the sensor’s suggestion is wrong at high/low status is given by 1 − h and 1 − l, respectively.
Besides memorizing the belief regarding the PoI, the human also needs to keep track of the
sensor’s credibility. The initial belief that the sensor is of high status is denoted as ω0 =

ν0
,
1−ν0

where ν0 ∈ (0, 1) is the prior probability that the sensor’s status is high. When the human receives
a suggestion s from the sensor, she processes three items, i.e., λ0 , ω0 , s, in her working memory to
calculate the posteriors denoted by λ1 , ω1 . If the decision maker is rational and has no cognitive
limitations, both posteriors of the two beliefs can be updated in parallel using λ0 , ω0 , s. However,
due to the limitations on working memory, the human updates the beliefs sequentially in the sense
that she calculates one posterior belief before another. Whichever order she chooses to update the
posterior beliefs, after the first updating she has to store four items in the working memory, i.e.,
two priors, the suggestion s and the newly derived posterior. In realistic decision making scenarios,
the cognitively limited human cannot remember many pieces of information at the same time and
in this chapter we consider that she can store up to three items simultaneously in her working
memory. Hence, after the human updates the first belief, she thinks that the prior of the updated
belief is outdated and discards this prior from her working memory. Then, she uses the posterior
2

Throughout this chapter, we use subscript t to represent beliefs or probabilities at different time. Note that π0 is
the prior probability at t = 0.
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of the first belief, instead of the prior, to update the second belief. The mismatch between the prior
and posterior of the first updated belief causes the cognitively limited human to develop a different
posterior in the second belief compared to rational decision makers.
Without loss of generality, we assume that s = 1 and compare the procedures for belief updating for two different types of decision makers:
Rational decision maker. After observing s = 1, the rational posterior belief on H1 can be
written as λ1 (s = 1) = λ0 δ0 , where δ0 =

P(s=1|H1 )
P(s=1|H0 )

=

ν0 h+(1−ν0 )l
ν0 l+(1−ν0 )h

and note that P(s = 1|H1 ) +

P(s = 1|H0 ) = 1. The rational posterior belief that the sensor is of high status is given by
ω1 (s = 1) = ω0 rq00 , where r0 = P(s = 1|sensor in high status) = π0 (1)(2h − 1) + 1 − h and
q0 = P(s = 1|sensor in low status) = π0 (1)(2l − 1) + 1 − l.
Type I cognitively limited decision maker. We consider that the type I human, who has limited
working memory capacity, updates the belief regarding the sensor’s status before updating the
belief regarding the PoI. The first updated belief has no bias, i.e, ω1I (s = 1) = ω1 (s = 1), where the
superscript I represents the type of the human. After ω1I (s = 1) is obtained, the human discards ω0
and mistakenly thinks that ν1 (s = 1) =

ω1I (s=1)
1−ω1I (s=1)

is the ‘prior probability’ that the sensor is of high

status. Hence, the second updated belief regarding the PoI is given by λI1 (s = 1) = λ0 δ1 (s = 1),
where δ1 (s = 1) =

ν1 (s=1)h+(1−ν1 (s=1))l
.
ν1 (s=1)l+(1−ν1 (s=1))h

It is clear that λI1 (s = 1) 6= λ1 (s = 1). When s = 0, the

posterior beliefs of the rational human and type I human can be similarly obtained.
Note that there is another type II cognitively limited human who updates the belief about the
PoI first, and uses the updated belief to update the posterior belief on the sensor’s credibility. There
is no bias in belief updating regarding the PoI and we do not analyze the type II human’s behavior
in this dissertation.

5.3

Decision Making based on Two Sources of Information

Now, let us come back to Fig. 5.1 where the human makes the final decision by sequentially processing the two sources of information, namely, the sensor’s suggestion s and her own observation
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r. Following the problem setup presented in Section 5.2, we further assume that under hypotheses
H0 and H1 , the continuous observation r has conditional probability density functions (pdf) f0 (r)
and f1 (r), respectively. Let cij denote the cost of deciding Hi when Hj is true for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. It
is often of interest that no cost is assigned to correct decisions, so we assume c10 = c01 = 0. Given
that H0 or H1 is true, we assume that s and r are independent of each other. For a specific realization of the pair {s, r}, we study the decision making performance of rational humans and type I
cognitively limited humans in the following subsections. Again, we proceed with our analysis by
assuming that both the rational human and the biased human observe s = 1 .

5.3.1

Rational Decision Maker

If the decision maker has no cognitive limitations, the order in which s and r are processed does
not affect the decision quality. We consider the structure shown in Fig. 5.1(a) where s is used first
in belief updating. As shown in Section 5.2, if s = 1, the rational human’s posterior belief on H1
can be written as λ1 (s = 1), which is a function of π0 , ν0 , h, l. The posterior belief λ1 (s = 1) will
be used as the new prior in the second round of decision making when r is observed.
It has been shown that when the prior belief on H1 is given by k, the optimal decision rule is
in the form of the likelihood ratio test (LRT) [142], which is equivalent to:

k

f1 (r) H1 c10 − 0
≷
,η
f0 (r) H0 c01 − 0

(5.1)

The two types of errors, namely, probabilities of false alarm and miss detection, are explicit funcR
R
tions of k such that PF (k) = {r∈R|klr (r)>η} f0 (r)dr and PM (k) = {r∈R|klr (r)<η} f1 (r)dr, where
R denotes the observation space of r and lr (r) =

f1 (r)
f0 (r)

is the likelihood ratio. In this case, the

Bayesian cost of the decision rule in (5.1) is

J(k) = c10

1
k
pf (k) + c01
pm (k)
1+k
1+k

(5.2)

For a concrete illustration of the system performance, in the rest of the chapter, we assume
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that h = 1, l = 0 so that the sensor sends either perfectly correct signals or perfectly incorrect
signals. Under this condition, we have λ1 (s = 1) = λ0 ω0 . Given that s = 1, the rational human
has probabilities of false alarm and miss detection pf = PF (λ0 ω0 ) and pm = PM (λ0 ω0 ). The
Bayesian cost is given by Jr = J(λ0 ω0 ).

5.3.2

Cognitive Memory Limited Decision Maker

If the human has limited capacity of working memory of type I, the order in which s and r are
processed affects the quality of decision making. Recall that we will use h = 1, l = 0 for ease and
clarity of presentation.
Order a: s → r updating. As shown in Fig. 1(a), consider that human A receives the sensor’s
suggestion before making her own observation. When s = 1, human A first updates the belief
ω1a (s = 1) = λ0 ω0 , and then, uses ω1a (s = 1) as the new prior to update the belief regarding H1
such that λa1 (s = 1) = λ0 ω1a (s = 1) = λ20 ω0 . In the next round, when A makes the final decision
based on r, the biased belief λa1 (s = 1) rather than the true belief is employed. Hence, the human
with order a will use the decision rule (5.1) with k = λ20 ω0 . The probabilities of false alarm and
miss detection are paf = PF (λ20 ω0 ) and pam = PM (λ20 ω0 ). As human A mistakenly holds the belief
λ20 ω0 instead of the true belief λ0 ω0 , the Bayesian cost J˜a is given by
2

2

PF (λ0 ω0 )
λ0 ω0 PM (λ0 ω0 )
J˜a (λ0 ω0 , λ20 ω0 ) = c10
+ c01
1 + λ0 ω0
1 + λ0 ω0

(5.3)

Order b: r → s updating. Consider that human B uses its observation r as the first information
source as shown in Fig. 5.1(b). Given the observation is r, B updates her belief on H1 through the
Bayesian rule: λb1 (r) = λ0 lr (r). Next, human B observes s = 1 and uses λb1 (r) as the prior belief
on H1 to update the belief on the sensor’s credibility: ω2b (s = 1) = λb1 (r)ω0 . Finally, B updates
the belief on H1 according to λb2 (s = 1, r) = λb1 (r)ω2b (s = 1) = λ20 lr2 (r)ω0 . Hence, the perceived
posterior probabilities of H1 and H0 are

λ20 lr2 (r)ω0
1+λ20 lr2 (r)ω0

and

1
,
1+λ20 lr2 (r)ω0

respectively. It follows that the
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final decision is made by

d = arg min (ci1
i∈{0,1}

λ20 lr2 (r)ω0
1
+ ci0
)
2 2
2 2
1 + λ0 lr (r)ω0
1 + λ0 lr (r)ω0

1
which is equivalent to λ20 lr2 (r)ω0 ≷H
H0 η, which we rewrite as

H1
√
λ0 ω0 ηlr (r) ≷ η

(5.4)

H0

√
We find that (5.4) matches the decision rule in (5.1) by replacing k with λ0 ω0 η. One may ‘interpret’ that human B uses the same decision rule in (5.1) except that B mistakenly holds belief
√
λ0 ω0 η instead of the true belief λ0 ω0 . Hence, given s = 1, human B’s probabilities of false
√
√
alarm and miss detection are pbf = PF (λ0 ω0 η) and pbm = PM (λ0 ω0 η). The Bayesian cost J˜b is
given by
√
√
PF (λ0 ω0 η)
λ0 ω0 PM (λ0 ω0 η)
√
˜
Jb (λ0 ω0 , λ0 ω0 η) = c10
+c01
1 + λ0 ω0
1 + λ0 ω0
We note that the same decision rule (5.1) applies to the rational decision maker, human A and
√
human B, where k = λ0 ω0 , λ20 ω0 , λ0 ω0 η, respectively. For the same values of s, r, cognitively
limited humans with different updating orders have different decision making performances. In
the following, we present some results for performance comparison.
Proposition 5.1. (a) The necessary and sufficient condition for paf > pf or pam < pm is λ0 > 1. (b)
p
The necessary and sufficient condition for pbf > pf or pbm < pm is η/ω0 > 1. (c) The necessary
p
and sufficient condition for pbf > paf or pbm < pbm is η/ω0 > λ0 .
P ROOF : As we showed that in selecting the correct hypothesis H0 or H1 , the same decision rule
√
(5.1) applies to the rational decision maker, human A and human B, where k = λ0 ω0 , λ20 ω0 , λ0 ω0 η,
R
R
respectively. Hence, we have paf = {r∈R|λ2 ω0 lr (r)>η} f0 (r)dr and pf = {r∈R|λ0 ω0 lr (r)>η} f0 (r)dr.
0

If

λ20 ω0

> λ0 ω0 , i.e., λ0 > 1, we have {r ∈ R|λ0 ω0 lr (r) > η} ⊂ {r ∈ R|λ20 ω0 lr (r) > η}. Hence,

pf < paf and pm > pam . Similarly, when we have pf < paf and pm > pam , we can show that λ0 > 1.
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condition (a) in the proposition is proved. Following the same logic, we can prove condition (b)
and condition (c).
p
p
p
Proposition 5.2. (a) If η/ω0 > λ0 > 1 or η/ω0 < λ0 < 1, J˜b > J˜a . (b) If λ0 > η/ω0 > 1
p
or λ0 < η/ω0 < 1, J˜b < J˜a .
P ROOF : Following the analysis in Proposition 5.1, we note that if

p
p
η/ω0 > λ0 > 1 or η/ω0 <

λ0 < 1, the decision rule employed by human B deviates from the optimal decision rule more than
the decision rule of human A. Hence, according to the results shown in [151], the Bayesian cost in
solving the hypothesis testing problem have the property J˜b > J˜a . Hence, condition (a) is proved.
Similarly, condition (b) can be proved.
Given that s = 1 and the human’s observation is r, the posterior belief on H1 for the rational
decision maker, human A and human B would be λ0 lr (r)ω0 , λ20 lr (r)ω0 and λ20 lr2 (r)ω0 , respectively.
Note that if the human’s first information source is r, i.e., human B, lr (r) has a greater influence
on the posterior belief regarding the PoI compared to human A. The same result still holds when
s = 0. For s = 0, the decision making performance for three types of humans can be similarly
obtained and we rely on simulation results for comparing the overall Bayesian cost.

5.4

Simulation Results

For illustration, we conduct experiments for the scenario where the human’s prior belief on the
sensor’s credibility is ω0 = 1.5 and the prior belief regarding the state of the PoI λ0 could vary.
Under hypotheses H1 and H0 , the human’s observation r follows Gaussian distributions with mean
µ1 = 2 and µ0 = 0, and the same variance σ 2 = 1. Let c10 = 3, c01 = 1 and h = 1, l = 0. First,
we assume that s = 1 to verify the results given in Proposition 5.1 and 5.2. In Fig. 5.2(a), we
plot the conditional Bayesian cost Jr , J˜a , J˜b for the rational human, the order a cognitively limited
human A and the the order b cognitively limited human B, respectively, as a function of λ0 . Given
p
the setup of parameters, we have η/ω0 = 1.41 > 1. In Fig. 5.2(a), there is a critical point
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λ∗ =

p
η/ω0 = 1.41 such that as λ0 increases from 1, if it is below λ∗ , human A has a lower

expected cost in decision making than human B. On the other hand, if λ0 > λ∗ , the decision
quality of human B, which differs from the rational human’s decision quality by only a small
amount, performs significantly better than human A. In Fig. 5.2(b), the probability of false alarm
for each of the decision makers is plotted with respect to λ0 . We see that A has a larger probability
of false alarm than B if and only if λ0 > λ∗ . It means that as λ0 is more in favor of H1 , human A’s
decision region where H1 is declared to be true is larger than that of human B. It indicates that a
large value of λ0 has a bigger impact on A than B.

Fig. 5.2: Performance comparison when s = 1.
Next, we consider that the sensor’s suggestion is randomly generated by the system dynamics
and can be either s = 1 or s = 0. The overall Bayesian cost is calculated as a weighted sum of
the conditional Bayesian costs given s = 1 and s = 0. Here, we assume that λ0 = 2 and let the
signal-to-noise ratio (SN R) of the human’s observation r vary, where we define SN R =

µ1 −µ0
.
σ

The overall Bayesian cost for each of the three types of humans, denoted by Gr , Ga and Gb ,
respectively, is plotted with respect to snr in Fig. 5.3. Note that the curves Ga and Gb lie above Gr
due to the humans’ cognitive limitations, the decision making performance is degraded compared
to rational decision makers. While the rational human’s Gr is monotonically decreasing as SN R
becomes large (r is more informative), both Ga and Gb increase up to certain values of SN R
before they start to decrease. This is because in our specific setup, certain values of snr, which
are small, magnify the biases of cognitively limited humans when they update their beliefs using
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the sensor’s suggestion. Finally, recall that compared to human A, lr(r) has a bigger impact
on human B who makes the decision using r before s. As expected, when the observation r is
significantly informative in the sense that SN R > SN R∗ , human B has lower expected Bayesian
cost compared to human A. Hence, it is possible to help the cognitively limited human make better
decisions by selecting the appropriate ordering of the information sources.

Fig. 5.3: Overall Bayesian cost with respect to SN R.

5.5

Summary

This chapter investigated the behavior of cognitive memory limited humans in binary decision
making. We find that the order with which information is processed and belief is updated heavily
impacts the final decision quality. In the future, it is worthwhile to study how cognitive memory
limitation affects human behavior in multi-round decision making processes.
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C HAPTER 6

U TILITY T HEORY BASED O PTIMAL
R ESOURCE C ONSUMPTION FOR
I NFERENCE IN I O T S YSTEMS

6.1

Introduction

With the recent proliferation of web-enabled smart devices/sensors deployed in almost every aspect
of our lives, the internet of things (IoT) has become a new paradigm to enable the concept of sensing as a service [129]. In many applications such as wireless communications, smart transportation, smart homes, healthcare, and environmental monitoring, the sensing task of interest can be
formulated as an inference problem. In this work, we consider an instantiation of the general inference problem, namely a signal/object/event detection problem and use the term "detection" to refer
to the inference task throughout the chapter. Compared to conventional centralized/decentralized
detection frameworks [142, 147], detection in an IoT system is carried out by social sensors that
are selfish agents, e.g., humans. Social sensors employ their own resources to perform the detection task and in return expect to earn monetary rewards by selling the detection result to interested
users.
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In the past works that study detection problems, the goal is to maximize the detection performance under some resource constraints such as on power consumption, bandwidth usage, computation complexity and monetary budgets. Resource constrained optimization problems have
been studied for different application scenarios [29, 30, 77, 111, 133]. For example, in the context of wireless sensor networks, cellular networks, ad-hoc networks and cognitive radio networks
(CRNs), power/bandwidth allocation has been studied for centralized, distributed and cluster-based
architectures [77, 111, 133]. In these detection methods that employ sensor networks to collect information regarding a phenomenon of interest (PoI), usually all available resources are used up to
maximize detection performance. In practice, however, when the sensors in the IoT systems are
selfish and intelligent, e.g., social sensors, the costs corresponding to resource consumption should
be incorporated in deriving the sensors’ utility functions. As a result, it may not be worthwhile to
consume all the available resources in many applications.
In this chapter, we employ a market-based philosophy and consider the detection problem as
a profit and loss proposition, i.e., a utility based approach. Detection performance is treated as
profit while energy1 usage is treated as loss (or cost). The goal is to find the optimal amount of
energy consumption such that the system utility is maximum. In most systems, system performance improves as more energy is used. However, after a certain point, the rate of performance
improvement slows down as more energy is used and a saturation phenomenon is observed. In this
situation, the lack of ‘return on investment’ does not justify the use of additional energy.

6.1.1

Related Work

Utility theory and the maximization of empirically designed utility functions have been widely exploited to guide system design and resource management in different communication and sensing
applications. For example, in two-hop IoT networks, the authors evaluated the utility of the uplink
data rate and designed strategies to optimize the spectrum partition ratio and aggregator association
bias [63]. A two-phase offloading optimization strategy was developed in [154] to jointly optimize
1

The terms ‘resource’ and ‘energy’ will be used interchangeably.
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the offloading utility while preserving privacy protection for edge computing enabled IoT systems.
To the best of our knowledge, however, no previous work has explicitly investigated the utility
based energy consumption problem in the context of IoT systems for detection problems by exploiting the cost-benefit relationship, i.e., return on investment. In this chapter, we explore how the
detection accuracy improves as more energy is invested and to determine the optimal point which
yields the maximum system utility. We consider that the cost valuation per unit energy is fixed,
which can be thought of as the price for energy exchange in the market. It is desirable to consume
less amount of energy while achieving an adequately accurate level of detection performance.
Motivated by IoT systems where sensing is often delivered as a service, we consider a general
structure shown in Fig. 6.1. In this paradigm, the sensor represents a selfish entity that aims to gain
profit by performing sensing tasks. Each sensor decides its energy consumption strategy for allocating its available energy to perform the signal detection task regarding the status of one or more
PoIs. On the other hand, the buyers are interested in the status of certain PoIs, and are willing to

Fig. 6.1: General structure of an IoT based inference system.
buy the sensing results from the sensors. In order to get compensated for their costs of energy consumption and gain profit, the sensors sell their sensing results to the buyers. The sensors interact
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with the pool of potential buyers through some incentive mechanisms. In different signal processing and communication domains, incentive mechanisms for crowdsensing/cloudsensing platforms
have been developed to stimulate sensor participation [16, 48, 75, 96, 115]. Most of the past works
employed game theoretic approaches to model the strategic behavior exhibited by both the sensors and buyers. For example, economic concepts, e.g., matching and competitive market, were
applied in CRNs for price-based spectrum trading between the primary and secondary users [96].
Auction based mechanisms were developed in [16,48,75] to address the concerns that sensors may
strategically falsify their bids to gain undue advantage.
The past works on incentive mechanisms mainly focused on analyzing the trading behavior and
goods/service exchange between the participating agents. However, none has studied the incentive
mechanisms where the sensor has the objective to maximize its utility by designing an optimal resource consumption strategy in the presence of a buyer. Such a problem is not only complicated by
the fact that the sensor should jointly optimize the resource consumption and payment negotiation,
but also by the fact that the incentives provided by the buyer depend on buyer’s valuation towards
the detection result quality, which might not be completely known to the sensor.

6.1.2

Major Technical Contributions

In this chapter, the property of return on investment for detection tasks and the payment negotiation
between the sensor and the buyer are synthesized together to build a unified incentive mechanism
for IoT systems. For a concrete exposition, we consider that there is only one signal detection task,
one sensor and one buyer in the system. The contributions of this work are three-fold:
• For illustration purposes and to serve as motivating examples, we employ three typical detection problems and show that the detection accuracy is an increasing and concave function
with respect to energy consumption. Considering that a sensor derives a benefit from a detection task, we explore the trade-off between system performance improvement and energy
consumption. The optimal amount of energy is determined that maximizes the sensor’s expected profit.
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• We consider that there is a buyer who is interested in the detection task. The buyer offers
the sensor incentives (via payment) to be informed of its detection result. In this work, we
limit our analysis to the participation of only one sensor and only one buyer. Depending
on how valuable the detection result is to the buyer, we design the best strategy for energy
usage and payment negotiation, so that the sensor obtains the maximum profit. We study
two scenarios: a) the sensor spends a fixed amount of energy and negotiates the payment
amount with the buyer, b) the sensor jointly optimizes the amount of energy consumption
and payment negotiation.
• We present numerical results to evaluate the performance of our approach and based on
which, we discuss how energy efficiency affects the sensor’s actual behavior of resource
consumption.
The notations we use in this chapter are summarized in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1:
Parameters
p
D(p)
c
α
β
t
b

6.2

Notation for IoT based inference model
Symbol
Sensor’s energy consumption
Probability of correctly detecting the PoI
Unit cost of energy
Sensor’s benefit parameter
Buyer’s benefit parameter
Sensor’s proposal on energy consumption
Sensor’s proposal on requested payment

Problem Formulation

Consider that a sensor invests some amount of energy to perform a detection task. We denote the
amount of energy consumption as p and it will be seen later that, p can take different forms such
as power, number of observations, etc. The probability of correctly detecting the PoI is denoted as
D(p). In a number of applications, D(p) is strictly increasing and concave with respect to p, i.e,
the rate of increase of D(p) slows down as p becomes larger [39]. This phenomenon is analogous
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to the law of diminishing returns in economics, which states that at some point, the increase of
output declines when adding one or more factors of production [90]. In the following, we present
three examples to show that D(p) is increasing and concave in a wide range of detection problems.

6.2.1

Examples to Illustrate the Concavity of D(·)

1. Binary hypothesis testing with shift of means. The shift-of-mean hypothesis testing problem
characterizes a large number of problems in signal processing and communications. Under the two
√
hypotheses, consider that the observation is a Gaussian random variable with the means ± p and
√
the same variance σ 2 . To generate the signals with amplitude ± p, the required power is p. The
optimal Bayesian detector’s probability of successfully detecting the hypothesis is [142]:
r
p
),
D(p) = 1 − Q(
σ2

(6.1)

where Q(t) is the probability that a standard normal random variable takes a value larger than t:
R∞
2
Q(t) = √12π t exp(− u2 )du, and σ 2 is the noise variance.
2. Asymptotic binary hypothesis testing. In binary hypothesis testing problems, there are two
hypotheses where the observation X follows a probability density functions (PDF) under each
hypothesis. Based on an n observation sequence X n drawn i.i.d from one of the two distributions,
∗

the Bayesian probability of correctly detecting the hypothesis is given by D(n) ≈ 1 − 2−nc (P0 ,P1 ) ,
R
where c∗ (P0 , P1 ) = − log minλ∈(0,1) P0λ (x)P11−λ (x)dx, known as the Chernoff information, is
the best achievable exponent for Bayesian probability of error.
3. Crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing is an effective paradigm to solve problems that are easy for
humans but hard for machines/computers, e.g., image annotation and text transcription. It breaks
work into several encapsulated microtasks and leverages the crowd’s wisdom and intelligence in
problem solving. Considering that we aggregate the crowd workers’ responses using the majority
rule [49, 50], it was shown in [50] that the probability of making a correct decision, D(n), is
an increasing and concave function with respect to n, where n represents the number of crowd
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workers.

6.2.2

The Sensor’s Optimal Energy Consumption

In various applications discussed above, the probability of successful detection, i.e., D(p), is shown
to be increasing and concave as more energy p is invested. We consider that the sensor that performs the detection task derives a profit α from a successful detection of the PoI and the utility is 0
for a wrong detection2 . The cost per unit energy consumption is denoted by c. The sensor chooses
to invest an optimal amount of energy so as to maximize the expected utility, which is the expected
revenue minus the cost for energy consumption:

max U (p) = αD(p) − cp.
p

(6.2)

Under the assumption that D(p) is increasing and concave with respect to p, the optimal amount
of energy p∗ that maximizes U (p) is given by
c
c
p∗ = (D0 )−1 ( ) , D∗ ( )
α
α

(6.3)

where D0 (·) is the first order derivative of D(p) with respect to p and D∗ (·) is the inverse function of
D0 (·). Note that since D(p) is increasing and concave, D0 (·) is strictly positive and is a decreasing
function with respect to p. Therefore, its inverse function D∗ (·) is a decreasing function. Hence, the
optimal energy consumption p∗ increases as α becomes larger and c becomes smaller. By investing
the optimal amount of energy p∗ , the sensor has the maximum expected utility U ∗ = αD(p∗ )−cp∗ .
In this section, we present a discussion on optimal energy usage in several detection problems.
In the areas of signal processing and communications which are core components of IoT systems,
the system utility function in a number of applications demonstrates the concavity property with
respect to the amount of invested energy, allowing our model to be readily generalized. Examples
2

One applicable example is where the PoI conveys information regarding the availability of vacant bandwidth
(channel) in spectrum sensing, which can be exploited and sold to secondary users for a payment.

119
include channel capacity with respect to signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and signal recovery accuracy
with respect to the number of quantization levels, etc. Next, we investigate the scenario where
there is a buyer who offers incentives to the sensor to buy the detection result.

6.3

Payment Negotiation in the Presence of Incentives from
a Buyer

There are many sensing as a service situations where the consumer of the sensed information
outsources the sensing task and pays to receive the sensing service. In particular, we consider the
general case that in addition to the profit α that it derives from the detection results, the sensor
provides the sensing service in terms of the detection result to interested buyers for a fee. Other
than spectrum sensing and cognitive radio networks where the sensor detects the availability of
the bandwidth and realizes its own signal transmission objectives as well as selling the remaining
bandwidth to secondary users, there are numerous IoT applications that this work can be applied
to. For example, in wireless communications, the sensor detects the quality of the communication
channel and decides its own transmission strategy. At the same time, the sensor may sell the
detection results to other transmitters. The sensor could also be a driver that detects the traffic
condition to guide his/her own travel route as well as selling the information to traffic control
agencies or commercial software. In the financial sector, the sensor could be a firm that detects
the performance of the market to guide its investment strategy. At the same time, the firm may
sell the market evaluation reports to other companies or organizations. These application scenarios
are highly aligned with the thriving IoT paradigm, where each sensing node is considered to be an
entity that is selfish and has its own objectives [136].
Let β denote the benefit parameter of the buyer, indicating that the buyer obtains a profit β
from the successful detection of the PoI, and 0 otherwise. In this work, we model the payment
negotiation between the sensor and the buyer via a Stackelberg leader-follower model [104]. The
Stackelberg model is a sequential game where the leader chooses its action first; the follower
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chooses its action after observing the action taken by the leader. We consider that the sensor acts
as the leader and the buyer acts as the follower. The sensor submits a proposal {t, b} to the buyer,
where t is the amount of energy the sensor is going to spend in performing detection and b is the
requested payment. The proposal is given to the buyer who decides whether to accept or reject.
Such a Stackelberg leader-follower model falls into the category of contract theory, which has been
adopted in different contexts [10, 37, 88]. We design the proposal to be a one shot game, without
considering the possibility of further rounds of negotiation.
As the buyer is also aware that detection performance improves as t increases, the proposal
is more likely to be accepted if t is large and b is small. On the other hand, the sensor prefers b
to be as large as possible while the buyer still choosing to accept. For the sensor to strategically
maximize its expected revenue, the optimal t and b are naturally dependent on the buyer’s benefit
parameter. Hence, when the sensor designs the proposal, both t and b are functions of β, namely,
t(·) and b(·), respectively. If the buyer rejects the proposal of the sensor, then the payment that the
sensor would receive from the buyer is zero. Upon the acceptance of the proposal, the sensor has
expected utility αD(t(β)) + b(β) − ct(β), and the buyer has expected utility βD(t(β)) − b(β).
An illustration of the utility flow chart is shown in Fig. 6.2. Note that the utility flow from the
sensor to the buyer, i.e., βD(t(β)), is represented using a dotted line, indicating that the sensor
does not incur a loss by providing information to the buyer. We assume that the buyer always
accepts the proposal when its expected utility is non-negative. This assumption, also known as
individual rationality (IR), is widely adopted in mechanism design to model human rationality by
constraining their expected gains from the trade to be non-negative [16]. In different applications,
depending on factors such as cost of time, competitions of other sensors in the market, etc., the
buyer may want to accept the proposal when his/her expected gain is larger than some constant
w ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that w = 0 as in many other works in the literature.
In this section, we consider that the sensor decides to invest the amount of energy derived in
(6.3), which is the optimal amount of energy consumption without including the consideration of
the buyer, i.e., t = p∗ . The objective of the sensor is to determine the best fee b∗ that maximizes its

121

Fig. 6.2: Illustration of the utility flow chart.
expected utility. We proceed with the discussion of two situations a) where the sensor has complete
information of the buyer’s benefit parameter β, and b) where only statistical information of β is
known.

6.3.1

Sensor Has Complete Information of β

By using the amount of energy p∗ , the probability of correctly detecting the PoI is D(p∗ ). If the
exact value of the buyer’s parameter β is available, the sensor knows that the buyer has a profit
βD(p∗ ) from the detection result. Since the buyer always accepts the proposal with non-negative
utility, any b less or equal to βD(p∗ ) is acceptable to the buyer. Hence, to maximize the expected
utility, the sensor should exploit the knowledge of β and choose b∗ = βD(p∗ ). In this case, the
expected profit of the sensor is U1 = (α + β)D(p∗ ) − cp∗ and note that U1 > U ∗ for positive values
of β.

6.3.2

Sensor Has Statistical Information of β

Here, we assume that the sensor does not know the exact value of β of the buyer before designing
the proposal. Only the statistical information of β is known, namely, β is a continuous random
variable that follows the probability density function (PDF) f (β) and the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) F (β) with the support [β, β̄]3 . The sensor consumes the energy amount p∗ while
performing the detection task and aims to determine the largest b∗ that the buyer will accept. Suppose that the sensor proposes b = ξD(p∗ ), where ξ is a constant. From the above analysis, it is clear
3

Although we assume that β is supported on a bounded interval, in the latter part of the chapter, the support set
could be unbounded, i.e., β̄ = +∞.
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that the buyer accepts to pay the fee only if its benefit parameter β ≥ ξ. For a given distribution of
the random variable β, if ξ is small, there is a high probability that the buyer accepts the proposal
and pays the fee. However, the amount of payment is small when ξ is small. On the other hand,
if ξ is large, although the payment amount is large, the probability that the buyer accepts to pay is
Rξ
small. One can see that there is a probability of β f (β)d(β) that the buyer rejects b and the actual
R β̄
payment is 0. Also, with probability ξ f (β)d(β), the buyer accepts b and the actual payment is
b = ξD(p∗ ). Hence, over the randomness of the buyer’s benefit parameter β ∼ f (β), the sensor
R β̄
has an expected payment from the buyer given by E(b) = ξ ξD(p∗ )f (β)dβ. The objective of the
sensor is to choose an optimal ξ ∗ that maximizes E(b):
(
ξ ∗ = arg max

Z

E(b) =

ξ∈[β,β̄]

)

β̄

ξD(p∗ )f (β)dβ

(6.4)

ξ

Z

β̄

ξf (β)dβ

(6.5)

= arg max ξ(1 − F (ξ))

(6.6)

= arg max
ξ∈[β,β̄]

ξ

ξ∈[β,β̄]

where we drop the constant term D(p∗ ) going from (6.4) to (6.5). We constrain ξ ∈ [β, β̄] since
if ξ ≤ β, the buyer always accepts the proposed fee b and b = ξD(p∗ ) achieves the maximum at
ξ = β. If ξ > β̄, there is no chance that the buyer accepts b and the expected payment is 0.
Proposition 6.1. The necessary condition for ξ ∗ to yield maximum expected payment in (6.6) is
ξ ∗ = β or ξ ∗ =

1−F (ξ ∗ )
.
f (ξ ∗ )


P ROOF : The objective function in (6.6), ξ 1 − F (ξ) , is a smooth function everywhere except at
the end points. From the first order condition (FOC), the necessary condition for a maximum is
that the first-order derivative be zero, i.e.,

∂
ξ 1 − F (ξ) = 1 − F (ξ) − ξf (ξ) = 0
∂ξ
Hence, the necessary condition for ξ to be optimal is ξ ∗ =

1−F (ξ ∗ )
.
f (ξ ∗ )

(6.7)

We should also check the end
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points at ξ = {β, β̄}. Note that in the case ξ = β̄, the expected payment obtained by the sensor is
0 and, therefore, we only need to compare the end point at ξ = β.
Note that it is not clear a priori if a solution of (6.7) exists for this equation for general distributions
F (·) and f (·). If no solution to this fixed point equation (6.7) exists, then the optimal ξ ∗ ought to
be the smallest value β in the support of the distribution of β. When there are multiple local
maximum points that satisfy ξ =

1−F (ξ)
,
f (ξ)

one must check and compare all the local maximum

points (including the point at β) to determine the global maxima. Moreover, the value of ξ ∗ not
only depends on the type of PDF of β, but also is affected by the specific support [β, β̄]. In the
following, we provide two examples for illustration.
1) β follows uniform distribution. Let β follow the uniform distribution U (a1 , a2 ). In this case,
the CDF given ξ is F (ξ) =

ξ−a1
.
a2 −a1

Hence, the objective function in (6.6) becomes

ξ ∗ = arg max
ξ∈[a1 ,a2 ]

which is maximized by setting ξ ∗ =

a2
.
2

(a2 − a1 )(a2 ξ − ξ 2 )

After checking the point ξ =

∗

ξ =



 a2 , a1 ≤
2

a2
2


a1 , a1 >

a2
2

a1
,
2

we have the final result:

2) β follows exponential distribution. Let β follow the exponential distribution f (β) = λe−λβ if
β ≥ 0 and f (β) = 0 otherwise. The CDF of the exponential distribution given ξ is F (ξ) = 1−e−λξ .
Following (6.6), the objective is to find ξ ∗ that satisfies

ξ ∗ = arg max ξe−λξ
ξ>0

The first order derivative of ξe−λξ with respect to ξ is e−λξ (1 − λξ). Hence, we have ξ ∗ = 1/λ and
one can verify that the condition ξ ∗ =

1−F (ξ ∗ )
f (ξ ∗ )

is satisfied.

Given that the payment proposed by the sensor is b∗ = ξ ∗ D(p∗ ), i.e., ξ = ξ ∗ , the expected
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profit of the sensor can be expressed as the profit derived from performing the detection task plus
the expected payment:

U2 = αD(p∗ ) − cp∗ + E(b∗ ) = α + ξ ∗ 1 − F (ξ ∗ )



D(p∗ ) − cp∗ .

So far, we have investigated the optimal payment b∗ requested from the buyer when the sensor
consumes a fixed amount of energy p∗ in the detection task. Two scenarios where the sensor
knows the exact value and statistical information of the buyer’s benefit parameter β have been
considered. In particular, when the sensor is uncertain about the value of β, we have shown that
the sensor can determine an optimal ξ ∗ that is either at the end points of the support of β or satisfies
ξ∗ −

1−F (ξ ∗ )
f (ξ ∗ )

= 0. In this case, the sensor can act as if he/she knows the exact benefit parameter

of the buyer to be ξ ∗ and propose the payment of b = ξ ∗ D(p∗ ) so as to maximize the expected
monetary reward. Given the PDF f (·) and CDF F (·) of the buyer’s benefit parameter β, we define
the critical function of β to be h(β) = β −

1−F (β)
,
f (β)

and the point β ∗ that satisfies h(β ∗ ) = 0

to be the critical point. In the following sections, we allow the sensor to vary the amount of
energy consumption based on the buyer’s benefit parameter β, so that the sensor can achieve the
maximum expected utility while performing the detection task and negotiating with the buyer. In
such scenarios, the critical function and the critical point will be used again in determining the
sensor’s optimal amount of energy consumption and requested payment.

6.4

Jointly Optimal Energy Consumption and Payment Determination

When spending the fixed amount of energy p∗ , the sensor does not necessarily gain maximum
profit. In this section, we consider the detection problem where the sensor is allowed to vary the
amount of energy consumption in order to earn more profit. With the participation of the buyer, the
profit of the sensor comprises of two parts: one is the profit from successful detection of the PoI, the
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other is the payment b received from the buyer. We consider that both t and b are functions of the
buyer’s benefit parameter β, namely, t(β) and b(β), respectively. Recall that upon the acceptance

of the proposal, the sensor has expected utility αD t(β) + b(β) − ct(β), and the buyer has utility

βD t(β) − b(β).

6.4.1

Sensor Has Complete Information of β

We first analyze the decision of the buyer whether or not to accept the proposal {t(β), b(β)}. Since

we have assumed that the buyer always accepts the proposal when its expected utility βD t(β) −
b(β)is non-negative, its decision i(β) on whether or not to accept the proposal can be expressed as

arg max




i(β) βD t(β) − b(β)

i(β)∈{0,1}

(6.8)

where i(β) can also be interpreted as an indicator function on β(D(t(β))) − b(β) being nonnegative.
When the sensor knows the exact value of β, the objective is to design the proposal {t(β), b(β)}
so as to maximize the expected profit:


max i(β)b(β) + αD t(β) − ct(β)
t(β),b(β)

(6.9)

Proposition 6.2. The optimal proposal if the sensor has complete information of the buyer’s benefit
parameter β is
c
)
α+β

bC (β) = βD tC (β)
tC (β) = D∗ (

(6.10)
(6.11)

where the superscript C indicates that the sensor has complete information of β.
P ROOF : We solve the optimization problem corresponding to the sensor and the buyer formulated
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in (6.8) and (6.9) by reasoning from the sensor’s side first. Since the buyer accepts the proposal
whenever the profit in (6.8) is greater or equal to 0, and the exact value of β is known, the sensor
can maximize its profit from the buyer by setting (6.8) equal to 0. Thus, we obtain the solution in
(6.11) and i(β) = 1. Any other value of b(β) that deviates from bC (β) leads to a potential decrease
in the sensor’s profit and is not an equilibrium solution.
Substituting (6.11) and i(β) = 1 into (6.9), the utility function for the sensor becomes


max(α + β)D t(β) − ct(β)
t(β)

(6.12)

Set the first order derivative of (6.12) with respect to t(β) equal to 0, and we get the optimal energy
c
usage amount for the sensor, tC (β) = D∗ ( α+β
), given in (6.10).

By investing tC (β) given in (6.10), the sensor obtains expected profit U3 = (α + β)D(tC (β)) −
ctC (β), which is greater than the profit obtained when investing t(β) = p∗ . Hence, we have
U3 > U1 > U ∗ for positive values of β.
Remark 6.1. In the presence of incentives from the buyer and if the exact value of β is known, the
optimal amount of energy to be invested tC (β) is obtained by replacing α by α + β in (6.3). Since
c
α+β

<

c
α

and recall that D∗ (·) is a decreasing function, it follows that tC (β) > p∗ , indicating that

the optimal energy consumption is higher in the presence of the buyer. The higher the value of β,
the larger is the value of tC (β).

6.4.2

Sensor Has Statistical Information of β

In Section 6.3.2, we considered that β is a continuous random variable that follows the PDF f (β)
and the CDF F (β) with the support [β, β̄]. The objective of the sensor is to design the proposal
{t(β), b(β)} for all β ∈ [β, β̄]. In this scenario where β is a random variable and the sensor may
vary its energy consumption t, we consider that the proposal offered to the buyer is represented
by two functions t(β) and b(β). If the buyer accepts the proposal, it shall convey its true benefit
parameter β t to the sensor. Based on β t , the sensor spends energy t(β t ) to perform the detection
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task and the buyer makes a payment b(β t ) to obtain the detection result.
Similar to the previous subsection, we characterize the buyer’s decision i(β) to decide whether
or not to accept the proposal {t(β), b(β)} in the following.
Proposition 6.3. For a given proposal {t(β), b(β)}, there exists a threshold β S such that the buyer
with benefit parameter β ≥ β S will decide to accept the proposal, and reject otherwise.
P ROOF : For a given proposal {t(β), b(β)}, a buyer with benefit parameter β1 will decide to reject
if his/her utility is negative


β1 D t(β 0 ) − b(β 0 ) < 0, ∀β 0 ∈ [β, β̄].

(6.13)

where β 0 ∈ [β, β̄] represents all the possible values of the benefit parameter conveyed from the
buyer to the sensor. Given that the buyer with parameter β1 does not accept the proposal, the buyer
will not accept it for any β2 such that β2 ≤ β1 . This is because


β2 D t(β 0 ) − b(β 0 ) ≤ β1 D t(β 0 ) − b(β 0 ) < 0

∀β 0 ∈ [β, β̄]. With a similar reasoning, we can state that if the buyer with parameter β3 decides to
accept the proposal, the buyer will also accept for parameter value β4 such that β4 ≥ β3 . Hence,
there must exist a threshold β S above which the buyer accepts the proposal and rejects otherwise.

Since the sensor only knows the statistical information of β, it designs {t(β), b(β)} to maximize
the expected profit:

max Eβ {i(β)b(β) + αD t(β) − ct(β)}

t(β),b(β)

(6.14)

Knowing that there exists a threshold β S above which the buyer always accepts the proposal
and below which the buyer will not, the utility function for the sensor in (6.14) becomes:

max

t(β),b(β),β S



E {αD t(β) − ct(β)} + E {b(β) + αD t(β) − ct(β)}

β≤β S

β≥β S
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or equivalently,

E{αD t(β) − ct(β)} + E {b(β)}

max

t(β),b(β),β S β

(6.15)

β≥β S

subject to the constraints:


βD t(β) − b(β) ≥ 0, ∀β ≥ β S


βD t(β) − b(β) ≥ βD t(β 0 ) − b(β 0 ) ∀β ≥ β S , ∀β 0 ∈ [β, β̄]

(6.16)
(6.17)

The constraint in (6.16) is the individual rationality (IR) constraint, which says that the buyer
whose benefit parameter is above β S should have non-negative profit and accept the proposal. The
constraint in (6.17) is the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, which ensures that the buyer
cannot gain extra profit by falsifying its benefit parameter, when its true valuation towards the detection result is β. Since the sensor does not know the buyer’s benefit parameter beforehand, the
buyer may strategically lie about β to gain undue advantage. For instance, if the buyer reports
a lower benefit parameter to the sensor than its true valuation towards the detection result β, the
sensor might decrease the payment amount because the sensor thinks that the buyer is less interested in the detection result. On the other hand, a higher benefit parameter than the truthful value
might lead the sensor to invest more energy so that a larger detection accuracy can be achieved.
Suppose the buyer’s real benefit parameter is β, the utility when the buyer truthfully reports this

parameter is U = βD t(β) − b(β). When the buyer falsifies the parameter to be β 0 , the utility is

U 0 = βD t(β 0 ) − b(β 0 ). By applying the IC constraint in (6.17), i.e., U ≥ U 0 , we ensure that the
buyer truthfully reports the benefit parameter.
Next, we eliminate the decision variable b(β) from the optimization problem in (6.15) via the
following lemma.
Lemma 6.1. The optimization problem in (6.15) under constraints (6.16) and (6.17) is equivalent
to solving:




max E{αD t(β) − ct(β)} + E

t(β),β S

β

β≥β S

1 − F (β)
β−
f (β)


D t(β)




(6.18)
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P ROOF : See Appendix A.6
Note that in Lemma 6.1, β −

1−F (β)
f (β)

= h(β) is the critical function defined in Section 6.3.2.

Hence, no matter whether the sensor consumes a fixed amount of energy or is able to vary the
amount of energy consumption, the critical function plays an important role in decision making
when only statistical information of β is available. Moreover, we define the function


 0,
β ≤ βS
g(β) =

h(β), β > β S

(6.19)

and have the following theorem that provides the solution for the optimization problem (6.15).
Theorem 6.1. The solution to the optimization problem (6.15) is given by:

β S = β, or satisfies h(β S ) = 0


c
S
∗
2. t (β) = D
α + g(β)

 R


βD tS (β) − βS D tS (u) du ∀β ≥ β S
β
S
3. b (β) =



β S D tS (β ∗ ) ∀β ≤ β S

1.

(6.20)
(6.21)

(6.22)

P ROOF : See Appendix A.7
When the sensor employs the optimal solution given in Theorem 6.1, the sensor has the expected
profit
Z

β̄
S

S

Z

β̄

αD(t (β)) − ct (β)dβ +

U4 =
β

bS (β)dβ,

βS

which directly follows from (6.15).
Remark 6.2. When the sensor knows the statistical information of β, the optimal solution in Theorem 2 prevents the buyers with benefit parameter lower than β S from accepting the proposal. In
other words, the sensor sacrifices the potential revenue from these low benefit parameter buyers,
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for the sake of ensuring the mechanism to be incentive compatible, i.e., buyers report their benefit
parameters truthfully. Besides, since g(β) in (6.21) is a non-negative term, the optimal amount of
energy consumption tS is greater than or equal to p∗ derived in (6.3).

6.5

Simulation Results

For illustration purposes, we conduct experiments for the shift-of-mean hypothesis testing problem
as described in Section 6.2.1. We assume that the channel noise variance is σ 2 = 0.25. The
benefit parameter of the sensor is α = 10 and the cost of unit energy consumption is c = 8.
Using the probability of correctly detecting the hypothesis given in (6.1) and exploiting (6.3), we
obtain that p∗ = 0.15, which is the optimal amount of energy that maximizes the expected utility
while performing the detection task. Next, we consider that the sensor has complete information

Fig. 6.3: Performance metrics as a function of β when the sensor has complete information of β
of the buyer’s benefit parameter β and investigate the two scenarios where the sensor invests a
fixed amount of energy p∗ as discussed in Section 6.3.1 and the sensor invests the optimal amount
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of energy as discussed in Section 6.4.1, respectively. In evaluating the performance, we make the
comparison between results obtained in Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 by considering the information
of β to be either completely known or have statistical knowledge. The purpose is to illustrate the
performance improvement when spending the optimal amount of energy compared to fixed energy
consumption.
In Fig. 6.3 (a), we plot the amount of energy consumption with respect to β. It can be seen
that the optimal amount of energy, which is larger than p∗ except at β = 0, increases as β becomes
larger. From Fig. 6.3 (b), we can see that the utilities of the sensor increase with respect to β
in both situations. By investing the optimal amount of energy, the sensor can obtain more utility
compared to investing the fixed amount of energy p∗ . In Fig. 6.3 (c), the energy efficiency, defined
as the utility per unit energy, is obtained for different values of β. We can observe that although
investing the optimal amount of energy brings more utility and/or profit, the energy efficiency with
fixed amount of energy consumption is higher. The reason is that by investing the optimal amount
of energy, the sensor obtains slightly more profit, at the cost of a relatively large amount of energy
usage compared to p∗ . In optimal energy consumption, “optimality” means that by spending that
amount of energy, the expected utility of the sensor is maximized. However, the amount of energy
that needs to be invested is higher resulting in low energy efficiency.
Energy efficiency is a critical factor that affects the sensor energy allocation strategy in performing multiple tasks. In case there are several tasks posted from one or more buyers at the same
time, the sensor should employ the ‘fixed energy consumption’ approach so that more tasks can be
undertaken. In each of the tasks, the sensor has a higher energy efficiency and obtains more profit.
On the other hand, if we only have one detection task from the buyer, the sensor should invest the
optimal amount of energy to derive the largest possible profit.
Next, we assume that the buyer’s benefit parameter β is a random variable that follows a beta
distribution Beta(γ, γ) with support {β = 0, β̄ = 100} and γ = 3. Under this setting, the sensor
is assumed to invest a fixed amount of energy p∗ as described in Section 6.3.2 as well as the case
where it invests the optimal amount of energy as shown in Section 6.4.2. In Fig. 6.4 (a), we plot
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Fig. 6.4: Performance metrics as a function of β when the sensor has statistical information of β
the amount of energy consumption with respect to the buyer’s benefit parameter β. We can see that
the optimal amount of energy tS (β) does not increase until β S = 39.8 is reached. In Fig. 6.4 (b),
we can see that the utility of the sensor in both situations rapidly increases when the threshold β S is
reached. The sensor obtains a higher utility by investing the optimal amount of energy, compared
to the fixed energy consumption strategy. In Fig. 6.4 (c), it can be observed that as β increases, the
energy efficiency for the optimal energy consumption strategy decreases. Similar to Fig. 6.3 where
the exact value of β is known, in Fig. 6.4 we see that when β > β S , the optimal amount of energy
consumption achieves higher utility for the sensor, while at the same time it has higher amount of
energy consumption and lower energy efficiency. From both Fig. 6.3 and Fig. 6.4, we see that for
the same value of the parameter β, the profit under complete information of β is higher than the
profit when only statistical information of β is known. It is because when the exact values of β
are not available, the sensor has to account for the uncertainties of the buyer on whether to accept
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the proposal or not. Besides, some profits must be ‘sacrificed’ to ensure that the buyer truthfully
reveals its benefit parameter. These two reasons account for the profit gap between the two curves.
Finally, we analyze the results for different statistical distributions of β. As before, we assume
β ∼ Beta(γ, γ) within the interval [0, 100], where γ could change. As shown in Fig. 6.5 (a), the
critical point β S is calculated for different values of γ. In Section 6.3.2, we showed that when the
information of β is uncertain, β S determines the amount of payment b if the sensor consumes a
fixed amount of energy p∗ . If the sensor varies the amount of energy consumption and proposes
{t(β), b(β)} to the buyer as discussed in Section 6.4.2, β S is the threshold below which the buyer
shall choose not to accept the proposal. It can be seen that β S decreases as γ becomes larger. In

Fig. 6.5: Performance results for different distributions of β
Fig. 6.5 (b), we can see that by investing the optimal amount of energy, the sensor obtains more
utility compared to the case when a fixed amount of energy p∗ is invested. In both situations, the
sensor has higher utilities as γ becomes larger. As a large value of γ indicates smaller variance
(i.e., less uncertainty) of the Beta distribution, it makes sense that more profit can be derived if the
sensor has less uncertainty regarding the parameter β.
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6.6

Energy Efficiency and the Effect on the Energy Consumption Strategy

As we discussed in the previous section, energy efficiency refers to the utility obtained from spending a unit amount of energy, which determines the energy allocation strategy when the sensor can
distribute the energy to perform multiple tasks, i.e., in a way that achieves highest energy efficiency. In this section, we provide more details on how the energy efficiency affects energy usage
behavior. For simplicity, we only consider the case in which the sensor performs the detection
problem by itself, in the absence of a buyer.
In Section 6.2, we formulated the problem that the optimal amount of energy p∗ maximizes
U (p) = αD(p) − cp, where we assumed that the utility is 0 for detecting the PoI incorrectly. To
be more general, we denote the penalty of a wrong detection as Cm . Hence, the objective function

becomes U (p) = αD(p) − Cm 1 − D(p) − cp and the corresponding optimal energy consumption
c
). For illustration purposes, in Fig. 6.6 we plot the expected utility U (p) and
is p∗ = D∗ ( α+C
m

energy efficiency U (p)/p with respect to p when the sensor performs shift-of-mean hypothesis
testing tasks, where we use α = 14, c = 5, σ 2 = 0.25, and Cm takes value from {0, 10, 20}. From
Fig. 6.6 (a), we can see that for a given value of cm , U (p) increases with respect to p up to a certain
point before it begins to decrease. The reason is that beyond the optimal point p∗ , the system
performance in terms of detection accuracy saturates while the cost of energy consumption keeps
increasing. As expected, it can also be observed that the utility curve with a smaller value of Cm
lies above the utility curve with a larger value of Cm . As the detection accuracy improves with
respect to p, the discrepancies between the curves with different values of Cm become smaller as
p increases. Moreover, note that the optimal amount of energy p∗ that maximizes U (p) becomes
c
larger as Cm increases. It is because that p∗ = D∗ ( α+C
) and D∗ (·) is a decreasing function, so that
m

a larger value of Cm gives a larger value of p∗ . In Fig. 6.6 (b), the energy efficiency monotonously
decreases for Cm = 0, 10. For Cm = 20, the energy efficiency increases with respect to p up to
a certain point before it begins to decrease. When there are many task options to choose from,
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Fig. 6.6: U (p) and energy efficiency with respect to energy amount p.
energy distribution among different tasks should be properly designed to maximize the efficiency
of available energy usage. On the other hand, when there is only one task to perform, one should
invest the optimal amount of energy p∗ in order to obtain maximum utility.
From the perspective of energy efficiency, there are scenarios, e.g., the blue and red curves in
Fig. 6.6 (b), where smaller the value of p, larger is the value of energy efficiency. In fact, when
p = 0, the expected utility from a random guess is positive and the energy efficiency goes to
infinity. However, in real applications, it is not practical to participate in many tasks by spending a
little bit of energy for each one. The reason is that the sensor is expected to be able to detect the PoI
with a certain level of accuracy and build up a reputation, which is beneficial in the market so that
more buyers become interested in working with them. Detection accuracy is a quality of service
(QoS) measure in many applications and a high level of QoS is required to ensure satisfaction of
customers [1].
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6.7

Summary

This chapter investigated the energy usage problem for detection problems in IoT systems from
a utility theory point of view. By exploring the cost-benefit relationship, we derived the optimal
amount of energy usage that maximizes the expected profit while detecting a PoI. We further
considered incentives from a buyer and applied a Stackelberg leader-follower model for payment
negotiation between the sensor and the buyer. We obtained the optimal energy usage t and payment
b that maximizes the expected profit of the sensor while guaranteeing the buyer’s expected utility to
be non-negative. Two scenarios where the sensor has complete or statistical information of buyer’s
benefit parameter β were studied. The formulation can be applied to many signal processing and
communication problems beyond detection in the context of IoT paradigms. Potential applications
also include incentivization and payment negotiation in distributed detection and crowdsoucing,
e.g., where the participants exhibit selfish behaviors.
In the future, we plan to extend our analysis to the general setting shown in Fig. 6.1 and investigate a broad range of problems that include a sensor’s energy allocation among multiple tasks
and the incentive mechanism between multiple buyers and multiple sensors. Another promising
direction of research is to consider the case where the sensors in IoT systems are scarce and introduce competition among the buyers. This would require the concepts of auction mechanism or
matching theory in order to maximize the system’s entire welfare. Finally, in payment negotiation
we have only considered a Stackelberg model where the sensor acts as the leader and the buyer
acts as the follower. It would be interesting to consider the case when the leader-follower roles are
reversed. In this case, the buyer will gain an advantage in terms of its profit.
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C HAPTER 7

H UMAN M ACHINE C OLLABORATION FOR
S EMI -A UTONOMOUS B INARY D ECISION
M AKING

7.1

Introduction

This chapter develops a semi-autonomous human machine collaboration system to perform signal detection. Detecting a phenomenon of interest (PoI) is a key step for successful operation of
many complex autonomous systems in realistic environments. Signal detection plays an important
role in potential applications such as wireless communications, target tracking, security, surveillance, navigation and healthcare. The task of determining which of the two probability models
best matches a set of observations, i.e., binary hypothesis testing, is a very commonly considered
problem in signal detection and has been well studied in the literature. Frameworks and fusion
rules under both centralized and distributed settings in different contexts have been explored to
enhance the performance of binary hypothesis testing [142, 147].
In conventional detection theory, it is typically assumed that observations are collected by
machines (or physical sensors) and a decision is made according to a pre-designed decision rule.
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While intelligent decision making systems composed of physical sensors/machines are prevalent
in many aspects of our life, critical decisions bearing great importance are quite often made by
humans, e.g., decisions in national security, natural disaster prevention, medical diagnosis and
surgery plans. In these critical situations, incorporating human expertise in addition to automated
machine-only systems can be beneficial in making high quality decisions.

7.1.1

Related Work

Considering that humans are important components in the decision making process, different models have been proposed to characterize the attributes corresponding to human-based and machinebased sources of information and to develop efficient decision fusion rules for such multi-source
decision systems. A crowdsourcing support system was constructed in [134] for the fusion of
data from physical and human sensors in real-time to improve its sensor coverage and the quality
of decisions. In [9], the authors designed a user refinement stage on top of the Joint Director of
Labs (JDL) fusion model and demonstrated the importance of the human judgement in decision
fusion. In the framework studied in [8], the machine is able to detect the human psychological
states such as anxiety and anger in real time and adapt its behavior for the purpose of improve
the human decision making performance. Hard and soft data fusion was investigated when both
human and physical sensors were assumed to make threshold-based decisions using identical observations [153].
Taking a perspective that is different from the above authors, here, we explore the workload
distribution between humans and machines in human-machine collaboration systems. According
to [61], humans surpass machines in their ability to improvise and use flexible procedures, exercise
judgement and reason inductively. On the other hand, machines outperform humans in responding
quickly, performing repetitive and routine tasks, and reason deductively (including computational
ability). In addition, humans may be able to observe some features and traits of the PoI that
machines cannot. Thus, humans and machines should work jointly so that they can interact with
and complement each other.
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As a result, human-machine collaborative semi-autonomous systems should be designed by
considering and exploiting the advantages of both humans and machines so as to increase system
effectiveness and performance. To solve the workload allocation problem, traditional literature in
human engineering often suggests breaking an activity into several elementary tasks and allocating
each one to the best fit operator (human or machine) for that task [60]. However, this approach has
been criticized in different contexts. First, the definition and scope of the tasks are quite subjective
based on the cognition and reasoning ability of the humans. It makes the task decomposition and
assignment inconsistent. Next, as humans and machines collaborate to achieve some system-wide
objective, humans can not control or operate the machines properly when they are not experts in
running the machines [137]. Hence, humans and machines, instead of being treated as two separate
entities, should be considered jointly in task environments so that they can interact and complement each other. However, existing literature that studies human interaction with automation either
analyzes the topic at a high conceptual level (e.g., in human engineering) [99,150] or focuses on experimental demonstrations targeted at specific domains (e.g., in experimental psychology) [26,84].
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has constructed a concrete quantitative model to optimize the dynamic workload distribution between the human and the machine in performing signal
detection tasks, i.e, when to use machine automation and when to request human participation.

7.1.2

Major Technical Contributions

In this chapter, we consider that the human and the machine have different sources of information
regarding the PoI. Specifically, the machine acquires an objective measurement and the human has
expert knowledge that comes from other information sources, experience, inductive reasoning, etc,
which is not available to the machine. We bring in a human as an expert/consultant1 in addition to
the machine’s observation for decision making while achieving the best trade-off among multiple
objectives that include system performance and human labor cost. The aim is to design a humanmachine collaboration framework that blends both machine observations and human expertise to
1

The terms “expert” and “consultant” will be used interchangeably throughout the chapter.
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solve binary hypothesis testing problems semi-autonomously. The main contributions made in this
chapter are summarized as:
• We investigate the conditions under which incorporating human consultation improves the
overall system performance and quantify the amount of improvement that can be achieved.
We derive the optimal human consultation region2 by balancing the trade-off between performance improvement and the cost of human consultation. Two scenarios where the human
requires a fixed consultation fee for a given period of time, and where the human is paid
based on the frequency of consultation, are studied.
• A correlation structure is proposed to model the dependency between the machine observations and human expertise. We show that the amount of dependency is an important factor
that guides the design of human-machine collaboration mechanism.
• We study the performance of the system as additional humans are recruited to work on the
detection tasks. Asymptotic performance of the system that is composed of one machine and
multiple humans is derived.

7.2

Human-Machine Collaboration Model

We consider the binary hypothesis testing problem assuming that there are two possible hypotheses
or “states”, H0 and H1 , regarding a phenomenon of interest (PoI), where the observation r under the
two hypotheses has the probability density functions (PDFs) f (r|H0 ) and f (r|H1 ), respectively.
The prior probabilities are denoted by π0 = P r(H0 ) and π1 = P r(H1 ) = 1 − π0 , respectively. In
the following, we use the notation f (x) to denote the PDF of the random variable x and use the
notation P r(X) to denote the probability that an event X happens. Given that the observation is r,
a decision rule φ(r) uniquely maps every possible r to either H0 or H1 , φ : Γ → {H0 , H1 }, where
Γ denotes the observation space. Note that φ represents partitions of Γ into subsets Γi such that
2

Human consultation region is defined as a subset of machine’s observation space such that when the machine
observation falls in this region, human consultation is requested. More details are presented in Section 7.2.

141
we choose Hi when r ∈ Γi for i = 0, 1. Note that Γ0 , also known as the acceptance region, is the
complement of Γ1 , Γ0 = Γc1 .
We consider that a machine observes r and employs the decision rule φm to decide on the
status of the PoI. As the optimal decision rule that minimizes the Bayesian risk is in the form of
likelihood ratio test (LRT) [142], φm can be expressed as
f (r|H1 )
f (r|H0 )

H1

R
H0

π0 (c10 − c00 )
, η,
π1 (c01 − c11 )

(7.1)

where cij is the cost of deciding in favor of Hi when the true hypothesis is Hj for i, j = {0, 1}. We
consider that the state of the PoI is determined by a memoryless process so that decision making
is independent across time. When there is no human participation, we consider that the machine
observes r and compares the likelihood ratio Lm (r) =

f (r|H1 )
f (r|H0 )

to η to make the decision d ∈ {0, 1}.

In previous research works, decision fusion where different decision makers observe the same
PoI has been studied under different contexts [105]. In this work, however, we consider that the
human does not have access to the observation r, but possesses additional information regarding
the PoI through his/her experience or other sources that is not available to the machine. We call the
human’s additional intuition which is not available to the machines as the side information provided
by humans. While the machine’s observation r is a continuous random variable, we consider
that the humans have limited information processing ability and only make categorical decisions
[93]. To model the error behavior in human decision making, the human’s side information s
is characterized using a binary symmetric channel (BSC) as shown in Fig. 7.1. In particular,
Pr(s = i|Hi is true) = β for i = 0, 1, where β represents the accuracy of the human and we
assume that β ≥ 0.5.
Our human-machine collaboration model is presented in Fig. 7.2. The machine monitors the
PoI and receives observation r constantly. When requested, human consultation is brought in to
further improve the detection accuracy. For instance, a) To determine the absence H0 or existence
H1 of an adversarial target, the machine measures the power of potential emitted signals while the
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Fig. 7.1: Human expertise modeled using BSC
human’s binary decision can be based on the human’s visual observation regarding the PoI which
may exhibit an error behavior described by a BSC. b) In quantitative trading, we want to predict
whether the stock price will increase (H1 ) or decrease (H0 ). The machine’s observation can be
based on some historical data of a certain index, while the human’s binary decision, modeled as a
BSC, may be based on his/her understanding of the company as well as the public news. Beyond
these two illustrative examples, our formulation is suitable to model numerous semi-autonomous
systems for situational awareness and command and control, both in military and civilian domains,
that involve human participation.
We refer to the machine’s observation space that requires human assistance as the human consultation region denoted by Γhs , which is a subspace of the entire observation space Γ. On the
other hand, if r ∈
/ Γhs , the machine makes a decision d automatically by employing the decision
rule φm . For the case when human consultation is requested for decision making, a fusion center
(FC) makes the final decision d by exploiting the human side information s and the machine’s
observation r via an LRT detector. Assuming that s and r are independent of each other given H1
or H0 , the fusion rule at the FC φf simplifies to:

Lf (r) =

P r(r, s|H1 ) H1
R η,
P r(r, s|H0 ) H0

(7.2)

β
if s = 0 and Lf (r) = Lm (r) 1−β
if s = 1. For simplicity, we assume
where Lf (r) = Lm (r) 1−β
β

the costs of the hypothesis testing problem to be c00 = c11 = 0 and c10 = c01 = c. In the rest of
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Fig. 7.2: Flowchart of the human-machine collaboration mechanism.
the chapter, we refer to this cost structure as uniform costs. Hence, η in (7.1) and (7.2) becomes
η=

π0
π1

, π ∗ . In this case, the Bayesian cost of the hypothesis testing problem is proportional to

the average probability of error Pe . Hence, we use Bayesian cost or Pe to characterize the system
performance.
The following lemma presents the necessary and sufficient condition for system performance
improvement as a result of human consultation. We derive a critical observation region such that in
this region, bringing in human expertise and applying the decision rule φf achieves better detection
accuracy compared to machine’s decision making by employing the decision rule φm .
Lemma 7.1. Compared to the automatic decision making of the machine, human consultation
(side information) enhances the accuracy of the system if and only if the observation r falls in a
critical observation region, i.e., r ∈ Γ! ≡ {r| π

∗ (1−β)

β

≤ Lm (r) <

π∗ β
}.
(1−β)

P ROOF : See Appendix A.8.
Lemma 7.1 and its proof imply that when r ∈ Γ! , the probability that the machine makes a correct
decision is less than the human accuracy β and incorporating human side information can improve
the system performance. When r ∈
/ Γ! , the accuracy of the machine’s decision is greater than
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β and bringing in human side information neither improves nor degrades detection performance.
In semi-autonomous systems, human consultation/participation always incurs a cost. Hence, we
choose not to request human side information if it does not improve the system performance.
As a direct result of Lemma 7.1, Proposition 7.1 presents a criterion to request human consultation when the machine cannot make high quality decisions.
Proposition 7.1. To ensure that the detection accuracy of the system does not fall below a threshold
ζ ∈ (0.5, β), the minimum human consultation region is given by Γζ = {r| π

∗ (1−ζ)

ζ

< Lm (r) <

π∗ ζ
}
(1−ζ)

Next, we quantify the improvement of detection accuracy by incorporating human consultation
via the following theorem.
Theorem 7.1. Given that the machine’s observation is r and using the detection accuracy of the
machine’s decision as a benchmark, adding human consultation increases the probability of making a correct decision by (or equivalently, decreases the error probability by)

t(r) =




β − g(Lm (r)), if r ∈ Γ! ,

(7.3)



0, otherwise,
where g(τ ) represents the probability that the decision of φm is correct given that Lm (r) = τ :

g(τ ) =

P ROOF :






τ /π ∗
,
1+τ /π ∗





1
,
1+τ /π ∗

if τ ≥ π ∗ ,
(7.4)
∗

if 0 < τ < π ,

From the proof of Lemma 7.1, it is obvious that the probability of making a correct

decision at the LRT detector when the likelihood ratio is Lm (r) can be expressed as g(Lm (r)).
Next, consider that when r ∈ Γ! , the probability of making a correct decision by employing φf is
β. The accuracy of the machine’s decision by employing φm is given by g(Lm (r)) ≤ β. Hence,
the increase in decision accuracy is β − g(Lm (r)). When r ∈
/ Γ! , we showed that φm = φf and
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bringing in human consultation yields the same system performance.
To give more intuition on the result, we analytically show that φm and φf have the same probability of making a correct decision when r ∈
/ Γ! . From Theorem 7.1, we know that if r ∈
/ Γ! , the
accuracy of the machine’s automatic decision given r is Ym (r) = g(Lm (r)). If human consultation
is incorporated, we need to consider the value of the side information s in calculating the probability of making correct decisions. Note that without specifying whether H1 or H0 is true, s and r
are not independent of each other because of the inherent hypothesis they are sampled from. From
the proof of Lemma 7.1 we know that if the machine observes r, the probabilities that H0 and H1
are true can be expressed as

P r(H0 |r) =

Lm (r)/π ∗
1
,
P
r(H
|r)
=
,
1
1 + Lm (r)/π ∗
1 + Lm (r)/π ∗

(7.5)

respectively. Hence, the probabilities that human’s side information are s = 1 and s = 0 respectively are given as

P r(s = 1|r) = P r(H1 |r)β + P r(H0 |r)(1 − β)
=

1−β
βLm (r)/π ∗
+
,
1 + Lm (r)/π ∗ 1 + Lm (r)/π ∗

(7.6)

P r(s = 0|r) = P r(H1 |r)(1 − β) + P r(H0 |r)β
=

(1 − β)Lm (r)/π ∗
β
+
1 + Lm (r)/π ∗
1 + Lm (r)/π ∗

(7.7)

(r)β
Note that when s = 1, the accuracy of the FC’s decision is g( Lm
) and when s = 0, the accu1−β
(r)β
racy is g( Lm (r)(1−β)
). Hence, the FC has the overall probability Yf (r) = P r(s = 1|r)g( Lm
)+
β
1−β

P r(s = 0|r)g( Lm (r)(1−β)
) of making correct decisions. By exploiting r ∈
/ Γ! and after simplificaβ
tion, we have Ym (r) = Yf (r).
As discussed in different contexts in the literature, adding a second source of information (or
more samples of the observations) improves the system performance on an average. In our setup,
we can see that the improvement of bringing in human side information only occurs when the
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machine’s observation r falls in the critical region. Hence, we should choose r in the consultation
region such that t(r) defined in (7.3) is greater than 0. In the system model shown in Fig. 7.2 where
the human consultation region is Γhs , we have the amount of improvement in decision accuracy
compared to φm given by
Z
(β − g(Lm (r))f (r)dr

(Γhs ) =

(7.8)

r∈{Γhs ∩Γ! }

where ∩ represents the set intersection operator and f (r) is the PDF of the observation r given
by f (r) = π0 f (r|H0 ) + π1 f (r|H1 ). Note that the error probability of the machine’s decision by
employing φm is
PeM

Z
= π0

Z
f (r|H0 )dr + π1

r∈{r|Lm (r)≥η}

f (r|H1 )dr

(7.9)

r∈{r|Lm (r)<η}

As a result, the error probability of the integrated system is Pe = PeM − (Γhs ). To reduce the
amount of human work and save the costs incurred by human consultation, we should choose the
smallest consultation region, i.e., Γhs = Γ! , that still guarantees the best system performance.
For a concrete illustration of our analysis, we let the observation r be a Gaussian random variable N (+m, σr2 ) under H1 and N (−m, σr2 ) under H0 . Gaussian distributions are widely used in
the literature as they characterize a lot of problems in experimental psychology, wireless communication, medical diagnosis, etc. Furthermore, we assume equal priors π0 = π1 = 1/2 so that we
have η = 1 in (7.1). In this scenario, based on Theorem 7.1, the critical observation region can be
β
)/2m and r− = σr2 log( 1−β
)/2m.
simplified to Γ! = {r|r− ≤ r < r+ }, where r+ = σr2 log( 1−β
β

Note that under the assumption that β ≥ 0.5, we have r+ ≥ 0, r− ≤ 0 and r+ + r− = 0.
As we stated, Γ! is the smallest human consultation region so that best system performance can
be achieved. More generally, we investigate the error probability of the system when the human
consultation region changes in the next proposition.
Proposition 7.2. When Γhs = [−γ, γ], where γ ≥ 0, the average error probability of the system
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for the above hypothesis testing problem is expressed as





γ−m
−γ−m
)
+
Φ(
)
−
Φ(
)
(1 − β), if γ ≤ r+
Φ( −γ−m
σr
σr
σr
Pe (γ) =



Φ( −γ−m ) + Φ( γ+m ) − Φ( r+ +m ) β + Φ( γ+m ) − Φ( r− +m ) (1 − β), if γ > r+ ,
σr
σr
σr
σr
σr
(7.10)
where Φ(x) =

√1
2π

Rx
−∞

2

e−z dz is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard nor-

mal distribution.
P ROOF : See Appendix A.9.

Fig. 7.3: Average error probability as a function of human consultation region upper bound.
For illustration, we plot the probability of error of our system with respect to the human consultation region upper bound γ in Fig. 7.3. The Gaussian distributed observations have means ±2
and standard deviation σr = 2 under H1 and H0 . For different values of β = 0.75, 0.85, 0.95, it is
observed that the probability of error decreases as γ increases. For each of the three cases, there is
a cutoff point after which the probability of error does not drop any more. The value of the cutoff
β
point becomes larger as β increases (since r+ = σr2 log( 1−β
)/2m). Also, after the cutoff point r+

is reached, the system has better accuracy as the human has more expertise, i.e., β is larger.
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7.3

Human Participation with Constraints

In this section, we analyze the design of Γhs by considering two constraining factors associated
with human consultation in realistic applications, i.e., limited attention duration and participation
cost. For analytical convenience, we continue with the assumption that under H0 and H1 , the
machine’s observation r follows Gaussian distribution with means −m and m, respectively and
variance σ 2 . We assume that the priors are equal and the costs are uniform so that η = 1. In this
case, recall that r+ = −r− so that the length of Γ! is 2r+ .

7.3.1

Human with Limited Attention Duration

In many situations, the human, who acts as a consultant, has many pressing tasks to attend to.
Suppose that the hypothesis testing for this PoI is only one of the many concurrent tasks that the
human has to attend to. The human has limited attention duration towards this particular task in
the sense that we consider that the region Γhs has a fixed length. The objective is to determine the
optimal region with fixed length L that requires human consultation ΓLhs . Depending on whether
L ≥ 2r+ or L < 2r+ , the results are presented in Proposition 7.3 and Proposition 7.4, respectively.
Proposition 7.3. When L ≥ 2r+ , the optimal consultation region for human ΓLhs reduces to Γ!
P ROOF :

From the result of Proposition 7.2, the system performance is improved because of

human consultation only in Γ! . Thus, we let ΓLhs = Γ! and the remaining attention span L − 2r+
can be released.
Proposition 7.4. When L < 2r+ , the human consultation region ΓLhs with length L that achieves
the minimum of probability of error is [−L/2, L/2].
P ROOF : See Appendix A.10.
From Proposition 7.4 and its proof, we can see that the error probability reduction by adding
human consultation takes the largest value at r = 0. As r deviates away from 0, the error reduction
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rate decreases. In order to achieve the largest amount in error probability reduction with concentration duration L, ΓLhs should be centered at r = 0. Simulations are provided to corroborate this
result. We assume that the human expertise parameter is β = 0.9. Fig. 7.4 shows the probability of
error with respect to the center of the human consultation region Γhs , with length L taking values
from {0.5, 2, 4}. It is observed that when the center of Γhs is located at the origin, as stated in
Proposition 7.4, the system has the lowest probability of error. The performance degrades as the
human consultation region center shifts away from the origin. When ΓLhs completely moves out of
[r− , r+ ], the probability of error does not increase any more.

Fig. 7.4: Bayesian risk when human consultation region has length L.

7.3.2

Human with Participation Cost

The fee paid to human consultants for their participation is the main source of expenses in our
human machine collaboration framework. There is a need to balance the trade-off between the
cost of hiring humans and the improvement in system performance. First, we consider that there
is a fixed cost cT for hiring a human during a time window T , in which a total of T independent
detection tasks are performed. We consider that cT has the same unit as the costs of the hypothesis
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testing problem, i.e., cij for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. The following proposition addresses the conditions under
which we should hire a human for consultation.
Proposition 7.5. A human expert is hired only when the expected reduction of Bayesian cost,
calculated by the left hand side of (7.11), exceeds the human consultation fee cT :
hire


T B1 − (B1 + B2 )(1 − β) c

R

cT ,

(7.11)

not hire

where B1 = Φ( r

+ +m

σr

) − Φ( σmr ), B2 = Φ( r

+ −m

σr

) − Φ( −m
).
σr

P ROOF : With the fee for the human cT over a time period T , we would like to make full use of
the side information, i.e, bring in human consultation in the critical region r ∈ Γ! = [r− , r+ ]. Note
that because of symmetry, the error probability reduction Γhs = [r− , r+ ] is two times the reduction
of error when Γhs = [0, r+ ]. Also, recall that we have derived the error probability reduction when
Γhs = [0, γ] in Proposition 7.2. Hence, the error probability reduction when Γhs = [r− , r+ ] is
given by 2de (r+ ) = B1 − (B1 + B2 )(1 − β), (de (r+ ) which can be obtained by replacing γ by r+
in the expression of de (γ) given in (A.33) from the proof of Proposition 7.2). Consequently, during

time period T the expected reduction of Bayesian cost is given by T B1 − (B1 + B2 )(1 − β) c.
Next, we analyze the scenario where the human is paid according to the frequency of participation, i.e, there is a unit cost ct for each time the human provides consultation. In this case, we
design the following human consultation region Γchst to minimize the expected cost.
Proposition 7.6. The optimal human consultation region Γchst with unit participation cost ct is

Γchst =




∅,

if ct > c(β − 1/2)



[−rct , rct ], if ct ≤ c(β − 1/2),
where rct =

σr2
2m

βc−ct
log( ct +(1−β)c
).

P ROOF : See Appendix A.11.
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Let the human consultation region Γchst be [−γ, γ], and we plot the unit time Bayesian cost with
respect to γ for three different values of ct = {5, 2, 0} in Fig. 7.5. In this experiment c = 10,
β = 0.9, and we can see that when ct = 5 > c(β − 1/2), the Bayesian risk monotonously
increases as γ increases, suggesting that Γchst = ∅. When ct = 2 < c(β − 1/2), the Bayesian risk
first decreases when γ is in [0, rct ] and then increases when γ ∈ (rct , ∞], confirming the optimal
consultation region Γchst = [−rct , rct ] given in Proposition 7.6. Furthermore, note that when ct = 0,
the upper bound of Γchst , i.e., rct reaches r+ , and thereafter the Bayesian cost remains constant.

Fig. 7.5: Bayesian cost as a function of human consultation region upper bound, when human is
paid based on participation frequency.

7.4

Correlation Between the Human Side Information and
Machine Observation

In Section 7.2, we made the assumption that human side information s and the machine observation
r are independent of each other, i.e., f (r|Hi , s = j) = f (r|Hi ) for i, j = 0, 1. However, the
assumption of independence does not hold in practice because of the inherent correlation between
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the attributes observed by the human and the machine. To make our analysis more general, we
incorporate this correlation and denote the conditional PDF of r as f (r|Hi , s = j) = fij (r) for
i, j = 0, 1. Exploiting the Bayesian relationship f (r, s = j|Hi ) = f (r|Hi , s = j)P r(s = j|Hi )
and assuming that s is modeled via the BSC channel shown in Fig. 7.1, the FC’s decision rule φ0f
computes the likelihood ratio given by L0f (r)

L0f (r)




L0 (r) =

0
f (r, s = j|H1 )
=
=
f (r, s = j|H0 ) 

L01 (r) =

f10 (r)(1−β)
,
f00 (r)β

if s = 0

f11 (r)β
,
f01 (r)(1−β)

if s = 1

Decision is made by comparing L0f (r) to the threshold η. On the other hand, when human consultation is not requested, the machine employs the decision rule φ0m and automatically makes a
decision by comparing the likelihood ratio

L0m (r) =

f (r|H1 )
f11 (r)β + f10 (r)(1 − β)
=
f (r|H0 )
f00 (r)β + f01 (r)(1 − β)

to the threshold η. Analogous to the derivation in Section 7.2, when the machine’s observation is r,
the detection accuracy of φ0m is Ym0 (r) = g(L0m (r)). The detection accuracy of bringing in human
side information and employing φ0f is Yf0 (r) = P r0 (s = 1|r)g(L01 (r)) + P r0 (s = 0|r)g(L00 (r)),
where P r0 (s = j|r), which represents the probability that s = j given machine’s observation r, is
given in (7.6) and (7.7). Note that in the calculation of P r0 (s = j|r), we need to replace Lm (r) by
L0m (r).
The critical region where the detection accuracy is enhanced after bringing in human side
information can be expressed as Γ0! = {r|Yf0 (r) − Ym0 (r) > 0}. Moreover, when the human
consultation region is Γhs , the probability of making a correct decision at the FC is
Pc0

Z
=
r∈Γhs

Yf0 (r)f (r)dr

Z
+

Ym0 (r)f (r)dr

(7.12)

r∈Γ∗hs

where Γ∗hs represents the complement of the set Γhs . Hence, the probability of error of the system
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is Pe0 = 1 − Pc0 .
Next, we investigate the performance deterioration because of mistakenly assuming that s and r
are independent when they are correlated with each other. If s and r are assumed to be independent
as in Section 7.2, φ00f uses the likelihood ratio

L00f (r) =




L000 (r) = L0m (r) 1−β , if s = 0
β


L001 (r) = L0m (r)

β
,
1−β

if s = 1

Let Γ00ij denote the set of observations in Γhs such that φ00f decides Hi to be true based on s = j,
namely,

Γ000j = {r|r ∈ Γhs & L00j (r) < η}
Γ001j = {r|r ∈ Γhs & L00j (r) ≥ η}
Similarly, we use Γ0ij to represent the set of observations in Γhs such that φ0f decides Hi when
s = j:

Γ00j = {r|r ∈ Γhs & L0j (r) < η}
Γ01j = {r|r ∈ Γhs & L0j (r) ≥ η}
In case where the FC makes the decision by comparing L00f (r) to η when the true likelihood ratio
is L0f (r), the error probability compared to Pe0 is incremented by
Z
δ=


P r0 (s = 0|r) 2g(L00 (r)) − 1 dr

0
00
0
r∈(Γ00
00 −Γ00 )∪(Γ10 −Γ10 )

Z
+


P r0 (s = 1|r) 2g(L01 (r)) − 1 dr

0
00
0
r∈(Γ00
01 −Γ01 )∪(Γ11 −Γ11 )

where the set Γa − Γb consists of elements that are in Γa but not in Γb .
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For a concrete illustration of the dependence structure of the machine observation r and the
human side information s, we consider that the human observes a continuous attribute t. The
binary decision s (side information) is made by comparing t with a threshold. In particular, we
assume that r and t follow the bivariate normal distribution3 :
 
  

2
ρσr σt 
r
µri   σr
  ∼ N   , 

t
µti
ρσr σt
σt2

(7.13)

under Hi for i = 0, 1. r is the machine observation and t is the attribute observed by the human. ρ
is the correlation parameter. Assuming equal priors and uniform costs, we consider that the human
makes a binary decision s by comparing t with the threshold τ = (µt1 + µt0 )/2. Since t has
−µt0
). In this scenario, r and s are dependent
Gaussian marginal PDFs, we have β = 1 − Φ( µt12σ
t

with each other because of the inherent correlation between r and t. By the Bayesian rule, we
have fij (r) = f (r|Hi , s = j) =

f (r|Hi )P r(s=j|r,Hi )
P r(s=j|Hi )

for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. In the following, we provide

the procedure to derive the expression for f11 : a) f (r|H1 ) is a Gaussian PDF with mean µr1
and standard deviation σt , which is denoted as N (r, µr1 , σt ), b) under H1 , the conditional PDF
of t given r is a Gaussian PDF with mean µ1t|r = µt1 + ρ σσrt (r − µr1 ) and standard deviation
p
τ −µ1
1
= 1 − ρ2 µt . Hence, we have P r(s = 1|r, H1 ) = P r(t ≥ τ |r, H1 ) = 1 − Φ( σ1 t|r ), c)
σt|r
t|r

under H1 , the PDF of t is Gaussian with mean µt1 and standard deviation σt . Hence, we have
t1
). Combining the three parts together and
P r(s = 1|H1 ) = P r(t ≥ τ |H1 ) = 1 − Φ( τ −µ
σt

exploiting the property that Φ(x) = 1 − Φ(−x), we have
µ

t1 −µt0 +ρ σt
2
σr

(r−µr1 )

√
N (r, µr1 , σt )Φ
1−ρ2 σt


f11 (r) =
−µt0
Φ µt12σ
t
3



In this section, we change the means of r under both hypotheses from ±m to µr1 , µr0 for ease of notation.
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All the four equations for i, j ∈ {0, 1} can be written in a compact form given by


µ −µ
σ
I(j) t1 2 t0 +ρ σ t (r−µrj )
r
√
N (r, µri , σt )Φ I(i)
1−ρ2 σt


fij (r) =
I(j)(µt1 −µt0 )
Φ I(i)
2σt
where I(z) is an indicator function acting on z ∈ {0, 1} so that I(0) = −1 and I(1) = 1.

Fig. 7.6: Error probability of φ0m and φ0f as functions of the machine observation r.
For simulation, we set µr1 = 3, µr0 = −3, µt1 = 2, µt0 = −2, σr = σt = 1 and ρ ∈ (−1, 1).
When the machine observation is r, the error probability of making a decision when employing φ0m
and φ0f , i.e., Ym0 (r) and Yf0 (r), are plotted in Fig. 7.6. For different values of ρ, the curve of Yf0 (r)
has different shapes, leading to the critical region of human consultation to be different (note that
the critical region is where Yf0 (r) < Ym0 (r)). When ρ = 0, r and t are uncorrelated4 and it reduces
to the scenario discussed in Section 7.2 where we have Ym0 (r) = Ym (r) and Yf0 (r) = Yf (r). In Fig.
7.7, we plot the error probability of the FC for different values of ρ. The red line representing the
error probability when r and s are independent is plotted as a benchmark for comparison. In the
left and right subplots, we set σr = σt = 1 and σr = σt = 2, respectively. It can be observed that
4

If r and t follow Bivariate normal distributions, uncorrelatedness implies independence.
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some values of ρ are beneficial for the system performance while some other values of ρ degrade
the detection accuracy. It is observed in Fig. 7.7 that in both subplots, small values of ρ usually
yield lower values of the probability of error than for the large values of ρ. This is analogous to
the results of how correlation affects estimation performance that were studied in [107]. We can
also see that the shape of the curve is quite affected by the system parameters (in this case, σr and
σt of the signal r and t). The question of finding the optimal ρ that yields the best performance of
human-machine decision making will be studied in our future work.

Fig. 7.7: Error probability of φ0f for different correlation parameter ρ.

7.5

System Performance Composed of Multiple Human Experts

In this section, we consider the scenario where multiple humans (n ≥ 2) participate in the collaborative decision making process. When there are tasks that require more stringent detection
accuracy, hiring multiple humans and bringing in side information from various experts becomes
necessary. However, the derivation of exact error probability reduction as discussed in Section 7.2
is intractable as the number of human participants is more than one. To evaluate system performance and to guide the worker recruiting strategy, we compute the asymptotic detection perfor-
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mance at the fusion center via the Bhattacharyya distance5 : lim

C→∞

ln Pe
C

≤ −BD(pH0 , pH1 ), where

Pe is the average error probability of the FC, C is the number of data samples and pH0 , pH1 are the
likelihoods under H0 and H1 , respectively. For discrete probability distributions:

BD(pH0 , pH1 ) = − ln

Xp

pH0 (x)pH1 (x)

x∈X

and for continuous distributions:
Z
BD(pH0 , pH1 ) = − ln

p
pH0 (x)pH1 (x)dx

x∈X

Intuitively, Pe decreases exponentially as the amount of available data C increases, and BD(pH0 , pH1 )
upper bounds the decay rate. It is desired to have a larger Bhattacharyya distance in order to minimize the upper bound of Pe .
Consider that there is a group of n human experts with different backgrounds who collaboratively provide their side information to help the FC decide between the two hypotheses H0 and
H1 . Following the BSC model shown in Fig. 7.1, the ith human’s side information is denoted as si
with expertise βi , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Assuming that each si is independent of all other human side
informations, the combined side information vector s̄ = [s1 , s2 , . . . , sn ] has the probability mass
Q
Q
function (PMF) p(s̄|H0 ) = ni=1 βi1−si (1 − βi )si under H0 and p(s̄|H1 ) = ni=1 βisi (1 − βi )1−si
under H1 . The machine observation r is employed together with the side information vector
s̄ to make the final decision. Assuming that r and s̄ are independent and following the notations given in Section 7.2, the joint probability distributions of r and s̄ under both hypotheses
Q
can be expressed as pH0 (r, s̄) = f (r|H0 )p(s̄|H0 ) = N (r; −m, σr2 ) ni=1 βi1−si (1 − βi )si , and
Q
pH1 (r, s̄) = f (r|H1 )p(s̄|H1 ) = N (r; m, σr2 ) ni=1 βisi (1 − βi )1−si , where N (r; ±m, σr2 ) represents the conditional PDFs of r under H0 and H1 that are Gaussian distributions with means −m
5

Bhattacharyya distance is a special case of Chernoff distance with the coefficient λ = 1/2. For analytical purposes, we assume the humans’ side information and the machine’s observation are independent in this section.
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and m, respectively, and variance σr2 . Hence, the Bhattacharyya distance is given by:

BD(pH0 , pH1 )
XZ
= − ln
s̄∈S̄

p
pH0 (r, s̄)pH1 (r, s̄)dr

r∈R


 v
Z
n

 u
p
uY
N (r; −m, σr2 )N (r; m, σr2 )dr
= − ln 2nt βi (1 − βi )


i=1

2

=

m
+
2σr2

n
X
i=1

−

r∈R


1
ln(βi (1 − βi )) − ln 2
2

(7.14)

where in the last step, we use the fact that the Bhattacharyya distance of two Gaussian random
p
R
m2
variables, i.e., − ln r∈R N (r, −m, σr2 )N (r, m, σr2 )dr is equal to 2σ
2 [102].
r

The result in (7.14) suggests that because of the contribution of the ith human whose side
information has accuracy βi , the Bhattacharyya distance is increased by ς = −1/2 ln(βi (1 − βi )) −
ln 2, which is non-negative when βi ∈ [0, 1]. Only when βi = 1/2, we have ς = 0 indicating that
the human does not contribute any useful side information. As βi increases beyond 0.5, ς becomes
larger and the information contribution from the human is more significant6 .
To characterize the decision making property of the human decision makers, we assume that βi
is random and follows a certain PDF. The mean and the variance of the random variable, denoted
by E(βi ) = µβ and V ar(βi ) = σβ2 , are used to represent the average and heterogeneity of the
humans’ accuracy, respectively. We may interpret µβ to be the average level of expertise and σβ2
to be the level of diversity of expertise in the group. A large value of σβ2 indicates that the humans
in the group have diverse decision making/cognitive abilities resulting in a large variance in their
decision making accuracy.
Theorem 7.2. Suppose that a group of n human decision makers with average level of expertise µβ
and level of diversity σβ2 collaborate with the machine for performing a detection task, the lower
bound of the expected Bhattacharyya distance at the FC increases as µβ , σβ2 become larger.
6

When βi < 0.5, the side information has the same information contribution with the one with prediction accuracy
1 − βi . It can be thought as flipping the answer si when βi < 0.5 and making the prediction accuracy greater than 0.5.
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P ROOF : From (7.14), the expected Bhattacharyya distance can be expressed as
" n
#
X

m
1
E[BD(pH0 , pH1 )] = 2 + E
− ln(βi (1 − βi )) − ln 2
2σβ
2
i=1


m
1
= nE − ln(βi (1 − βi )) + 2 − n ln 2
2
2σβ

(7.15)

Note that h(·) = −1/2 ln(·) in (7.15) is a convex function. Hence, we have the following result by
applying Jensen’s inequality
 1


1 
E − ln β(1 − β) ≥ − ln E β(1 − β)
2
2
1
= − ln(µβ − µ2β − σβ2 )
2

(7.16)

Since −1/2 ln(·) in (7.16) is a decreasing function and µβ − µ2β is decreasing for µβ ∈ {0.5, 1},
it is clear that − 12 ln(µβ − µ2β − σβ2 ) increases as µ and σβ2 become larger. Hence, the term


E − 12 ln βi (1 − βi ) and consequently the lower bound on the expected Bhattacharyya distance
given in (7.15) becomes larger as µβ , σβ increase.
Using the lower bound of the expected Bhattacharyya distance as the surrogate judging criterion, it
can be seen that a group performs better if it has higher average accuracy µβ . At the same time, it
is interesting to observe that for a fixed value of µβ , a group that has a larger variance σβ2 achieves
better performance.
Remark 7.1. In a decision making system composed of multiple humans, if the average expertise
of the humans is kept the same, the group with higher diversity (quantified in terms of σβ2 ) yields
better decision making performance.
In Fig. 7.8, we show the actual Bhattacharyya distance of conditional distributions of the
observations under the two hypotheses as a function of the number of human experts working on
the task. Our results on decision making composed of multiple human experts, which is obtained
using the surrogate criterion (namely, the lower bound of BD), is corroborated by the numerical
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Fig. 7.8: Bhattacharyya distance as the number of human experts increases for different distributions of β.
results shown in Fig. 7.8. In each of the four curves, human side information accuracy β is
sampled from i) fixed value at 0.7, ii) uniform distribution U (0.5, 0.9), iii) Beta distribution within
the interval [0.5, 0.9] with parameters (2, 2) and iv) Beta distribution within the interval [0.5, 0.9]
with parameters (5, 5), respectively. Results are obtained by averaging over 5000 Monte Carlo
simulations. Though the expected means of the four distributions of β are the same µβ = 0.7,
they have different variances. The variances of β in the four curves (red, green. yellow, blue)
are 0.013, 0.008, 0.004, 0, respectively. It can be observed that in these four distributions of β,
the Bhattacharyya distance increases linearly as we have more human experts recruited. As the
variance of the distribution from which β is sampled from becomes larger, the rate of BD increase
becomes larger as well. This motivates us to select those groups that are composed of humans of
diverse expertise levels to achieve better decision making performance.
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7.6

Summary

In this chapter, we studied the problem of potential human assistance while making detections
based on machine observations. Our objective was to systematically design the consultation region
where human assistance will yield improved detection performance leading to a semi-autonomous
decision making system involving human machine collaboration. We took human participation
factors, i.e., limited attention duration and participation costs, into account in the optimization of
consultation region. We brought attention to the fact that the correlation between the machine
observation and human side information is an important factor in quantifying the performance
improvement arising from human consultation. Finally, the asymptotic performance measured in
terms of Bhattacharyya distance was derived as a large number of human experts get involved in
the task.
This study of human consultation in machine automation provides insights in the design of
user-focused intelligent systems, and is the first step towards the development of large scale autonomous human-machine collaboration networks. Advances in this area depend on connecting
the ideas and concepts across different disciplinary boundaries such as behavioral informatics,
optimization theory and experimental psychology. In future work, we aim to analyze how the correlation parameter between the human and machine observations impact the design of consultation
region in a more comprehensive manner. We will consider that humans, instead of making binary
decisions, categorize their observations into a small number of levels (by employing subjective
quantization rules) and how it will impact the system performance.
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C HAPTER 8

C ONCLUSION AND F UTURE D IRECTIONS

8.1

Conclusion

In almost all intelligent and decision making systems developed in the signal processing literature,
the objective function is based solely on objective performance measures and is devoid of any
human perception considerations. The incorporation of human in the loop generalizes cognitive
systems by allowing humans and machines being tightly coupled in the same working environment
for advanced interaction. In this dissertation, we explored the state of the art in how human behavior and decision making can be modeled in the statistical signal processing framework. In Chapter
2, we considered that the rationality of human agents can be modeled by Prospect Theory (PT) and
developed PT based human decision rules in the context of hypothesis testing. We studied several
decision making frameworks that include human participants, modeled using PT, who are a part
of networked human-machine teams. In Chapter 3, we proposed a novel crowdsourcing system to
solve classification problems and accurately characterized the behavioral aspects of crowd workers
(honest workers and spammers). In order to obtain optimal classification performance, we designed
the optimal weight for every worker in the weighted majority voting fusion rule. In Chapter 4, we
studied a novel sequential task ordering algorithm for classification in crowdsourcing composed
of unreliable human workers. In Chapter 5, we investigated the behavior of cognitive memory
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limited humans in binary decision making. In Chapter 6, a unified IoT based inference system was
developed where sensing was treated as a service. To address the selfish concerns of the users,
we jointly optimized the resource usage policy and payment negotiation strategy for the user so
as to maximize the expected profit. In Chapter 7, we designed a human machine collaboration
framework that blends both human expertise and machine observations to solve binary hypothesis
testing problems semi-autonomously. We brought in human consultation in addition to machine
observations to improve the system performance while incorporating the concern of human labor
cost.

8.2

Future Directions in Human Machine Teaming

Human behavior and decision making are complex processes that represent the intricate interplay
between the psychological activity within humans and the influence of outside environment. A
fully cognitive human-machine collaboration architecture requires the machine to be able to understand, anticipate, and augment the performance of the human; and the human to have the ability
to support, supervise, and enhance the automation conducted by the machine [53]. Application
scenarios of interest may include ones where decisions are made autonomously by machines or
the decisions are made by a human or a semi-autonomous system where humans and machines
collaborate in making the final decision. In addition to the specific future work for each line of
work discussed in Chapters 2-7, we present several ‘big’ research directions so as to accomplish
the interactive symbiosis where humans and machines are tightly coupled together.
1. Behavioral informatics: For the machine to better understand human behavior in different applications, it is necessary to explore research findings in psychology that characterize
how human behavior is impacted by time constraints, memory limitations, emotion state as
well as stimulus from the outside environment. To achieve ‘order of magnitude increases in
available, net thinking power resulting from linked human-machine dyads’ [122], it becomes
imperative to perform human cognitive state sensing for designing efficient communication
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interfaces between the human and the machine. Another interesting topic is the real time
prediction of human cognitive workload based on sensor-based brain signals such as electroencephalogram (EEG), as well as the design of system augmentations such as offloading
tasks or assisting users with modality-specific support.
2. Trust in autonomous systems: In human-machine collaboration, the authors in [91] have
described trust as ‘the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party’. In particular, many
autonomous systems employed in high stake applications are black boxes that do not explain
how the decision are made. The challenge is to develop a quantitative definition of trust and
establish clear guidelines to construct human-machine transparency and enhance calibrated
trust between the human and the machine.
3. Situational awareness: Situational awareness (SA) refers to the user’s familiarity of the task
environment, the perception of the task status, and the anticipation of future states. If humans
are not appropriately incorporated in the loop, it is very likely that the human is not aware
of or not familiar with the machine’s task execution. In such a situation where there is overreliance on machine automation, the human’s understanding of the work environment, i.e.,
SA, is jeopardized. The loss of SA (also referred to as complacency or automation induced
decision biases in different works) compromises the human’s level of expertise and ability
to perform the automated tasks manually in case of unpredictable automation failure and it
may cause severe breakdown in critical applications like autopilot and submarine navigation
systems. Hence, the concerns of SA must be addressed in the design of human-machine
symbiosis to prevent irreparable damage.
4. Herding, nudging and incentives: Humans are also known to be subject to herding and
nudging phenomena. To elicit desirable outputs from humans, future research work can proceed with some explorations along these lines. a) The optimum design and task allocation of
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collaborative human-machine networks. This will include change in strategies of individual
nodes, e.g., adapting the threshold of some or all the nodes or shaping the input to selected
nodes during the inference process. b) The suitable distribution of the tasks and workload
to be performed by humans and machines in complex decision making systems. c) Another
important consideration will be the incentivization measures of humans to actively engage
in the inference process, which can be posed in a reinforcement learning based framework.
While the topics and research directions discussed in this work might serve as starting points to
advance the next generation intelligent and decision making systems that involve human participation, novel theoretical frameworks for collaborative human-machine decision making in complex
environments require inputs from different disciplines such as statistical signal processing, artificial intelligence, machine learning, economics, experimental psychology, and neuroscience. The
ultimate goal is to merge the best of humans with the best of machines in task environments so
that humans and machines can interact and complement each other. Developments in this area
are envisaged to result in a significant revolution in the design of many autonomous and semiautonomous systems for situational awareness and command and control, both in military and
civilian application, that involve human-machine collaboration.
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A PPENDIX A

A PPENDIX : P ROOFS OF VARIOUS R ESULTS

A.1

Proof of Lemma 2.1

We write
Z∞
P r(r ≥ x|H1 )fτ (x)dx

PD =
−∞
Z∞

=
−∞

x − m1
1
Q(
)p
e
σs
2πστ2


−

(x−mτ )2
2
2στ



dx

(A.1)

Construct two independent random variables X ∼ N (mτ , στ2 ) and Y ∼ N (0, σs2 ). Since X + Y ∼
N (mτ , σs2 + στ2 ), which is the same as the distribution of Z + mτ , where Z ∼ N (0, σs2 + στ2 ). Thus,

P r(X + Y ≤ m1 ) = P r(Z ≤ m1 − mτ )
m1 − mτ
mτ − m1
= 1 − Q( p
) = Q( p
).
σs2 + στ2
σs2 + στ2

(A.2)
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where we use the fact that 1 − Q(x) = Q(−x). On the other hand, by the law of total probability
(conditioning on X), we have:

P r(X + Y ≤ m1 )
Z∞
=
−∞
Z∞

=
−∞



1
P r(Y ≤ m1 − x) p
e
2πστ2


x − m1 )
1
Q(
)p
e
σs
2πστ2

−

−

(x−mτ )2
2
2στ

(x−mτ )2
2
2στ



dx



dx.

(A.3)

Observing that (A.3) is the same as the expression of pd in (A.1), which in turn is equal to the
mτ −m1
expression in (A.2), it is easy to conclude that PD = Q( √
). Following a similar procedure,
2
2
σs +στ

PF =

A.2

mτ −m0
)
Q( √
σs2 +στ2

can be proved straightforwardly.

Proof of Theorem 2.2

Following (2.17), we express the human’s expected utility while making a decision:

U = π0 U00 + π1 U01 + π1 (U11 − U01 )PD − π0 (U00 − U10 )PF
, APD − BPF + C,

(A.4)

where A = π1 (U11 − U01 ), B = π0 (U00 − U10 ) are positive constants and C = π0 U00 + π1 U01 . PD
and PF represent the detection and false alarm probabilities of humans as given in (2.14).
When m0 < mτ < m1 , from the expression in (2.14) we can see that PF increases and PD
decreases as στ2 becomes larger. Thus, the expected utility U is a decreasing function with respect
to στ2 .
Next, we consider mτ ≥ m1 . In this case, both PF and PD increase with respect to στ2 . We
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substitute the expression of PD and PF in (2.14) in (A.4) and take the derivative with respect to στ2 :
 (m −m )2

(m −m )2
∂U
1
− τ 2 12
− τ2 02
2(σ
+σ
)
2(σ
+σ
)
s
τ (m −m )A−e
s
τ (m −m )B
× e
.
= p
τ
1
τ
0
∂στ2
2 2π(σs2 + στ2 )3
It follows that

∂U
∂στ2

≥ 0 if and only if

g,e

2
2(m1 −m0 )mτ −(m2
1 −m0 )
2 +σ 2 )
2(σs
τ

×(

mτ − m1
B
)≥ ,
mτ − m0
A

where g is a function that decreases with respect to στ2 .
B
,
A

When g|στ2 =0 ≤

we have

∂U
∂στ2

≤ 0 for all στ2 ≥ 0, which suggests that U is a decreasing

function with respect to στ2 . When g|στ2 =0 >
i.e.,
as

∂U
∂στ2

στ2

> 0; and g|στ2 <στ2 ∗ ≤

B
,
A

becomes larger. The threshold

τ −m1
(m
)=
mτ −m0

∂U
∂στ2

i.e.,

∗
στ2

B
,
A

∗

there exists a point στ2 such that g|στ2 <στ2 ∗ >

B
,
A

≤ 0. In other words, U first increases and then decreases
is obtained by solving the equation e

2
2(m1 −m0 )mτ −(m2
1 −m0 )
2 +σ 2 ∗ )
2(σs
τ

×

B
.
A

On the other hand, g is an increasing function with respect to mτ . Note that g|mτ =m1 = 0 and
g|mτ =∞ = ∞. Therefore, there exists a mτ > m1 such that g|στ2 =0,mτ ≤mτ ≤
B
.
A

B
A

and g|στ2 =0,mτ >mτ >

In other words, when m1 ≤ mτ ≤ mτ , U is a decreasing function with respect to στ2 and when

mτ > mτ , U is unimodal with respect to στ2 . mτ is obtained by solving mτ in the equation
e

2
2(m1 −m0 )mτ −(m2
1 −m0 )
2
2σs

τ −m1
× (m
)=
mτ −m0

B
A

= η.

The analysis of the case mτ < m0 is similar to the above derivations. There exists a mτ <
m0 such that U is a decreasing function with respect to στ2 when mτ ≤ mτ ≤ m0 , and U is
unimodal with respect to στ2 when mτ < mτ . mτ is obtained by solving mτ in the equation
e

2
−2(m1 −m0 )mτ +(m2
1 −m0 )
2
2σs

η.

mτ −m0
)
×( m
τ −m1

=

A
B

=

1
,
η

which is equivalent to e

2
2(m1 −m0 )mτ −(m2
1 −m0 )
2
2σs

mτ −m1
)=
×( m
τ −m0
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A.3

Proof of Proposition 3.2

When there are M spammers in the crowd with M0 skipping and MN completing all the questions,
the expected weight contributed to the correct class is given by
W
−M
X

"

#

MN
X
1
Ww (n = 0) +
EC [W] =
Ep,r
Ww (n)r(n)P(n) +
Ww (n = N )
2N
w=1
w=1
w=1
n=0
 
N
N
N
X
X
X
MN
n N −n
n N
(1 − m) m
+
M0 Ww (n)δ(n) +
=
(W − M )Ww (n)µ
Ww (n)δ(n − N )
n
2N
n=0
n=0
n=0
N
X

M0
X

N
N
X
X
MN
M0
Ww (n)P(n)δ(n) +
Ww (n)P(n)δ(n − N )
=
(W −M )Ww (n)µ P(n)+
N
P(0)
2 P(N )
n=0
n=0
n=0
N
X

=

N
X

n

Ww (n)S(n)P(n)

(A.5)

n=0

where r(n) is the product of any n out of N variables rw,i for i = 1, . . . , N , which represents the
probability that n answers are correct given n definitive answers have been submitted1 . P(n) =

N
(1 − m)n mN−n represents the probability that the wth worker submits a total of n definitive
n
MN
M0
answers. In the last step of (A.5), S(n) = (W − M )µn + m
N δ(n) + 2N (1−m)N δ(n − N ). Since
N
P
P(n) = 1, (A.5) is upper-bounded according to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
n=0

EC [W] =

N
X

Ww (n)S(n)P(n)

n=0

v
v
u N
u N
uX
uX
t
2
≤
(Ww (n)S(n)) P(n)t
P(n) = α
n=0

Also note that equality holds in (A.6) only if Ww (n)S(n)

(A.6)

n=0

p
p
P(n) = α P(n), where α is a positive

constant such that Ww (n)S(n) = α. Therefore, the optimal weight assignment is obtained
−1

MN
n M0
Ww (n) = (W−M ) µ + N δ (n)+
δ (n−N )
m
2N (1−m)N
1

Candidate scores are assigned to the correct class only when all the definitive answers are correct.

(A.7)

170
Note that the final classification decision d∗ corresponds to a unique N -bit word, and each bit, 1
or 0, represents the decision of a microtask. From the Proposition 1 in [79], we know that the
classification rule (3.1) is equivalent to the bit-by-bit decision for the ith bit
W
X

H1

Tw ≷ 0

w=1

(A.8)

H0

for i = 1, . . . , N , with

Tw = Ww (n) (I1 hi, wi − I0 hi, wi) ,

(A.9)

where Is hi, wi , s ∈ {0, 1}, is the indicator function that equals 1 if the answer of the wth worker
to the ith question is s, and it equals 0 otherwise.
Hence, if a worker submits no definitive answers and skips all the questions, i.e., n = 0, his/her
decision is not taken into consideration for aggregation at the FC. Thus, we can assign any weight to
the worker with n = 0. Essentially we are neglecting Type I spammers and excluding them for classification. For simplicity and consistency purpose, we drop the second term on the right hand side
h
i−1
MN
δ
(n
−
N
)
.
of (A.7) and write the weight assignment as Ww (n) = (W − M ) µn + 2N (1−m)
N

A.4

Proof of Proposition 3.3

Following Appendix B, the ith bit of the final aggregated N -bit word is determined by (A.8) and
Tw is the weighted decision from the wth worker. Let Hs denote the hypothesis that a microtask
has true answer to be s for s = 0, 1. If the wth worker is honest, the probability mass function
(PMF) of Tw under hypothesis Hs , Pr (Tw |Hs ), is given as


 r1−|s−t| (1 − rw,i )|s−t| ϕn (w), I = 1

w,i
t+1
Pr Tw = I(−1) Ww (n)|Hs =
t ∈ {0, 1},


p
I=0
w,i

(A.10)
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where I = I1 hi, wi + I0 hi, wi, ϕn (w) = (1 − pw,i )

N
P Q

k

j
pw,j
(1 − pw,j )1−kj represents the

C j=1,j6=i

probability that the wth worker gives a definitive answer to the ith question and the total number
of definitive answers he/she submitted is n. C is defined as the set
(
C=

{k1 , . . . , ki−1 , ki+1 , . . . , kN } :

N
X

)
kj = N −n

(A.11)

j=1,j6=i

with kj ∈ {0, 1} and n ∈ {1, . . . , N }. On the other hand, if the wth worker is a Type II spammer
who submits a definitive answer randomly, Tw has the following probability mass function:


 1/2, Tw = Ww (N )
Pr(Tw ) =

−1/2, Tw = −Ww (N )

(A.12)

Under the assumption that hypotheses H0 and H1 are equally likely, the probability of correct
classification for the ith bit Pc,i is Pc,i =

1+Pd,i −Pf,i
,
2

where Pd,i is the probability of detection, i.e.,

deciding the ith bit to be “1” when the true bit is “1” and Pf,i is the probability of false alarm, i.e.,
deciding the ith bit to be “1” when the true bit is “0”.
For the honest workers from a total of W workers, let G0 denote the subgroup that decides “0”
for ith microtask, G1 the subgroup that decides “1” and Gδ the subgroup that decides δ. Moreover,
out of the MN Type II spammers we assume that there are MN0 spammers deciding “1” for the ith
bit and MN00 deciding “0”. We employ the result in (A.10) and assume that the workers answer the
questions independently. Under H1 , the probability of the crowd’s answer profile for the ith bit is
{G0 , G1 , Gδ , MN0 , MN00 } can be expressed as
 MN0  MN00 Y
Y
Y
1
1
Fi =
pw
(1 − rw,i )ϕnw (w)
rw,i ϕnw (w)
2
2
w∈G
w∈G
w∈G
δ

0

(A.13)

1

where nw represents the total number definitive questions submitted by the individual. Let qn , −N ≤
n ≤ N , denote the number of honest workers that submit |n| total definitive answers to all the microtasks. Specifically, n < 0 indicates the group of honest workers that submit “0” for the ith bit
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while n > 0 indicates “1”. For n = 0, q0 represents the number of honest workers that submit δ
for the ith bit. Note that the number of honest workers in subgroups G0 , G1 and Gδ are equal to
P−N
PN
n=−1 qn ,
n=1 qn and q0 , respectively. Denoting

G=

{(q−N , q−N +1 , . . . qN , MN0 , MN00 )

:

N
X

qn = W − MN − M0 , MN0 + MN00 = MN }, (A.14)

n=−N

with natural numbers MN0 , MN00 , and qn for {n = −N, . . . , 0, . . . , N }. From the result in (A.13),
the answer profile for the ith bit G has the following probability under H1
 MNY


q−n+qn
N
1
N −1
q−n qn
n N −n
F (G) = m
(1−µ) µ
(1−m) m
2
n−1
n=1
q0

where we substitute the expression of ϕn (w) using

(A.15)


(1−m)n mN −n . Based on the above

N −1
n−1

results, the probability of detection Pd,i can be expressed as

Pd,i

where

W,M
G



=



X W, M 
1 X W, M
=
Fi (G),
Fi (G) +
2
G
G
0
S
S

(W −M0 )!
Q
0 !M 00 ! N
MN
n=−N qn !
N

(
S = G:
(
S 0= G :

N
X
n=1
N
X

(A.16)

represents all possible combinations in the answer profile G and
)

(qn −q−n )Ww (n)+(MN0 −MN00 )Ww (N ) > 0

(A.17)

)
(qn −q−n )Ww (n)+(MN0 −MN00 )Ww (N ) = 0

(A.18)

n=1

P
0
where S represents the scenario where W
w=1 Tw > 0 and “1” is decided under H1 , and S is the
P
case where W
w=1 Tw = 0 and the FC decides “1” with probability 1/2.
Similarly, we can obtain Pf,i given pw,i and rw,i as

Pf,i



X W, M 
1 X W, M
0
=
Fi (G) +
Fi 0 (G).
G
2 S0
G
S

(A.19)
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where
 MNY


q−n+qn
N
1
N −1
n N −n
qn q−n
F (G) = m
(1−m) m
(1−µ) µ
2
n−1
n=1
0

q0

(A.20)

Then, the expected probability of correct classification for the ith bit Pc,i can be obtained as

Pc,i





1 X W, M
1 1 X W, M
0
(Fi (G) − Fi (G)) +
(Fi (G) − Fi0 (G))
= +
2 2 S
G
4 S0
G

(A.21)

A correct classification result is obtained if and only if all the bits in the N -bit word are classified
correctly, and recall that the microtasks are completed independently. The probability of correct
classification of the final result is given as
"
Pc = E

N
Y

#
pc,i =

i=1

N
Y

N
E [pc,i ] = Pc,i
,

(A.22)

i=1

where pc,i is the realization of the probability of correct decision for the ith bit. Therefore, the
crowdsourcing system has overall correct classification probability Pc that is given by




iN
1 X W, M
1 X W, M
0
Pc =
+
(F (G) − F (G)) +
(F (G) − F 0 (G))
2 2 S
G
4 S0
G
h1

A.5

(A.23)

Proof of Proposition 3.4

For an honest worker, the statistic Tw has PMF given in (A.10) and the expected Tw of an honest
worker under H1 is given by
"
H
EH1
=E

1 X
N
X
t=0 n=1

#
(−1)t+1 Ww (n)(rw,i )t (1−rw,i )1−t ϕn (w)

(A.24)
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Substituting the expression of Ww (n) in (3.9), we have
N
X



N −1
= (2µ − 1)
Ww (n)
(1 − m)n mN −n
n−1
n=1


n
N −1
2µ − 1 X N − 1
1−m
(2µ − 1) (1 − m)N
N −n
=
m
+
MN
W − M n=1 n − 1
µ
(W − M ) µN + 2N (1−m)
N

N −1
(2µ − 1) (1 − m) 1 − m
(2µ − 1) (1 − m)N ZM
=
+m
+
,
(W − M ) µ
µ
(W − M ) µN ZM + MN

H
EH1

where ZM = 2N (1 − m)N . The variance of the statistic Tw for an honest worker can be expressed
as:
  

2
H 2
, E Tw − (EH1 )
" 1 N
#
XX
2
t
1−t
H 2
=E
(Ww (n)) (rw,i ) (1−rw,i ) ϕn (w) −(EH
)
1

H
VH1

t=0 n=1


n
N
−1 
X
N −1
1−m
(1 − m)N
1
H 2
N −n
m
+
=
2 − (EH1 )

µ2
M
(W − M )2 n=1 n − 1
N
(W − M ) µN + 2N (1−m)
N

N −1
2
1−m
1−m
(1 − m)N ZM
H 2
=
+
m
+
2 2
2 − (EH1 )
2
N
µ
(W − M ) µ
((W − M ) µ ZM + MN )
On the other hand, the statistic Tw of Type II spammers has PMF (A.12). In this case, the expected
value of Tw under H1 is given by

S
EH1

=

1 X
N
X
t=0 n=N

(−1)

t+1

 t  1−t
1
1
Ww (n)
=0
2
2

For Type II spammers, the variance of Tw under H1 is given by

S
VH1
, E Tw



=


2

" 1 N
 t  1−t #
XX

1
1
2
S 2
(Ww (n))
− (EH
) =E
1
2
2
t=0 n=N
1

(W − M ) µN +

MN
2N (1−m)N

2 =

2
ZM
((W − M ) µN ZM + MN )2

(A.25)
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As the number of workers W increases to infinity, according to the Central Limit Theorem, the
P
statistic W
w=1 Tw can be approximated by a Gaussian random variable:


H1 : N (M1 , V1 )
Tw ∼
as w → ∞

H : N (M , V )
0

0

0

Under H1 , we have obtained the mean and variance of Tw for a single honest worker and a spammer. Note that in the crowd there are W − M honest workers and MN Type II spammers. Since
the workers/spammers complete the tasks independently, we have

H
S
M1 = (W − M ) EH1
+ MN EH1

N −1
(W − M ) (2µ − 1) (1 − m)N ZM
(2µ − 1) (1 − m) 1 − m
+
+m
=
µ
µ
(W − M ) µN ZM + MN

and

H
S
V1 = (W − M ) VH1
+ MN VH1
 2
N −1

(W − M )(1 − m)N + MN ZM
M12
1−m
1−m
+
m
−
=
(W − M ) µ2
µ2
W −M
((W − M )µN ZM + MN )2

From similar procedures, under H0 we can obtain M0 = −M1 = −M and V0 = V1 = V. Since
the ith bit is determined via (A.8), it is clear to see that the probability of correct classification
of the ith bit is Pc,i = Q(− √MV ). By considering the N bits independently, we obtain the desired
result.

A.6

Proof of Lemma 6.1

The IC constraint in (6.17) is equivalent to the following:




βD t(β) − b(β) ≥ β 0 D t(β 0 ) − b(β 0 ) + (β − β 0 )D t(β 0 )

(A.26)
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Define function K(x) = xD t(x) − b(x) and (A.26) becomes:


K(β) ≥ K(β 0 ) + (β − β 0 )D t(β 0 ) ∀β > β S , ∀β 0

which is equivalent to:


K(β) − K(β 0 ) ≥ (β − β 0 )D t(β 0 ) ∀β > β S , ∀β 0

(A.27)

Switching the role of β and β 0 , we have:


K(β 0 ) − K(β) ≥ (β 0 − β)D t(β) ∀β 0 > β S , ∀β

(A.28)

Combining (A.27) and (A.28) we have:



(β − β 0 )D t(β 0 ) ≤ K(β) − K(β 0 ) ≤ (β − β 0 )D t(β)

(A.29)




From (A.29), we can see that when β 0 < β, D t(β 0 ) < D t(β) , which suggests that D t(·) is
an increasing function.

The inequalities in (A.29) can be further written as D t(β 0 ) δ ≤ K(β) − K(β 0 ) ≤ D t(β 0 +

δ) δ for any δ > 0 such that β − β 0 = δ. Since D(t(β 0 )) is increasing in β 0 and is upper bounded,
it is Riemann integrable:
Zβ


D t(u) du = K(β) − K(β S )

βS

Then, we express E



β>β S

E

β>β S

=

b(β) in the following:

n

o
b(β) − βD t(β) + βD t(β)

Zβ̄ n

o

− K(β) f (β)dβ + E βD t(β)
β>β S

βS

(A.30)
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Zβ̄
=

Zβ
n
 o

− K(β S ) + D t(u) du f (β)dβ + E βD t(β)
β>β S

βS

βS

n
o Zβ̄ Zβ̄


= E βD t(β) − K(β S ) −
D t(u) f (β)dβdu
β>β S

βS u


n
o Zβ̄

 1 − F (u)
S
f (u)du
= E βD t(β) − K(β ) − D t(u)
f (u)
β>β S
βS

n
o

 1 − F (β)
S
= E βD t(β) − K(β ) − E D t(β)
f (β)
β>β S
β>β S
Thus, the optimization problem (6.15) can be written as:

max

t(β),β S ,b(β)


E{αD t(β) − ct(β)}
β




1 − F (β)
+ E
β−
D p(β) − E K(β S )
f (β)
β>β S
β>β S

(A.31)

From the constraints in (6.16) we know that K(β S ) ≥ 0. Thus, we could choose b(β) such that
K(β S ) = 0 and, therefore, remove b(β) in the optimization problem. Lemma 6.1 is proved.

A.7

Proof of Theorem 6.1

First, given an energy consumption function t(β), we want to find an optimal β S that gives the
maximum of the objective function (6.1):




max E αD t(β) − ct(β) + E h(β)D t(β)
β>β S

β∈[β,β̄]

(A.32)



Since term E αD t(β) − ct(β) does not depend on β S , the first order derivative of (A.32) with
respect to β S equals:

∂
∂
E
h(β)D
t(β)
=
∂β S β>β S
∂β S

Z
βS


h(β)D t(β) f (β)dβ
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= −h(β S )D t(β S ) f (β S )

where we utilize that if the function φ is defined as φ(x) =

R
x

f (u)du, then

dφ(x)
dx

= −f (x). We

consider that D t(β S ) > 0 and f (β) > 0 for β ∈ [β, β̄]. Then, the FOC indicates that the optimal
point β S occurs at h(β S ) = 0. Again, there might be several local optimal points and we also
need to check the boundary of the support β to select the global optimum. The first condition in
Theorem 6.1 is proved.
Next, given the buyer’s benefit parameter threshold β S , the objective function of the sensor
becomes
max Eβ

n

o


α + g(β) D t(β) − ct(β)

t(β)

We take the derivative of the above expression with respect to t, and get the optimal amount of

c
.
energy consumption to be tS (β) = D∗ α+g(β)

Finally, employing (A.30) and recalling that K(β S ) = 0, we have K(β) = βD t(β) −b(β) =

 Rβ

Rβ̄
D t(u) du. It follows that bS (β) = βD tS (β) − β S D tS (u) du if β > β S , and we set b(β)
βS

equal to β S D t(β) for continuity. It could be any amount which is high enough to prevent the
buyer with a lower benefit parameter than β S from participating. Our result indicates that the
sensor would forfeit some small revenues from the buyer with low benefit parameters to ensure the
truthful revelation of the mechanism.

A.8

Proof of Lemma 7.1

First, we show that the detection result of φf differs from that of φm only when r falls in the critical
region. Consider that Lm (r) >

π∗ β
1−β

≥ π ∗ . In this case, φm given in (7.1) determines H1 to be true.

On the other hand, φf given in (7.2) also determines H1 to be true regardless the value of s. This
is due to that when Lm (r) >

π∗ β
,
1−β

no matter s = 0 or s = 1, we have Lf (r) ≥ π ∗ , so that H1 is

decided. For the same reason, when Lm (r) <
However, when

π ∗ (1−β)
β

≤ Lm (r) <

π∗ β
,
1−β

π ∗ (1−β)
,
β

both φm and φf decide H0 to be true.

φm decides H0 if π ∗ ≤ Lm (r) <

π∗ β
1−β

and decides
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H0 if

π ∗ (1−β)
β

≤ Lm (r) ≤ π ∗ . On the other hand, by incorporating human side information and

employing φf , if s = 1, we have Lf (r) ≥ π ∗ so that H1 is decided. If s = 0, we have Lf (r) < π ∗
so that H0 is decided. Hence, one can see that the detection result of φf is different from the that
of φm in the sense that φf always makes the decision by following the human side information s.
Since with probability β, the human’s side information s is correct, the accuracy of φf is β in the
critical observation region.
Next, we show that the accuracy of the machine’s automatic decision based on (7.1) is less
than β when r ∈ Γ! . Let Lm (r) =
P r(Hi is true|r) =

f (r|Hi )πi
f (r)

f (r|H1 )
f (r|H0 )

= τ and according to the Bayesian rule, we have

for i = 0, 1. It follows that

P r(H1 is true|r)
P r(H0 is true|r)

When τ ≥ π ∗ , H1 is declared and the decision has a probability

=

f (r|H1 )π1
f (r|H0 )π0

τ /π ∗
1+τ /π ∗

π ∗ (1−β)
β

≤ Lm (r) <

π∗ β
,
1−β

τ
.
π∗

to be correct. When

0 < τ < π ∗ , H0 is declared and the probability that the decision is correct is
that when

= τ ππ10 =

1
.
1+τ /π ∗

One can see

the accuracy of the machine’s decision can be verified to be

less or equal to β.

A.9

Proof of Proposition 7.2

First, let us assume H0 is true without loss of generality, and the error probability can be calculated
by adding up the error probabilities induced in human consultation region and machine operation
region. In the region r ∈ (−∞, −γ) ∪ (γ, ∞) where machine makes the decision by employing
φm , error occurs with a probability P r(r ∈ [γ, ∞]|H0 ) = 1 − Φ( γ+m
) = Φ( −γ−m
). However,
σr
σr
the error probability incurred in human consultation region r ∈ [−γ, γ]should be analyzed in
two scenarios: a)when γ ≤ r+ , we have Γhs ⊆ Γ! and decision is made based on human side
information which has a error probability 1−β. Hence, the error probability in human consultation

−γ−m
region is P r(r ∈ [−γ, γ]|H0 )(1 − β) = Φ( γ−m
)−
Φ(
)
(1−β). b) when γ > r+ , we have
σr
σr
Γhs ⊇ Γ! and the human decides H1 when r+ ≤ r ≤ γ if s = 0 is received, and decides H1
when r− ≤ r ≤ γ if s = 1 is received. Under the assumption that H0 is true, the human receives
s = 0 with probability β and s = 1 with probability 1 − β. It follows that the error probability

180
incurred in Γhs can be written as P r(r ∈ [r+ , γ]|H0 , s = 0) + P r(r ∈ [r− , γ]|H0 , s = 1) =


+
−
Φ( γ+m
)−Φ( r σ+m
) β + Φ( γ+m
)−Φ( r σ+m
) (1−β).
σr
σr
r
r
By symmetry, it can be shown that the error probability under H1 is the same with that under
H0 . By summing up the error probabilities from both of the human and machine operation regions,
the result shown in (7.10) is proved.

A.10

Proof of Proposition 7.4

Since Bayesian risk is proportional to the average probability of error. It is equivalent to prove that
[−L/2, L/2] results in the minimum average probability of error.
For 0 ≤ γ ≤ L/2, denote de (γ) to be the reduction of average error probability due to the
employment of φf instead of φm in the region r ∈ [0, γ], namely, de (γ) = Pe (r ∈ [0, γ] & φm ) −
Pe (r ∈ [0, γ] & φf ). Following the analysis in the proof of Theorem 7.1, the error probability incurred by employing φm in the region r ∈ [0, γ] is P r(r ∈ [0, γ]|H0 )P r(H0 ). The error probability
by employing φf reduces to P r(r ∈ [0, γ])(1 − β). Hence, we have:

de (γ) = A1 − (A1 + A2 )(1 − β)

(A.33)


m
)−Φ(
)
, A2 = P r(r ∈ [0, γ]|H1 )P r(H1 ) =
where A1 = Pr(r ∈ [0, γ]|H0 )P r(H0 ) = 1/2 Φ( γ+m
σr
σr

1/2 Φ( γ−m
) − Φ( −m
) .
σr
σr
Taking the first and second order derivatives of de (γ) with respect to γ, we get: d0e (γ) =
−
√β
e
2 2πσr

(r+m)2
2
2σr

−
− 2√1−β
e
2πσr

(r−m)2
2
2σr

, and

d00e (γ)

=

β
− 2√2πσ
3e
r

−

(r+m)2
2
2σr

−
(r +m)+ 2√1−β
e
2πσr3

(r−m)2
2
σr

(r −m).

It can be easily verified that d00e (γ) < 0 for 0 ≤ γ ≤ r+ . Thus, d0e (γ), which is the average
error probability reduction rate, is decreasing when γ increases from 0 to r+ . By symmetry, the
average error probability reduction rate is also decreasing when γ decreases from 0 to r− . Recall
that our objective is to select a region ΓLhs within [r− , r+ ] that has human consultation in order to
reduce the average error probability as much as possible. Therefore, ΓLhs should lie in the region
that has the maximum value of error probability reduction rate, which as stated in Theorem 7.1, is
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[−L/2, L/2].

A.11

Proof of Proposition 7.6

Since each time the human provides a consultation, there is a cost ct , our objective is to determine
whether it is worthwhile to bring in the human given an observation r. Without loss of generality,
assume r ≥ 0 where φm always determines H1 to be true. Recall the posterior probability ratio
given in (7.5) and P r(H1 |r) + P r(H0 |r) = 1, the probability of error given observation r is
P r(H0 true|r) = 1/(1 + e

2mr
2
σr

). On the other hand, φf makes the decision based on human’s side

information and the probability of error: Pe (φf |r) = 1 − β. Therefore, after bringing in the human
consultation at observation r, the expected reduction of Bayesian cost, can be written as:

db (r) = c(

1
− (1 − β)).
1 + e2mr/σr2

To ensure ct is well spent, we only ask for the human to participate when db (r) ≥ ct at observation
r. Since db (r) is a decreasing function with respect to r, it is easy to verify that the maximum
value r∗ that satisfies db (r) ≥ ct is less than 0 when ct > c(β − 1/2). As we have assumed r ≥ 0,
Γcht = ∅ in this case. When ct ≤ c(β −1/2), we should have Γcht = [0, rct ] to ensure that db (r) ≥ ct ,
where rct is calculated by setting db (r) = ct as given in Proposition 7.6. Note that db (r = r+ ) = 0,
indicating that it is not worthwhile to bring in human consultation with any positive cost. Besides,
as discussed in Lemma 7.1, we do not allow human to participate when r > r+ , where human side
information does not improve the system performance while asking for additional participation
fees.
When r ≤ 0, the optimal human consultation region is symmetric to the region when r ≥ 0,
and therefore, the result is proved.
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